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ABSTRAC T
Scientific, unmanned spacecraft on missions to Jupiter and beyond will be
subjected to nuclear radiation from the natural environment and on-board
nuclear power sources which may be harmful to subsystems. This report pos-
tulates these environments and discusses practical considerations to assure
confidence that the spacecraft's materials and subsystems will withstand the
effects of anticipated radiation. Degradation mechanisms are discussed.
| ..
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PRE FAC E
BACKGROUND AND RELATED INFORMATION
Since the early 1960's, personnel of the Goddard Space Flight Center have
been interested in deep-space missions to obtain information concerning the
planets, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune and Pluto, as well as information
concerning the interplanetary medium. Studies have been performed to ::stab-
lish the feasibility of such missions and various reports were written by
Goddard personnel I and by others 2.
For almost as long as these missions have been considered, the engineers,
scientists and managers at Goddard have realized the necessity for systems,
independent of the Sun's energy, to supply the spacecraft electric power require-
ment. In general, Goddard studies have indicated that there is a weight advantage
in using small nuclear power systems such as radioisotope fueled thermoelectric
generators instead of presently available solar cells when missions go beyond
2.5 or 3 AU 3 . Further, there are technological and practical uncertainties in
projecting use of solar arrays in a range starting beyond 3-5 AU 4 whereas the
use of small nuclear power supplies is technically and practically feasible.
However, the use of small nuclear systems, while feasible, nevertheless pre-
sents technical questions. An in-house Goddard study s identified pertinent tech-
nological areas requiring study prior to the use of these nuclear generators on
spacecraft designed for scientific deep-space missions. 6 These areas were
divided into the iollowing numbered Tasks:
IA selected list of Goddard Space Flight Center deep space reports is presented in Task ! report
X-701-69-170.
2A limited list ot deep space reports prepared by other centers and contractors is presented in
X-701-69-170.
3See X-701-69-170 for references.
4Technical uncertainties involve practical design questions arising fromthe use of very large
solar anay areas, their survival dlmugh metemid belts and their system performancewhen oper-
ating at the low temperatureand low illumination levels anticipated.
SNE_ MOONSX-730-66-117dated 1966.
6This study is referredto as NET MOONS.
]96902]297-0] ]
Reference
Task Number Task Description -- Title X Document
I Analysis of Selected Dc,ep-Space Missions X-701-69-170
IIA Subsystem Radiation Susceptibility Analysis X-701-69-171 -
for Deep-Space Missions
IIB Spacecraft Charge Build-Up Analysis X-701-69-172
HI Techniques for Achieving Magnetic X-701-69-173
Cleanliness
IV Weight Minimization Analysis X-701-69-174
V Spacecraft Analysis ar.d Design X-701-69-175
VI Spacecraft Test Documentation X-701-69-176
VHA Planar RTG-Component Feasibility Study X-701-69-177
VIIB Planar RTG-Spacecraft Feasibility Study X-701-69-178
VIII RTG Interface Specification X-701-69-179
Summary Report of NEW MOONS . X-701-69-190
A contract 7 was established for further study of these _reas. This study
was entitled --NASAEvaluation With Models Of Optimized N_uelear Spacecraft
(NEW MOONS). During the execution of the NEW MOONS Technology Study,
Goddard was assigned the task of conducting a Phase A study covering a Galactic
Jupiter Probe s. These two study efforts, Galactic Jupiter Probe and NEW MOONS,
were directed to provide the maximum practical benefit to each other. In general,
the Galactic Jupiter Probe was considered as a "base llne spacecraft and mis-
sion" or a "reference design" during the NEW MOONS Technology Study. On the
other hand, the Galactic Jupiter Probe Study. team made uN of the techsmlogy • I
and data as developed by the NEW MOONS Study in areas of missions analysis,
shielding, aerospace nuclear safety, thermal and structural analysis and other
related areas.
7NAS_-10441 RCA Asuo-Elecmmics Divisimt, Pfiacetm, N. J.
8See AdvancedNuclearSystems Sum'y,GSFC X-716-67-323dated July 1967; see P_oetispiece A.
X
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As the NEW MOONS contract was being concluded, the scope of Galactic
Jupiter Probe project was broadened ,and adopted the name Outer Planets Ex-
plorer (OPE)9. The Outer Planet Explorer is considered for a generally more
mnbitious program than the original Galactic Jupiter Probe, in that the OPE is
intended for a family of single and multiple planet m lssions.
The OPE, as presently visualized, encompasses spacecraft in the 750-950
pound c;:,ss and also in the 1100-]400 pound class whereas the GJP "reference
design-spacecraft" for the NEW MOONS Study was 500-600 pounds. This is a
significant practical difference from a flight project viewpoint; however, the
technology .and techniques of NEW MOONS are generally applicable. Specific
numeric values will be different when solutions are developed, but the techniques
and rationale indicated in the NEW MOONS reports are applicable to the general
problem of integrating `and using small nuclear power systems on a scientific
spacecraft designed for deep-space missions.
SPECIFIC RATIONALE FOR TASK HA
Nuclear radiation both naturally occurring in space ,and that resulting from
on-beard radioisotopes in the electric power supply can affect the performance
of various elements of a spacecraft. This report constd,:vs the following aspects
of the problem:
A. What is the naturally occurring radiation environment on a mission to
Jupiter and beyond? This inquires into the environment in the followin_
regions:
-- Near Earth
-- Interplanetary Space (Earth to Jupiter)
-- Near Jupiter
-- Beyond Jupiter
B. What is the mlclear environment associated with the RTG's _." _-
considers both pre-launch and post-launch per4ods.
C. What are the effects of such radiation on spacecraft materials and sub-
systems? What steps should be taken by the systems engineer and
)See OPE X-701-69-189;see F.'_tispiece B.
I
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subsystems designers to minimize the adverse effects of the postulated
radiation? This covers the nature oz physics of interaction of radiation
with matter in a preliminary fashion. Mechanisms of damage of com-
ponmts and materials are discussed. Shielding, derating and selection
techniqaes are covered and testing is indicated.
L
APPLICABILITY TO OTHER PROGRAMS
The NEW MOONS technology and techniques reported maj have applicability
or some relevancy to additional space missions that may in the future use nuclear
systems such as planetary landers and rovers as well as applications spacecraft.
gi!
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SUBSYSTEM RADIATION SUSCEPTIBILITY ANALYSIS
FOR DEEP-SPACE MISSIONS
A Report Covering Task HA Effort Under The Study
NASA Evaluation With Models Of Optimized Nuclear Spacecraft
(NEW MOONS)
SECTION I
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
A. INTRODUCTION
The preface to this report presents background information relative to this
study. In general, scientific spacecraft on missions into deep space will be ex-
posed to naturally occurring radiation and radiation from on-board nuclear
sources. This radiation may affect adversely various electronic subsystems
and materials such as electrical insulation, thermal coatings, optical devices,
and electronic elements unless suitable precautions are taken. This report dis-
cusses the problem generally.
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM -- SUBSYSTEMS RADIATION
SUSCEPTIBILITY ANALYSIS
Spacecraft subsystem performance deterioration caused by nuclear radiation
can be classified arbitrarily and rather broadly according to the subsystem !
which is affected. One category or class consists of spacecraft electronic sub-
systems which degrade as a result of damage to sensitive components, primarily
bipolar and MOS transistors, and diodes, both discrete and integrated devices, i
Component damage manifests itself in the form of electrical parameter changes.
The net effect of these parameter changes throughout a circuit, e.g., the reduction i
of transistor gain below (or the rise of junction leakages above) a certain value
may result in subsystem performance below acceptable limits or even cata-
strophic failure.
• A second class of subsystem degradation may occur in sensor subsystems.
Among the scientific objectives of the NEW MOONS mission, as described in
Task I, are the measurements of magaetic fields and particle radiation daring
the cruise phase of the mission and daring planetary e_otmter. These meamare-
ments would involve the use of ou-board magnetometers and particle detectors,
1
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The composition, pressure, and temperature of Jupiterts atmosphere may also
be measured using spacecraft-borne I1t, UV, and microwave instruments capable
of measuring the intensity of radiation. All of these instruments are operated
by electronic components, which are susceptible to the same parameter changes
as the electronic subsystems. It should be noted, however, that a degree
of degradation tolerable in general functional electronics (e.g., power regu-
lators) may not be tolerable in the carefully-calibrated linear amplifier circuits
used for photometric and other scientific measurements. Optical systems (lenses,
light-sensitive surfaces, etc.) may also degrade and hence go out of calibration.
A unique problem in this subsystem class is presented by the particle detectors.
The purpose of these devices is to measure high-energy space radiation while at
the same time tl'e spacecraft power supply (two RTGIs) * will be emitting such
radiation, thereby presenting a possible interference that must be reconciled if
accurate measurements of the environment are to be made.
The third class of radiation damage pertains to materials other than semi-
conductors. This category spans all subsystems and covers thermal-control
coatings, eonformal coatings, seals, lubricants, bearing material, wire coatings,
insulators, etc. The degradation of bulk materials, particularly of highly-stressed
materials, is an important consideration because every subsystem contains some
of them and precision in prediction of all conceivable failure modes is less
feasible than with electronic and optical materials. In addition many structural
and coating materials may be directly exposed to the full impact of the space
environment including solar UV radiation and the very-low-energy protons and
electrons which, because of their limited penetration capabilities, only affect the
properties of outer surfaces, particularly the reflectance. A typical example is
the discoloration of certain types of white paint.
C. TASK OBJECTIVES AND TECHNICAL APPROACH
The objectives of Task HA are as follows:
1. Estimate the magnitude of the combined radiation envlrome_t (SectionII)
and its effect on the performance of sensitive spacecraft subsystems
(SectionIn),
, 2. Provide system engineers and subsystem designers with information on
J critical constraints (Section I),
*In 3e_,nd, dlis report does me cover dte 8ffecus of oe-bowd R'rG'soe sctendfic dam. T88k iV
coacatules oe d_s facet of d_ i_blan, ht Task Jl& _sis is placed oo &a_is8 effects
of mdis_kmoatvmtous spececr_ eleme_s.
, !
' { F •
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3. Define a Radiation Hardening Program (Section IV), and
4. Provide a preliminary assessment of the magnitude of the programmatic
considerations to be encountered (Section V).
The approach to meeting these objectives consisted of four parts. The first
of these was to determine the anticipated types and levels of space and RTG
radiation that will arrive at the surface of the spacecraft over the prescribed
mission period. This analysis, as described in Section II of this report, was
followed by the preparation of internal dose level estimates, based on the calcu-
lated environment and radiation shielding provided by the spacecraft structure.
{"Internal" includes the internal effects even within thin coatings on the surface
of the spacecraft.)
The second part, described in Section m, consisted of assessing the magni-
tude of the radiation-hardening problem to be encountered by spacecraft design
engineers. In this connection, the various types of critical components and ma-
terials anticipated for use in the spacecraft were discussed; failure mechanisms
were examined and, based on experience and a large quantity of existing test data,
predictions were made with respect to the level of component degradation that
can reasonably be expected for the dose levels estimated in Section II, and the
resulting effects on subsystem performance.
Throughout this report, a spacecraft configuration has been postulated that
is in substantial accordance with the Galactic Jupiter Probe (GJP) which is de-
scribed in Reference 6. A photograph of an 1/18 scale model of this spacecraft
is shown in the Frontispiece. Other spacecraft configurations could be used and
the analysis techniques presented in this report would remain applicable.
The postulated spacecraft employs two RTG's, each rated at 1725 W{t) using
Pu 2as O 2 as the fuel.
In the third part, described in Section IV, radiation hardenir, g concepts were
developed in detail. The goal of radiation hardening is to achieve the condition
whereby spacecraft subsystems, when exposed to the damaging effects of irradia- _-
tion, will not experience performance degradation below acceptable levels.
There are various alternative approaches to achieve this goal. The techniques t
employed for the ideal radiation hardening program are tailored to the specific Ineeds of the spacecraft configuration and the intended mission. In the NEW
MOONS mission the seriousness of the radiation problem may vary considerably,
depending on the precise spacecraft configuration and device packaging method
chosen; on the final trajectory and mission duration; and on the actual intensity
of the Jupiter radiation belts and solar flares which future scientific investigations
3
| ........
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reveal. Thus, the treatment of damage possibilities has been extended con-
siderably beyond the "nominal" environment models used for quantitative calcu-
lations. Therefore, two programs, producing different degrees of radiation
tolerance, by somewhat different methods, were developed. These programs
incorporate sufficient flexibility to serve the needs of the spacecraft, within the
range of the missions postulated in Task I and the generally postulated space-
craft configuration. °
The final part of the Task H-A effort consisted of estimating the approximate
impact of radiation hardening on the NEW MOONS program with respect to time
and cost. Various levels of effort have been evaluated and labor estimates are
given. In addition this section also includes a development plan to take advantage
of improvements which are desirable in the state of the art in device, material
and system technology before the spacecraft is built, so that the benefits from
such improvements can be realized and potential problems eliminated.
D. SUMMARY OF TASK RESULTS
The Subsystem Radiation Susceptibility Analysis was prepared in four parts.
The work performed on each of these four parts will be described briefly and the
results and/or conclusions summarized.
1. Analysis of the Radiation Environment
Both the space and RTG radiation environments were evaluated, first sepa-
rately, then in combination. The following regions were considered: pre-launch,
near-Earth, interplanetary space (Earth to Jupiter), near-Jupiter, and interplane-
tary space (Jupiter and beyond). It was concluded that, in the near-Earth and
near-Jupiter regions the particles of concern are high-energy electrons and
protons. In interplanetary space, the only radiation likely to damage the space-
craft will be the protons ejected from the Sun in the solar wind and solar flares.
Radiation from the RTGts will consist, primarily, of fast neutrons and gamma
ray photons. Spacecraft may also by ultraviolet radiation .surfaces be affected
! from the Sun. Of the space regions considered, the near-Jupiter is the most
significant. [
The two effects caused by the energy dissipation of bombarding particles
were discussed: The first effect concerns single-crystal semiconductor com-
ponents; it occurs when a high-energy bombarding particle collides with the
nucleus of an atom, dislodging the atom from its position in the crystal lattice.
The resulting defect affects the electrical properties of the crystal. The degree
4
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of bulk displacement can be conveniently expressed as the equivalent fluence of
the 1-MeV electrons which cause the damage. The resulting unit of damage capa-
bility is called the DEN[*. The second effect occurs when a bombarding particle
interacts with the electron cloud surrounding the atom, causing the ejection of
some of the electrons surrounding the atom. The result is ionization damage,
which is due to the subsequent rearrangement of the atoms or charges and can
produce changes in the characteristics of the material. The dose from ionization
damage is usually expressed in fads+. Bulk damage has serious deleterious
effects on semiconductors, and ionization damage adversely affects all spacecraft
materials as well as "planar" semiconductor devices (these include MOS devices,
many bipolar transistors and integrated circuits).
The estimate of radiation damage due to the near-Earth environment, the
flight-path being postulated as part of the Task I effort, "Analysis of Selected
Deep-Space Missions," was based on data on the Van Aller be!t, available in
NASA documents (Ref. 2). The anticipated levels for interplanetary radiation
were also derived from published data (Refs. 3, 5). The near-Jupiter environ-
merit, was based on particle flux data included in the Galactic Jupiter Probe
Report (Ref. 6) and an assumed similarity of the Jupiter radiation belt to the
Earth's Van Allen belt. The estimate prepared for each of these three environ-
ments was summed in terms of estimated total bulk damage and total ionization
dose.
An estirnate of radiation damage stemming from the two RTG's was also
prepared for three RTG-spacecraft separation distances, calculated on the basis
of the essentially inverse-square relationship between radiation flux and distance
from the RTG. The total radiation environment external to the spacecraft was
then obtained by summing total bulk damage and ionization dose as a function of
RTG-spacecraft separation distance.
i
Internal radiation levels were estimated for exposed and protected levels
within the spacecraft. The range of difference in internal dose levels is based
on the amount of "equivalent" shielding surrounding any component, as a result
of spacecraft configuration and internal packaging.
Table 1 summarizes the worst-case damage levels from the combination of
all radiation sources. More detailed data of this kind are presented in Tables 4
and 5 in Section H.
I *Damage-EquivalentNormally-Incident1 MeVElectrons per soeem.
[ t One radis the dose resulting fromradiation incident on a material when the energy deposited in%
the material is 100ergs per gram.
5
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2. The Accommodation of Radiation Damage Effects
in Spacecraft Subsystems
Whether or not a spacecraft subsystem can survive a particular radiation
environment depends primarily on the effect of the environment on those com-
ponents whose parameters will be s'gnificantly altered at the anticipated dose
levels. Subsystem performance degradation can usually be held within tolerable
limits by providing adequate allowances in the design of the subsystems for the
anticipated component parameter changes. Such changes can usually be accom-
modated by the application of various circuit design techniques such as feedback,
for example, to maintain amplifier gain in spite of significant transistor Beta
reduction. If such measures unduly complicate a circuit design then considera-
tion can be given to other possible approaches to the problem such as the addition
of shielding to reduce the dose levels affecting the more sensitive components.
Measures of this kind form part of the subsystem design procedure called "radia-
tion hardening _' which is outlined later in this report and described in detail in
Section IV.
A difficulty arises, however, if the design cycle of already available space-
craft subsystems did not include a radiation hardening procedure. In situations
of this kind, a detailed worst-case analysis of all the circuits using radiation-
sensitive components must be made to determine the dose levels corresponding
to the threshold of just acceptable subsystem performance. If these threshold
dose levels are below those predicted by an analysis of the anticipated environ-
ment, then suitable preventive measures must be taken. If component substitu-
tions or circuit modifications to reduce sensitivity to radiation are impractical,
then the only remaining solution to the problem may be to add the shielding
needed to keep component degradation to within acceptable limits. Radiation
hardening by this "after-the-fact" method is usually much more involved and
costly than is needed if radiation hardening forms part of the normal design
procedure as recommended in the present project. Radiation testing of complete
subsystems has also been considered as a possible method for determining the
overall radiation susceptibility of particular subsystem designs. Unfortunately,
unlike vacuum or thermal testing, radiation is frequently destructive. In cases
where damage is reversible, high annealing temperatures are required. Restoring
complete subsystems to their original condition by such an annealing process does
not appear feasible at this time. Conceivably, it would be possible to irradiate a
' sufficient number of subsystems so that the behavior of similar unirradiated units
could be predicted on a statistical basis. In most instances, however, the cost of
following a test procedure of this kind would probably be prohibitive. This would
not exclude a Proof-of-Principle test or a test to destruction of a single engi-
neering test model or a breadboard of an electronic package during the design
phase of a program.
"j
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NOTES FOR TABLE 1
1. For the 5 year mission the regions considered were near-Earth; Earth to
Jupiter; near-Jupiter, and; Jupiter and beyond. However, for worst-case
presentation a 9 month pre-launch period is assumed during which time the
RTGls, fueled with PuO 2, is assumed to be located 18 inches from electronic
subsystems. This period of time is occupied with the integration of the
spacecraft and pre-launch check-out of _he spacecraft at the launch site.
2. The energy spectrum for the RTGts is given in Appendix II. The flux and
fluence are discussed in Section IID.
3. The proton and electron flux near-Earth and near-Jupiter are dependent upon
the distance from the planets. These data are given in Section I1, C, 1 for
near-Earth and Section H, C, 3 for near-Jupiter. The solar-wind as well
as the solar-flare protons flux varies inversely as the square of the distance
from the Sun, see Section H, C, 2. The solar flare flux is highly sporadic
but an average flux was used based on measurements for the period of 1956]
to 1961.
I
4. For an estimate of damage to electronic subsystems only the naturally oc-
curring electrons and protons noted were used.
5. The tabulated particle data are in terms of integrated fluence (¢ > E).
6. Exposed internal location is equivalent to a spherical shield of 100 mils of
aluminum around a component.
7. Typical internal location is equivalent to a spherical shield of 270 mils of
al.mtn.rn around a component.
!
8. Two RTG_s are used each containing 1725 watts (thermal) of PuO 2 fuel with
naturally occurring oxygen and 5 year aged.
i
9. A detailed explanation of the units DENI and RADS are found on pages 18,
and 19.
t "
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It is assumed, therefore, that the design of subsystems for the NEW MOONS
program will include a radiation hardening procedure based primarily on con-
servative predictions of the effect of the anticipated environment on individual
radiation-sensitive components obtained by careful testing of piece parts. Any
radiation tests or preconditioning of components for flight units would be done
on only a few selected types and would be carried out before assembly into elec-
tronic packages.
Based on estimates of the NEW MOONS environment, the prediction of
damage effects includes analyses of radiation susceptibility in three important
areas: (1) electronic subsystems, which degrade in performance as a result of
component damage; (2) detector subsystems which are subject to the same effects
as electronic subsystems, and are, in addition, subject to inaccurate measure-
ments if flooded by excessive local radiation emanating from the RTGts; and
(3) bulk materials, such as thermal coatings, optical windows, etc., which are
also subject to deterioration primarily from particle bombardment and conse-
quently may not adequately serve the purpose for which they were intended.
In accommodating the probable effect of the NEW MOONS environment on
spacecraft subsystems, it is necessary to consider only those components that
will be affected at the anticipated dose levels as generally indicated in Figure 1.
This Figure shows the dose level ranges that can be expected to produce signifi-
cant changes in the characteristics of various devices and materials• The data
presented in Figure 1 are based on the results of extensive tests, compiled
principally by the Lockheed Aircraft Co•, The Battelle Memorial Institute, and
RCA.* At the worst-case dose levels estimated for _he NEW MOONS environ-
ment as summarized in Table 1 the components of interest are transistors, inte-
grated circuits and germanium devices, MOS devices, diodes, and thyristors.
Each of these devices was treated first in terms of the physics of radiation-
induced failure, then in terms of sensitivity to the dose levels anticipated far the
NEW MOONS mission• The evaluation of the radiation sensitivity of these devices
is empirical to the extent that the predictions are based on past experience and
experiments made on earlier projects. (Devices in use at the time of the mission
may incur a different set of damage problems.) They will serve only as guide-
lines to indicate where performance deterioration due to radiation damage can
be clearly anticipated.
f
3. Recommended Radiation Hardening Program
I Radiation Hardening is a comprehensive program involved in every phase of
spacecraft planning and design functions. Activities of radiation specialists and
*References 27 and 28.
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design engineers will need coordination throughout an overall program such as
the development of a spacecraft to perform the NEW MOONS missions. During
the various program phases the major anticipated corresponding project and
radiation hardening activities are listed in the following adjacent columns.
I. DEFINITION PHASE
General Project Activity Radiation IIardening Activity
Mission Description Analysis of the Space Environment and
RTG Radiation Environment
Spacecraft Concept
Estimates of Dose Levels Affecting
Subsystem Performance Components
Specifications
Determination of Critical Parts and
Spacecraft Subsystems La_)ut Materials
Estimates of Spacecraft Radiation
Zones and Degradation of Parts and
Materials as Laid Out
Recommendations for Radiation Testing
II. DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT PHASE
General Project Activity Radiation Hardening Activity
Spacecraft Structural Design Refinement of Environmental and Dose
Level-Data
Subsystems Design
Map Breadboard Spacecraft to Verify
Build Subsystems Brea(R)oard Shielding Estimates
Design Reviews Radiation Testing of Critical Com-
ponents and Materials t
• Build Breadboard Radiation !
Spacecraft Analysis of Problem Areas Caused by
Device or Material Degradation
Recommendations for Shteld/_ or Alter-
hate Radiation Problem Solutions
13
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llI. HARDWARE PIIASE
General Project Activity Radiation lIardening Activity
a. Prototype
Build Prototype Subsystems Proof-of-Principle Radiation
Exposure Tests on Selected
Subsystems and Systems Subsystems
Testing
Build Prototype Spacecraft
b. Flight
Build Flight Units Life Tests on Selected Subsystems
As indicated previously, a suitable radiation hardening procedure should be
included as an essential part of the NEW MOONS program to insure the survival
of all subsystems without performance deterioration beyond accep,able limits.
Both the project definition phase and the hardware phase will involve a coopera-
tive effort between design engineers and radiation specialists. This cooperation
is an essential part of the radiation hardening procedure even during the early
part of the program because tradeoffs at this stage will probably involve such
questions, for example, as the optimum placement of subsystems on the space-
craft structure. Those subsystems particularly sensitive to radiation from the
RTG's should, other factors permitting, be placed at the maximum possible dis-
tance from these radiation sources.
Two alternative programs for radiation hardening NEW MOONS components
are described in this report. Both are predicated on the results of previous tests
and the need for supplementary radiation testing of critical components and ma-
terials. Although a large quantity of component rad/ation test data is available
as a result of extensive tests by RCA and other organizations there is a continuing
need for up-dating information on older component types and thoroughly evaluating
new ones. Differences in the effect of radiation on semiconductor devices even of
the same type are not uncommon. The reasons for this variabfl/ty are not always
: clear. VariabiLity can arise from changes in manufacttwi_ process techniques;
from some inherent difference in materials from batch to batch; or from inade-
quate control of mamzfaeturing processes with regard to reproducibility.
I
i
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The two radiation-hardening programs under consideration represent
different approaches to the same end, each v:ith its particular advantages and
disadvantages. The first of these programs, based on "worst-case prediction"
data, appears to have the advantage of economy in both program time and co_* if
the damage hazard is not. after analysis, found to be too serious. For this type
of test prograra, small statistical samples of each device are irradiated and sub-
sequently m-'asured for change in electrical performanee. These measurements
form the basis for predicting the "worst-case level" of radiation degradation ex-
pected for a particular device from a specific manufacturer. The design engineer
then applies the prediction data to his circuit and determines what meusures may
be taken to avoid failure. If the deviate degrades within tolerable limits, no major
circuit changes is needed. If the device is not within tolerable limits, he has
array of alternatives• e.g., choose another device (and test it). redesign his circuit
to accept reduced performance, find a more protected spacecraft location for the
circuit, provide additional shielding, or seek other possible alternatives.
The second radiation hardening program under consideration is based on the
promising experimental results from recent RC A tests of a radi,_tion precondi-
tioning procedure. The object of this procedure is to determine in advance with
high accuracy the anticipated effect of space radiation on particularly critical
transistors. Test samples in this case would be 100 percent of the quantity needed
for a particular device plus a percentage of extras. The subsystem design engi-
neer would submit performance criteria to the radiation evaluation project in
terms of allowable degradation. The total batch would then be irradiated and
subsequently measured to determine percent of degradation. All those devices
that were found to be within tolerance would be baked; the baking procedure pro-
duces an annealing effect which serves to restore the device to near its original
(pre-irradl_tion) performance level. For any subsequent irradiation (to the same
dose level used for testing), the component is expected to degrade to approximately
the same level measured after the initial irradiation. By way of this irradiate-
measure-anneal cycle then, the designer is supplied with space-qualified devices,
suitable for spacecraft integration, whose performance is within tolerance and
whose subsequent degradation during flight is known. This screenln S process
not only makes possible much greater uniformity of radiation resistance in semi-
" conductor devices used but also, most significantly, obviates the possibility of
inadvertently incorpor_Zing a "mavericl_' into a critical circuit. A device is
called a "maverick" if its parameter changes _re greatly in excess of the amount
• that would normally be expected on a statistical basis from radiation testing a
batch of devices of the same type. While the incidence of "mavericks" is ex-
ceedingly infrequent, their occasiorml occurrence represents a small but definite
possibility of a catastrophic failure even at relatively low dose levels. For very
long spacecraft missions in particular, it is extremely important to avoid the
possibility of incorporating such anomalously sensitive devices in critical circuits.
15
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Although the "worst-case prediction,' program incorporates, by comparison,
a small test effort, it still retains an element of reliability risk in that the design
engineer receives 9nly statistical estimates of worst -case degradation which in-
volve inherent uncertainties. In addition, since he must design for worst-case
performance he may have to penalize his system unduly to anticipate such
changes. This can lead to redundancy (added weight and added power drain) or
consideration of a possible reduction in subsystem performar__e requirements.
Obviously. such a design change in one circuit can often affect all subsequent
circuits in the electronic chain and lead, in the end, to a much larger and longer
design or redesign effort.
The recommended choice of radiation hardening programs will be strongly
influenced by the final estimate of the somewhat uncertain space hazard and the
final spacecraft RTG configuration, since dose levels will depend on the place-
ment of the RTG's on the spacecraft structure. It is also reasonable to consider
a combination of the two proposed programs, where worst-case testing would be
suitable for devices in less critical circuits or, where due to location, dose levels
would be low. In the opposite instance, however, in unprotected locations or
where dose levels may be high, preselection seems to be the best approach to
ascertain that subsystem performance will not degrade below tolerable levels
due to radiation damage of components.
4. impact of Radiation Effects on the NEW MOONS Program
(Time and Cost)
Radiation-hardening, as a design parameter has, inevitably, some time and
cost implications. A well-planned radiation analysis effort need not add greatly
to the time required to bring a 3pacecra_ from concept to hunch phase, since
the work involved can be "dovetailed" with the routine design process. However,
the services of "radiation effects" specialists grounded to some degree in radia-
tion physics, test procedures, and design engineering are required. Total "radi-
ation effects" effort involved could vary from 5 to 15 man-years, depending on
(1) severity of "internal" environment, (2) number of types of component involved,
(3) degree of reliability requir&i in design and (4) duration of project activities.
!|
!
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SECTION II
ANALYSIS OF THE RADIATION ENVIRONMENT
A. GENERAL
The flight path of the NEW MOONS spacecraft, for the purposes of this dis-
cussion, is based on data taken from the Task I report. Over a five year period,
the spacecraft is expected to follow a trajectory essentially in the plane of the
ecliptic from a near-Earth parking orbit to a near-encounter with Jupiter and
i then continuing on well beyond Jupiter. The distance from the center of Jupiter
to the spacecraft at its closest point to the planet is taken as 8.4 Jupiter radii (Rj).
From a 200 mi (nautical) parking orbit near the Earth the elapsed time to reach
Jupiter at about 5 AU will take about 549.5 days. The remaining part of the five
year mission period will take the spacecraft to nearly 16 AU.
A substantial part of the radiation dose accumulated by spacecraft components
during the mission is expected to come from exposure to relatively intense radia-
tion durin_ passage through the Earth's Van Allen belt and the presumed equiva-
lent belt st rounding Jupiter even though the exposure times will be relatively
short, about one hour near the Earth, and about 15 hours near Jupiter.* In inter-
planetary space, although the radiation intensity in this region is much lower than
it is in the belts, the long exposure time will allow a significant build up in dose
levels. Radiation from the RTG's will, of course, contribute continuously to the
dose received by the spacecraft.
Radiation from the RTG's consists primarily of fast neutrons and gamma
rays. In contrast, the source of space radiation encountered during the 5-year
mission consists mainly of high-energy electrons and protons. In addition, bom-
barding electrons, interacting with the material of the spacecraft, will also gen-
erate X-rays of the same general nature as the gamma rays from the RTG's.
Intensity of radiation in the near-Earth region reaches a maximum at about
1500 mi. (nautical) above the equator because of the high-energy electrons and
• protons trapped in the Earth's magnetic field. In the region between the planets, i
!
the only radiation likely to affect the spacecraft will be the protons ejected from
the Sun in the solar wind and solar flares. In addition, ultraviolet radiation from
. the Sun can affect the outer surfaces of the spacecraft. Present evidence suggests
that a radiation belt of the same general characteristics as that of the Earth's
Van Allen belt, but of considerably greater intensity, exists within the presumed
strong magnetic field surrounding Jupiter.
*See Appendix I for variations of fluence with variations in radius of closest approach.
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Estin_ting the combined effect of subsystem exposure to the space and RTG
radiation environments is a complex procedure. It is first necessary to de_er-
mine the anticipated types and levels of space and RTG radiation that will arrive
at t.le surface of the spacecraft over the prescribed mission period. This deter-
mination is then followed by the preparation of internal dose level estimates,
based on the calculated external environment and the radiation shielding provided
by the spacecraft structure and the protection provided a particular device by
surrounding components and enclosures. Estimates of the impact of these dose
levels on individual devices and circuits form the basis for determining the
overall effect on subsystem performance and the measures that must be taken,
such as added shielding, to prevent performance deterioration beyond acceptable
limits.
The approach used to arrive at a final estimate of the internal radiation
environment and its effect is outlined briefly in Section HI. The remainder of
this section, then, describes each step of the analysis in detail, providing esti-
mated results and conclusions.
B. TECHNICAL APPROACH
1. General
In predicting the combined effect of various types of radiation on materials,
particularly semiconductors, it is necessary to distinguish between two types of
radiation damage, bulk damage and ionization damage.
a. Bulk Damage. Bulk damage i_ the effect produced by particle bombard-
ment described as the displacement of atoms from the crystal lattice of a semi-
conductor as a consequence of collisions. The resulting defects affect the elec-
trical properties of the crystal; in the range of interest, the principal effect is
normally a reduction in the lifetime of the minority carriers.
The bulk-damage-producing capability of bombarding particles is strongly
dependent on their energy, charge, and mass. Electrons in t_ ,- 8-MeV range,
for example, produce about 15 times more damage in silicon than 1-MeV elec-
trons. 1-MeV neutrons produce more damage than 1-MeV electrons. To facili-
tate comparisons of bulk-damage-producing capabilities, a method was evolved
by Bell Telephone Laboratories (BTL) and RCA for converting a mixed-particle
energy spectrum into units which express the damage this spectrum could cause
(Ref. 19).
The degree of bulk displacement can be conveniently expressed as the
equivalent fluence of 1-MeV electrons which cause the damage. The resulting
_.. 18
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unit of damage capability was cal!ed the "DENI" for "Damage-Equivalent Normally-
Incident 1-MeY Electrons/_m 2." Several investigators (Refs. 1 and 2) have deter-
mined efficiency factors experimentally for different energy ranges which, when
multiplied by the particle population in that energy range, give the damage-pro-
ducing potential in DE NI' s.
• These damage efficiency factors depend strongly on the nature of the bom-
barding particles, their energy, and the type of semiconductor device subjected
to bombardment _]so of importance is the injection level at which the device is
to operate as _ _.: as _he type of doping impurity and its concentration in the sili-
con. However, so long ,tz these factors are remembered,* a similar bulk-damage-
summing procedure for mixed fluxes of particles is practical for the purpose of
making a worst-case engineering estimate of device degradation during a mission.
Some definitive RCA work in this field is given in Reference 1.
b. Ionization Damage. Ionization damage is the effect produced in a material
by the passage of high-energy particles or photons which eject some of the elec-
trons bound to atoms. Subsequent rearrangement of the atoms or charges may
produce changes in the characteristics of the material. This is the type of
[ damage which most affects all common spacecraft materials (e.g., plastics,
I optics) and is a primary cause of degradation in "planar" semiconductor devices.
Ionization damage will, for example, turn glass brown throughout its thickness,
whereas, in the case of bipolar transistors, only the surface of the transistor
chip is sensitive. This circumstance has lead to the description of ionization
damage, as it pertains to transistors, as "surface damage."
*Limitations to the Use of Bulk Damage Efficiency Factors
The term, "Bulk DamageEfficiency Factors," as used in this footnote concerns the conver-
sion from"Equivalent 1 MeVElectt_ms/cm 2 (DENI)" to "Bulk Damage Units -Neutrons/cm _
(E > 10 KeV)".
The fluence of I-MeVelectrons which producea given amonat ot damage in a solar cell is
about l0 s times higher than the fluence of reactorneutrons required to do the same damage (ReL 1); _
on the other hand, with bipolar transistors, the factor is about 102. The reason for this is the dif- iference in "injection level" in the two situations. In earlier explanatory sections (see e.g., 1
Fig. IB) the latter factor, 102, is taken as a workingratio to deal with the nmmal silicon junction ]
devices used internally in the spacecraft (e.g., transistors, $CR's, diodes, integrated circuits,
.i etc.) in which the electrical degradationis controlled by the degradation of minority-carrlerlife-
!_ time and the injection levels are high.
i . The case of the gos device is different; here, the only important effects of neutrons on the
silicon is to reduce majority-carrier conduction (Ref. 14); the ratio of damage efflcieacies foraen-
trons and electrons will be different again here, althoughthe ratio of damage efficieacies of the
two particle types is still in the region of 102 (see, for example, H. Stein and R. Ge=eth,J. Appl.
Phys. 39 (6), 28701968). Note also, however, that in most commonradiation situations, and with
state-of-the-art MOSdevices, it is not the bulk damage effect, producedby neutrons, which dotal-
antes the electrical change_, in *hedevice. Long before this effect is significant, the ionization
effect has producedvery extensive changes in the device.
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In a similar manner as that described for bulk damage, the ionization-
damage-producing capability of a mixed radiation environment can be summed
and expressed in "rads". By definition, 100 ergs of ionization energy deposited
in a gram of material constitutes a dose of one rad. The amount of energy ab-
sorbed per gram of material per particle or photon depends on the energy and
type of the incident radiation. For electrons, this variation in absorbed energy
vs. particle energy in the range from 0 to 8 MeV is relatively small. For the
protons in the range from 0 to 1000 MeV, however, it may be several orders of
magnitude. Thus, it will be seen that calculation of the ionizing dose will, as for
the bulk damage calculations, be complicated by the need for using energy-de-
pendence factors for electrons, protons, neutrons, and gamma photons.
The advantage of using the "DENI" and "rads" system in estimating the
radiation dose affecting a subsystem is that contributions from various sources
can be converted into the same units and added arithmetically.
2. Procedure for Estimating Total Radiation Dose
from the Space Environment
: To estimate the combined effect of the various types of space radiation on
I particular spacecraft subsystems, four different kinds of information are needed:
(1) The number and directionality of the particles which the spacecraft will
encounter during the mission, classified according to their energy con-
tent for each of the radiation regions (near-Earth, Interplanetary-Earth
to Jupiter, near-Jupiter, and Interplanetary-Jupiter and Beyond).
{2) The relationship between the energy content of the particles and their
damage-producing capability.
(3) The relationship between the energy content of the particles and their
ability to.penetrate materials, such as alumintun, used in the construc-
tion of the spacecraft.
(4) The radiation shielding provided by adjacent devices and enclosures
t
surrounding individualcomponents.!
: The relationship between the damage-producing capability of the incoming
i particles and the shielding effect of theintervenlng materials and structures o
protecting sensitive components, is then expressed as a "damage profile" for
i each of the two types of damage, bulk and ionization.
3. Procedure for Estimatin_ Total Radiation Dose from Two RTGts
Major differences in the nature and source of the radiation from the RTG's
_ compared with space radiation, dictate a somewhat different approach to the
2O
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evaluation of damage effects from this source. The fast neutrons and gamma
rays emanating from the RTGts are highly penetrating compared with most of
tl_e electron and proton popu!ation in space. Protecting sensitive components
from RTG radiation by providing sufficient shielding could impose a severe
weight penalty on the spacecraft. However, the essentially inverse-square re-
lationship between radiation flux and distance from the RTG can be used to deter-
mine radiation levels at various distances from the RTG and a safe distance for
the placement of sensitive components can then be determined. By using isoflux
maps, which indicate the contours of equal radiation flux in the region surrounding
an RTG, the relationship between dose level and distance may again be plotted in
terms of rads and DENI's.
NOTE: Radiation effects on spacecraft subsystems can be reduced by
shielding techniques and by separation techniques and combinations of these.
The weight considerations associated with reducing the radiation background at
the scientific experiments is covered in Task IV.
4. Calculation of Internal Environment
In estimating the radiation dose affecting a particular component, the con-
tributions from various sources expressed in compatible damage units can be
added arithmetically. Dose-vs.-distance curves will provide the information
necessary to estimate the dose from the RTG's, assuming that no special
shielding is added to attenuate neutron and gamma flux.
In estimating the dose contribution from space radiation, the necessary data
are taken from damage profiles, which show how the anticipated dose from the
space environment affecting a component will vary as a function of the thickness
of a hypothetical uniform spherical shell of alumInum surrounding the component.
The data from the damage profiles are then applied to a Sector Analysis* of the
spacecraft structure, which is, in effect, a technique for calculating the amount
of shielding surrounding any component, based on the spacecraft configuration
and packaging. The values of equivalent shield thicknesses for various particle
paths through the spacecraft are determined, and through the use of the damage
. profiles, the net level of internal radiation to which a component will be exposed
can be estimated. In addition to analytical techniques for determining spacecraft
shielding, exposure of a breadboard radiation spacecraft to a mlitable radiation
• source with appropriate detectors at various locations within the spacecraft, a
more precise estimate of the thickness of an idealized aluminum shield can be
obtained. An idea of the large variety of radiation exposure conditions produced
within the structure of a spacecraft is shown in Figure 2.
eDiscussed in Sections lIE _d IVBof dtis report.
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The final summing of the combined dose levels from space and RTG radia-
tion, in the two categories of ionization and bulk damage is then achieved by
adding the damage values for space radiation to that for B.TG radiation for vari-
ous distances of the RTG from the spacecraft structure. The procedure described
above is shown in block diagram form in Figure 3.
C. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF EXTERNAL RADIATION FLUX
FROM SPACE ENVIRONMENTt
In estimating the anticipated radiation dose from the space environment that
will affect sensitive, components within the spacecraft, the result of exposure to
each of the different radiation regions has been evaluated. Damage vs. shield-
thickness profiles for the combined effect of the various types and energies of
space radiation particle were then plotted.
In general, a review of Table 1, Summary of Worst-Case Estimates of
Radiation Damage Levels for a 5 Year NEW MOONS Mission indicates the rela-
tive orders of magnitude of radiation dose attributable to various regions of the
mission. Assuming that the total "mission dose" for components in a typical and
exposed spacecraf_ location is 100%, then, for ionization damage the percent dis-
tribution among the various regions, including the RTG contribution in the region,
could be thought of in the following terms:
... Dose, Percent ..
Region
Typical Location Exposed Location
1 Integration and Pre-Launch 11 2
2 Near-Earth Neg. Neg.
3 Earth to Jupiter 25 4
4 Near-Jupiter 10 86
5 Jupiter and Beyond 54 8
0, N
While this is not a complete presentation, it does serve to illustrate the relative
area of concern. Each of these areas is discussed in the following sections:
1. _tegration and Pre-Launch
_. Radiation to the spacecraft during the integration and pre-launeh period is
due to the RTG eavironment and not space environment but it is noted here be-
t References ate sivea at _te poiots in the text to the principal sources ft_n _hich the
basic space enviromnentdata .weretskeQ. See References 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8.
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cause it represents the first region, ground, of exposure of the spacecraft to a
radiation field. Ground testing can add greatly to the radiation dose level de-
pending on the exposure period and the proximity of the RTG's to sensitive space-
__ tf
craft components. A "worst-caoe estimate has been made based on a 9 month
exl_osure and an 18 inch RTG-spacecraft separation distance. The magnitude of
the dose level accumulated under these conditions is given in Table 1. A thorough
. discussion of RTG produced radiation is given in Section IID, "Radiation Dose
from RTG's. Although the ground region is of concern, this Report deals pri-
marily with the flight portion of the mission and subsequent discussions do not
include the integration and pre-launch dose level.
2. The Near-Earth Region
The electrons and protons trapped in the Earth's magneLic field occur
principally in a region referred to as the Van Allen belt. This is a region of
intense high-energy-particle radiation that surrounds Earth outside the atmos-
phere. Trapped electrons have energies from a few hundred electron volts to
over 8 MeV, protons from a few kilovolts to over 1000 MeV• However, the popu-
lation of both particle types is concentrated toward the low energy region.
Passage through the Earth's Van Allen belt will subject the spacecraft to
relatively intense radiation for a short period of time. Information needed to
esUmate the magnitude of the effect includes the trajectory through the belt and
the variation of radiation intensity with altitude. Curve A in Figure 4 shows the
variation in spacecraft altitude above Earth from the time it leaves a parking
orbit* at 100 nautical miles until it is well beyond the most intense region of the
radiation belt. The altitude curve is based on a computer run, prepared for
Task I, determining the flight path during the initial phase of the trip to Jupiter.
Figure 5 is a typical map showing the distribution of electron flux with
energies > 0.5 MeV in the Van Allen belt, averaged over a 24-hour period•
I Estimates of the particle flux affecting the spacecraft during this part of the
journey are based on data available in NASA publications. One of these publica-
tions lists the anticipated electron and proton environment in late 1968 and these
data were used unchanged (Ref. 2). The error in using the same data for launch
dates in 1974 is not expected to exceed a factor of two since the particle popula-
• tion in the Van Allen belt is apparently reaching a relatively stable level after
being greatly disturbed by the '_tarflsh" explosions in 1962. This situation could
be drastically altered if nuclear experiments in space are resumed, t
Curve B in Figure 4 _:.ows the variation in electron flux with time correo
sponding to the altitude variation of Curve A. The area under Curve B is, there-
*Since the pm_icle flux at the pattdn8 orbit altitude is only s small fraction of the flux at altitudes
above about 300 mi (nauticsd), the dDse contribution fromexposme to radiaticmin the pinking
orbit can be neslected.
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fore. a measure of. the total flux of electrons having energies above 0.5 MeY that
strike the surface of the spacecraft during passage through the Van Allen belt.
" The result of graphical integration is an electro_ fluence of 3.8 x 101° e/cm 2 of
energy greater than 0.5 MeY. In obtaining Curve B from the NASA data, it was
assumed that the flight path would not be inclined more than about 20 degrees
from Earth's geomagnetic equator. It was also assumed that the variation in
flux with longitude could be ignored without causing serious errors. Since the
NASA tables are based on 24-hour averages, using the data for shorter exposures
will be somewhat in error, particularly at low altitudes.
Curve C in Figure 4 showing the variation in proton flux with time, was ob-
tained in the same manner as Curve B. A graphical determination of the area
under Curve C gives a proton fluence of 2.8 x 107 p/cm 2 of energy greater than
15 MeY.
The procedure, illustrated by Figure 4, was repeated a number of times,
each time using a differeLt "value for the minimum particle energy and different
from those forming the basis for the curves in Figure 4. The results of such
calculations are summarized in Table 2, Column A. Data of this kind, combined
with similar data from e_cposure to radiation over other segments of the flight
path, form the basis for ca tculations of the anticipated total radiation damage or
dose levels fro: n exposure to the combination of the space and RTG environments.
3. Interplanetary Space (Earth to Jupiter)
a. Solar Flares. The solar disturbances called flares, occasionally eject
into space short but extremely intense clouds of high-energy protons. The major
p;-oton flares oc_ ..r at highly irregular time intervals "_dthere are rarely more
than fi, e pe: y_r. Predictions of the frequency and intensity of these bursts are
based largely on the history of such events and are, therefore, subject to con-
siderable error. Observations of these phevomena since the early 1800's indicate
that solar disturbances of tlds kind follow an ll-year cycle of increasing and de-
creasing intensity. A launch date in 1974 would coincide approximately with a
minimum in solar activity. To'determine the approximate average effect of this
radiation, an estimate was prepared of the possible total integrated solar proton
flux on "_hefollowing basis: It was a_sumed that the solar proton flux in the re-
gion neaz the Earth but outside its magnetic field would be constant and e_ml to
the average measured over the period f_om 1956 to 1961. This average, deter-
mined from data included in reports by Dr. W. Webber (Ref. 3) is shown in
Table 3. v.twas also ass_ned that this flux will vary inversely as the square of
the distance from the Sun.
The technique used previously in estimating the total flux from trapped pro-
tons and electrons was al_ found useful in calculating the total integrated fll,y.
|
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Table 2
Summary of Estimates of Particle Fluence
From Space Environment -- 5 Year Mission*
A B C D
• Trapped Interplanetary Trapped
Energy Particles Spacer Particles TotalParticles
_eV) Near-Earth (_b > E) Near-Jupiter§ (_b > E)
(¢ > E) _ (_ > E)
...... i
Electrons 0.001 2.7 x 1011 Not 6.91 × 1013 6.94 x 1013
per sq. cm. 0.5 0.38 Applicable 1.02 1.02!
1 0.092 0.306 0.307
2 0.011 0.0613 0.0614
3 0.0026 0.0143 0.0143
4 0.00078 0.00368 i 0.00369
5 0.00024 0.000956 0.000958
6 0.000075 0.000253 i 0.000254 ]
7 0.0000251 0.000068 11 0.000068 tr
Protons Solar W'md Not Not
per sq. _m. 0.001 to 0.050 Applicable _2.9 x 1015 Applicable _2.9 x 10 Is
..... Solar Flare ......
>0.1 9.7 x 101° -- 44.2 x 10J2 44.3 × 101!2
0.4 4.0 -- 23.0 23.0
1.0 0.12 0.093 x 1012 6.7 i 6.79
4.0 0.050 0.0099 0.050 0.0604
10 0.0080 0.00248 0.00118 0.00374 i
I
15 0.0028 _ 0.00136 0.00027 1 0.00163
30 0.00068• 0.00050 IP 0.000015 _r 0.00052 !I
* For a more detailed breakdown see Table 1.
t A large uncertainty exists as to the flux and enerb,y content of the solar wind protons. It is
thought that the peak is in the region of I to 50 keV. At this energy level no semi-conductor de- |
• vice would be adversely effected, since this energy component would be absorbed in the first Ifew microns of the spacecraft exterior surface. The effects on Thermal Coatings are described
in Section Ill. The proton fluence from solar flares is taken as the average over the period 19?_6-
1961 inclusive.
Fluence, ¢, are given above specific vnergy values, E.
§ See text for discussion on the uncertainties of the Jupiter radiauon belt.
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Table ,3
Six-Year Total -- Solar Flare Protons in the Region Near the Earth
(From Data by W. R. Webber)
E (_ZeV) ¢ > E
protons per sq. cm.
1 1.5 x 1012
4 0.16 •
10 0.04
: 15 0.022
30 0.008
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from solar tlare protons. Trajectory information taken from the Task I report 
(Ref. 4) provided the basis for Curve A on Figure 6. snowing how distance of the 
spacecraft from the Sun varies with. time in days from launch. Curve B shows 
the :"\: :;'!.~ltj.ng variation in proton flux of energy above 1 ~leV as a function of time. 
Based on ~t ~rea underneath Curve B. from the beginning of. the interplanetary 
porti.",'n of the mission to Jupiter encounter, the integrated flu..~ at the end of 
this perivif will be 8.0 x 10 10 protons per square em. 
b. Solc.tr Wind!- Particle-measuring devices c.)n such satellites as IMP-l 
have shown that a relatively constant stream of low~· ~nel"gJ protons is contin.uously 
emitted from the Sun. A recent article by N. F. Ness (Ref. 5) describes the gen-
eral .:-har:::cteristics of this type of space radiation. The average flux in the re-
gion near the Earth but outside the influence of its magnetic field is in the 
neighborhood of 2.5 x lOS particlesl cm2 -sec. The average energy of these 
particles is approximately! ke V with a maximum of the or-der of 50 ke V. 
In this energy range, protons will only penetrate a few microns of the outer 
surface and will, therefore, have no effect on such components as transistors and 
diodes. However, thermal-control coatings applied to the skin of the spacecraft 
may be appreciably affected by prolonged exposure to the solal' wind. The same 
would apply to any solar-c011 or sensor cover glasses (Ref. 29). 
The integrated flux from the solar wind at the spacecraft surface can be 
estimated in the same manner used previously in evaluating the effect of solar-
flare protons. This estimate is again based on an assumed invel'se-sq\\are 
relationship between rroton flux and distance from the Sun. Integrating the a\\X 
over the Earth to Jupiter part of the mission period gives an average total dose 
of 2.5 x 10 15 protons per square cm. with energies between 0.1 to 50 keV. A 
dose of this magnitude will substantially alter the reflectance propert;.es of cer-
tain types of paints. This subject is treated in greater detail in Section III of 
this report including an evaluation of enhanced damage from the effect of ultra-
viole\. radiation. 
4. The Near-Jupiter R~gion 
:Particlcs trapped in the Jovian magnetic field will only affeot the spacecraft 
during the relatively short flyby maneuvel'. However, present estimates (Ref. 6) 
of the number of trapped particles indicate that the dose accumulated during only 
a few hours will be one of the dominant elements in the radiation environment 
and sufficient to cause significant damage effects in sensitive components. The 
radiation dose from this source will, of course, be strongly dependmt on the 
spacecraft trajectory in the near-Jupiter region. The trajectory used in the 
calculations, as shown in Figure 7, was taken from the Task I report. Curve A 
in Figure 8 derived from Figure 7 indicates the time variation in altitude of the 
spacecraft expressed in terms of the dist~oe from the CfJnter of Jupiter in 
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Figure8, Voriotionwith Timeof AltitudeendProtonFlux in the Near-JupiterRegion
Jupiter radii. It is assumed that the trajectory is symmetrical about the vertical
axis at t = o. The effect of trajectories th_ bring the spacecraft closer to
the surface of Jupiter will be considered later in this section and in Appendix II.
The information in the Phase A report (Ref. 6, Figures 5-3 and 5-4) relating
the near-Jupiter particle flux to the altitude above Jupiter formed the principal
basis for calculations of estimated dose levels resulting from the Jupiter flyby
maneuver. These data, however, are limited to the electron flux in the range
from 5 to 100 MeV and the proton flux in the range from O.1 to 4 MeV. Since, in
the Earth's Van Allen belt the electron flux extends to the region below 5 MeV
as far as 40 keV and the proton flux e_tends above 4 MeV to at least 1000 MeV,
it was assumed that electrons and protons in these energy ranges would also be
trapped in the radiation belt that presumably surrounds Jupiter. The particle
. flux data from the Phase A report was therefore extrapolated to include electrons
in the energy range below 5 MeV and protons in the energy range above 4 MeV.
It was also assumed that the energy distribution of the particles in these energy
ranges would be similar to that in the Van AHen belt.
In addition it was assumed that
(1) The angle of inelination of the trajectory with the Jovian geomagnetic
equatorial plane is sufficiently small so that Van Allen belt data taken
for a zero angle of inclination (equatorial orbit) will be applicable, and
(2) Longitudinal and temporal variations of the Jovian particle flux can be
neglected.
33
i .
1969021297-056
a. Calculation of the Trapped Proton Environment. The two curves of
Figure 9 aUow a comparison of the ass:mind variation in proton flux as a func-
tion of distance from the center of Jupitel- _,-ith the equivalent data fo_ Earth.
I I I" • I i
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Figure9. Comparisonof JupiterandEarthProtonFlux Above0.1 MeV
Proton flux models AP1 through AP5 prepared by Dr. Vette (Ref. 2) and co- Q
" authors formed the basis for the curve designated "Earth." This curve shows
i_ the total flux above 0.I MeV while the curve marked "Jupiter" shows only the
flux between E = 0.1 to 4 MeV. However, if the assumption regarding the siml-
_'." larity of the energy spectra is correct, the curve for total flux above 0.1 MeV
•"" for Jupiter will not be significantly different from the one sho_m, since the flux
_" of E > 4 MeV is such a small fraction of the i.
-_,_-
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It will be seen that the trajectory as sho_ in Figures 7 and 8, will bring the
spacecraft into the region of maximum proton flux, as shou_a in Figure 9. Expo-
sure to proton bombardment will be confined largely to the region traversed from
a distance of about 12 Jupiter radii to the mil..mum distance at 8.4 radii and again
to the outer part of the belt at 12 radii. The relationship in Figure 9 of proton
flux of E > 0.1 MeV to Jupiter radii was used to construct Curve B L_ Figure 8,
• sho_ng the variation with time of the proton flux affecting the spacecraft. The
area underneath Curve B is, therefore, a measure of the total integrated proton
' flux of E > 0.1 MeV encountered during the Jupiter flyby. Converting the hours
to seconds, integrating graphically, and multiplying by two (because of symmetry
around the vertical axis at t = 0) results in a total of 4.42 x 1013 protons per
square cm of E > 0.1 MeV.
The energy distribution of the proton flux in the Van Allen belt near its peak
at about three Earth radii, as shown in Figure 9 was taken as the model for the
energy distribution in the region traversed during the Jupiter flyby also near its
proton flux peak. Other assumptions could be made but the assumption that the
proton energy distribution remains constant in this region probably provides a
substantial margin of safety since in the Van Allen belt the proton spectrum be-
comes markedly softer beyond the peak at three Earth radii. However, the total
proton population decreases more slowly with altitude in the Van Allen belt than
the data (Ref. 6) indicates is the case for Jupiter, according to the curves shown
in Figure 9. This condition, however, was also recognized as noted in Refer-
ence 6. Column C of Table 2 shows the resulting estimate of the total integrated
proton flux and its energy distribution, based on the model just discussed.
b. Calculation of the Trapped Electron Environment. The technique just
described was also used as the basis for an estimate of the total integrated elec-
tron flux and its energy distribution. Figure 10 shows the electron flux variation
with altitude in the near-Earth and near-Jupiter radiation belts. Dr. Vette's re-
ports (Ref. 2) provide the data for the Van Allen belt; the equivalent data for
Jupiter were taken from the NASA Galactic Jupiter Probe Report (Ref. 6). Of
particular interest is the '_¢alley" in the curves, which is not in evidence in the
proton curves of Figure 9. i
The various factors that cause the '_alley" in the Van Allen belt could be i
altogether different in the belt surrounding Jupiter. If, indeed, the electron con- T• tours proceeded smoothly upwards with decreasing altitude, then the flueneesaccumulated near the point of nearest approach would be larger by a factor of 2
to 3. The valley in Earth's belt arises because electron trspplng on certain
magnetic shells is inefficient and particles are "dumped" from these shells,
probably into the polar atmosphere.
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Figure10. Comparisonof JupiterandEarthElectronFlux Above5 MeV
The estimated total integrated electron flux of E > 5 MeV to be encountered
by the spacecraft was determined by the same graphical integTatton method de- J
scribed previously. On the basis of the area under Curve B of Figure II, the !
total flux is 9.56 x 10 e electrons per square cm (E > 5 MeV). The energy dis-
trilmtlon of electrons at the second peak in Earthts Van Allen belt served as the
model for the equivalent energy distrilmtton in the region around the second peak
of the Jupiter belt from about 8 to 11 Jupiter radii, as shown in Figure 10. Col-
umn C of Table 2 shows the resulting estimate of the total integrated electron
flux above given values of minimum particle energy.
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Figure 11. Variation with Time of Altitude and Electron Flux in the Near-Jupiter Region
The highly speculative nature of the assumptions regarding the presumed
radiation belt around Jupiter should again be emphasized. Data of this kind taken
I from the Phase A Report represents a compromise in the estimates prepared by
a number of different investigators. These estimates are based primarily on
observations of radio emission _rom the near-Jupiter region. The motion of
high-energy electrons trapped in a magnetic field around Jupiter can presumably
account for the observed radio signals. The intensity of the radio signals and
their frequency spectrum provide a basis for estimating the strength of the mag-
netic field around Jupiter and the trapped electron population. Estimates of
trapped protons are even more speculative since there is no direct evidence of
their presence in the near-Jupiter region. An assumed similarity of the radiation
belt around Jupiter to the Van Allen belt provides the only available basis for
estimating the near-Jupiter proton flux and its energy distribution.
As m_y be expected, published estimates of the near-Jupiter electron and
proton flux vary over several orders of magnitude. The estimates from the
Phase A report are apparently above the average but less than the _um and,
therefore, appear to be reasonably conservative. The remote possibility that the
actual particle flux values may be above the estimates by perlmps an order of
magnitude should not be overlooked. The problem of providing an adequate factor
of safety in this respect will be treated later in the text.
A substantial increase in the radiation dose affectl_ spacecraf_ eompone_
would also result if the trajectory were altered to bring the spacecraft closer toi
i
I
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the surface of Jupiter. Figures 9 &nd 10 show that as the spacecraft approaches
closer to Jupiter than 8.4 R both the electron _md proton fltux encountered fall
substartially below the peak wdues at around 9 R,. The electron fhLx, however,
(Figure 10) reaches a valley at about 6 Rj and then rises to a much higher peak
at 3 I{j.
These variations are of particular import_mce since the following discussion
shows that the electron flux will probably be the principal source of radiation
damage from the Jupiter flyby maneuver. The increase in the veloe y of the
spacecraft in trajectories (:loser to Jupiter _'ill tend to reduce the dose rate in
the region of minimum distance to Jupiter. tiowever, the total exposure time
_411 increase, ,and therefore the total dose from exposure in the Jupiter radiation
belt will also increase. Preliminary estimates indicate that if the minimum dis-
tance from Jupiter were decreased from 8.4 R) to 5 Rj the radiation dose levels
would increase by a factor of about 3 and if the dist&nce were reduced to 3 R theJ
factor would be about 10. The probability of such increases will also need con-
sideration in determining what factor of safety should be applied to the environ-
mental data to take care of any contingencies.*
5. Interplanetary Space -- Jupiter and Beyond
The assumptions and techniques used for estimating the solar fare fluenee
and the solar wind fluefice described in paragraph 3 of this Sectiov, Interplane-
tary Space -- Earth to Jupiter, is equally appropriate for estimating the flucnce
for Jupiter and Beyond. Integrating the area under Curve B of Figure 6 from
Jupiter encounter to the end of the 5 year mission gives an integrated flux, above
1 MeV, of 1.3 x 10 l0 protons per square cm. The addition of this value, 1.3 x
101° protons per square cm., to that accumulated during the Earth to Jupiter
portion of the mission, 8.0 x 10 l° protons per square cm., gives the accumulated
, fluence 9•3 x 101° protons per square cm. for the 5 year mission from inter-
planetary space• Column B of Table 2 shows the energy distribution of these
protons ,_ssuming that variations of the distribution with dietance from the Sun
are negligible.
The solar wind fluence for the Jupiter and Beyond portion of the missl.,n is
0.4 x 10 ss protons per square cm. and is a total of 2.9 x 10 ss protons per miuare _,
cm. for the 5 year mission as shown in Column B of Table 2. The damage effects
to the outer surfaces of the spacecraft due to solar wind is treated in Section HI.
i 6. Radiation Damap Profile, from Space Environment
The relationship between damage-producing cspabilt_r ot the incoming parti-
cles and the shielding effect of intervesflng materials and structures protecting
*Also see AppendixI ccmcentins n_liad_enviroemen¢of the Jupiterflyby fo¢various, _ur-Jupiter
trajecu_cies.
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sensitive components c_m be shox_ graphically in a particularly useful form
called the "Damage Profile." Th_ method for preparing such profiles f_'om the
environmental data of the type sho_ in Table 2 is described in detail in the TOS
Radiation Program Heport (Ref. 7), date( September 1965. Two profiles are
needed t_) indicate the separate ionization-d,'mmge ,'rod bulk-damage effects.
I hese profiles show the dose level dependence on the amount of shielding sur-
rounding a component in terms of the convenient concept of a component at the
center ,: a uniform spherical shell of aluminum, exposed to a specified on, '-
directiomd particle enviromnent. Figures 12 and 13 show the damage profiles
derived from the information provided by Table 2. Curves are plotted in these
!
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figures to indicate the contributions to the total dose from various sources. The
overall curves represent the combined effect of exposure in all regions of the
fli._ht path over a 5-year mission and indicate how a uniform distribution of
packaging material will reduce the space radiaUon effects incurred on the mis- g
sion. To these, of course, must be added the level o_ damage incurred from the
i RTG sources, dependent upon their location. This will be a sensitive function of
distance but will be almost unaffected by the spacecraft structure* and hence
l _'ol_ld act simply as a '_edestal" for these curves. "I
i
*The gamma raysand neutrons from the RTG will interact with spacecraft materials andproduce
secondary emissions Insoneral, these have not been considered in this study because of their
relatively insignificant contributionto totalince_zeddose.
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In addition to the types of particle radiation described thus far, it will be
noted that in Figure 12, there is a curve for bremsstrahlung (brake radiation).
::lectrons (but not protons), when slowed dox_ in any way, emit some of their
energs" as X-Ray type electromagnetic radiation. In the artificial electron belt,
the bremsstrahlung includes photons in the range of energies characteristic of
gamma rays, which x_411penetrate 300 rails of aluminum with only a 10-percent
loss of intensity. The intensity of bremsstrahlung generated is proportional to
the atomic weight of the target material. It is fortunate, therefore, that aluminum
and magnesium, which are the main structural materials, are moderately ineffi-
cient in generating gamma rays.
The principal source of possible damage to the exterior spacecraft surfaces
is their bombardment by the extremely large number of low energy particles,
including solar flare and solar wind protons, trapped protons and trapped elec-
trons. Table 2 provides an estimate of the total number of these particles but
their energy distribution in the range from 10-3 to 10 -1 MeV is poorly defined
for lack of accurate data on the interplanetary medium. For this reason it is
difficult to make estimates of the dose profile in the external parts of the space-
craft (e.g., within the front surfaces of lenses, active regions of thermal coatings,
solar-cell cover glasses, etc.). However, rough calculations of the energy flux
values indicate that matetials directly exposed to the space environment incur
very high energy deposition levels at the surface. For example, solar-wind pro-
tons will be stopped within a few micrometers of the surface (order of 10-4 cm).
A solar-wind flux as shown in TP.ble 2, of 2.9 x 10 Is p/cm2/5 years, with an
average energy of the order of 10 a eV, is thus an energy flux of 2.9 x 1018 eV/cm2/5 years. This is equivalent to 4 x 106 erg/cm2/5 years and given the above
stopping distance, is equivalent to a total deposition of 4 x 1010 erg/cm3/5 years
in a thin skin. In material of density = 1 gm/sq.cm, this corresponds to a total
dose of 4 × 10 s rads in 5 years, i
In a similar manner, electrons in the energy range below about 0.5 MeV will
deposit most of their energy in the first few thousanths of an inch of the space-
craft surface. However, the available data from energy distribution measure-
ments of these particles is insufficient to define the detailed shape of the dose-
vs-depth profiles in the region near to and including the outer skin of the space-
craft. The development of measurement techniques for this purpose and their
implementation on a suitable spacecraft system is recommended. The possible
contribution to such surface damage effects from ultraviolet radiation also needs
• further evaluation (Ref. 26).
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D. RADIATION DOSE FROM RTG's
_s statedearher inthissection,the dose from RTG's isdifferentinnature
from thatof space radiation,necessitatinga somewha_ differentapproachto the
evaluationof damage effectsfrom thissource. The fastneutronsand gamma rays
emanatingfrom the RTG's are highlypenetratingcompared with most of theelec-
tron and protonpopulationin space. Protectingsensitivecomponents from RTG
radiatienby additionalshieldinginvolvesa weightpenaltythatcan be justlfied
onlyunder particularlycompelling circumstances. However, the essentially
inverse-squarerelationshipbetween radiationfluxand distancefrom theRTG's
can be used to advantageinthe placingof particularlysensitivecomponents.
Estimatesofthe anticipatedneutron and gamma fluxthatthe RTG's _ill
generateare based on theassumption thatPuO 2 willbe used as the fuel.*The
characteristicsofthisfuelfrom theradi_!.,-viewpoiutare discussedindetail
in Appendix If.Two possiblemethods fo_ .:_-rporating_herue'.elements intoa
complete RTG unitare under consideration(1)a planar assembly thatresembles
a fiatdisk mad (2)a cylindricalassembly.
Details of the planar generator design are discussed in Task VIIA report
and the cylindrical design is discussed by J. Epstein, D. W. Harris, and W. S.
West, in the document "Advanced Nuclear Systems Study," Goddard Space Flight
Center, Greenbelt, Maryland, Doc. No. X-7!6-67-323.
The radiation patterns presented here are for the planar RTG's. For RTG's
of the same power in a c3 lindrical configuration, the neutron contours are essen-
tially the same. Different types of fuel would, in all probability, produce different
[ radiation patterns.
!
In Appendix H the physical, chemical, and nuclear properties of IhtO 2 are
presented on the basis of the latest available experimental and theoretical data.
A discussion of the relative biological hazards of PuO2 microspheres and PuO 2
: cermets fuel form is also given. In addition, an evaluation is made of the feasi-
bility of Oxygen-18 depletion from PuO 2 and the associated reduction in neutron
emission rates. However, for this report, in estimating radiation damage effects
from the RTG's, the calculations were based on neutron emission rates associated
with naturally occurring oxygen.
The RTG gamma and neutron radiation fields are presented ffrsphically h
the form of isoflux contour maps. A separate map was constructed for each oi
*SP7031 .Pmpenie'sof Selected Radioisotopes by Dile Harrisand Joseph Epsteh, presents a se-
lection of annotated references to technical pspets, Journalarticles, andbooks covering radio-
activity of Pu _mdselected otherradioisowpes of interest.
] "
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the three selected RTG electrical power levels, i.e., 50 watt(e), 75 watt(e), and
100 watt(e). The effect of 0-18 depletion is discussed in conjunction ",with the iso-
flux data. A description of the nuclear fuel data and the method of analysis is
also included.
Conclusions and recommendations with respect to PuO 2 cermets, Oxygen-18
depletion, and the accuracy of the RTG radiation field analysis are also presented.
The isoflux maps of Figures 14 and 15 were taken from Appendix H for a
1725 watt (thermal) planar RTG, using 5-year-aged PuO 2 fuel with naturally oc-
curring o:_ygen. The isoflux maps indicate contours of equal radiation flux in the
region immediately surrounding a single RTG. These maps are similar to those
for a 1520 watt thermal cylindrical RTG, included in the Phase A Report (Ref. 6)
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i but are the result of more up-to-date information. The Phase A maps were
based on emission spectra data for aged, 5-year-old Pu238 0 2 fuel with naturally
occurring 0 2 configured for a cylindrical RTG, with a begimflag of life (BOL)
thermal output of about 1520 watts. These calculations, aided by the QAD corn-
; puter program, included build-up factors for the gamma flux.
In revisIng the Phase A maps, use was made of newer information from
Mound Laboratory provided by data sheets dated July 1, 196T and November 9,
1967. These newer reports Indicate lower gamma fluxes throughout the energy
spectrum. To test the validity of such data, liittman Associates, Inc., calcu]Jlted
the expected fluxes from a SNAP-19 and compared the results with measurements
made by the Martin Nuclear Division (Ref. 33). Excellent agreement was obtained
if ]zdld-up factors were .ot included in the calculations. Dropping the build-up
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factors can be justified on the theory that the gamma-ray mean-free-paths are
much greater than the thicknesses of RTG construction materials, mad, therefore,
the build-up factors related to scattering effects are of negligible proportions.
Without the build-up factors used previously, the gamma flux estimates based
on the newer data are about 25 percent of the original values. This difference is
• attributed to the two points just discussed:
(1) Use of build-up factors will increase the calculated gamma flux levels
by factors in the range from 2.7 to 3.0.
(2) The recent re-estimates of the gmnma flux account for the remaining
differences between the revised and the earlier flux maps.
The revised neutron flux estimates, on the other hand, are nearly the same
as those used in the Phase A Report (Ref. 6).
In applying the above radiation flux data to the calculation of dose levels
from continuous e_posure to the RTG's, the following assumptions were made:
(1) Since both neutrons and gamma rays are highly penetrating, the attenu-
ating effect of intervening _tructure and packaging, in the path of the
radiation reaching a component, will be neglected, since these will
probably reduce fluxes by no more than a few percent.
(2) The ionizing dose in rads affecting components exposed to neutrons mad
gamma rays is dependent on the energy spectrum of the radiation source.
The conversion factors used to calculate the ionizing dose from the
RTGts are
Neutrons to fads 3 x l0 s n cm -2 tad -z
Gamma photons to fads 2.2 × I09 photon cm -2 tad -z
• (3) The effectiveness of a particular kind of radiation in producing atomic
i displacements in the crystal lattice of a semiconductor (bulk damage)
. is generally based on the results of expos/ng representative samples
under conditions simulating the anticipated actual environment. The
i results of recent experiments of this kind (Ref. 1) were used as the basis
for estimating the bulk-damage effect from RTG neutrons in transistors.
An average multiplying factor of 100 was used in converting neutron
fluence to the dose in DENPs. Although bulk-damage effects can also
be produced by gamma photons, these effects are so small in comparison
45
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with those produced by neutrons in the present case that they can be
neglected.
(4) The neutron and gamma photon output from the RTGts is assumed con-
stant over the period used as _he basis for calculating the ionization and
bulk-damage dose levels. This time inte_-al is taken as the five-year
mission period.
(5) The combined flux from the two RTG_s is assumed to be twice that from
a single RTG. If the distances from a particular component to the two,
RTG's is not the same, then the use of the shorter distance in calculating
the dose can be taken as a worst-case condition.
Figure 16 shows the relationship between dose levels and distance from two
planar 1725 watt (thermal) RTGYs, based on the preceding assumptions. Curve A
indicates the dose in rads from the combined effect of both neutrons and gamma
photons. The major part of this effect comes from the photons since neutrons
have a relatively limited ionizing capability. Curve B gives the bulk-damage
dose in DENI's. This results almost exclusively from neutron bombardment.
These calculati_,_s are ;.ased on the assumption that the fuel elements in the
RTG's are arranged in a planar configuration. Gamma rays originating in the
central elements of the fuel assembly will therefore be attenuated to some extent
by the surrounding fuel elements. As a consequence, the gamma isoflux contours
(see Figure 15) have a minimum value in the plane of the fuel elements.
If, as proposed in the Phase A study (Ref. 6), the RTG fuel is arranged in a
cylindrical form, the orientation of the RTG axis with respect to spacecraft com-
ponents may result in somewhat higher dose levels for this configuration than
was estimated for the planar type units. At the same distances from the two
different types of RTG's, the gamma flux may be higher by a factor of as much
as 25 percent. The neutron flux levels from the two types, on the other hand,
will be essentially the same since the isoflux contours in both cases are nearl_
circular.
o
! For a subsystem in ._n "exposed" internal location, a 25-percent increase in
i gamma flux from the RTG's will increase the total ionization dose by about
10 percent at a dL=.tance of 18 inches from the RTGts, about 4 percent at a dis- w
tance of 36 inches, and about one percent at 78 inches. Transistor gain will be
affected to a s ew at greater extent than is the case with the planar RTG, but
the differences will be small and can be acco_ in the design with no
_ difficulty.
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" E. COMBINATION OF SPACE AND RTG RADIATION
t
t The major object of the evaluation of particle fluxes and their variation with
I shielding and distance from RTG sources, given in the preceding sections, has
beem to evolve a data format in which, for az_y component type and location, an
estimate of the combined effects of the RTG and space radiation can rapidly he
obtained, using a uniform set of ground rules. It is then possible to combine the
environments for any location L t, as shown in Figure 17 for a_ semiconductor
component.
47
0
1969021297-071
E' TIMATEO[CALCULATE
E×TRN'LSPACEI ATTENUATION I ,NTERNA"I
RADIATIONJ FROM | SPACE /
.p, STRUCTURAL I_ I RADIATION
TABLE I OR 2 SHIELDING _ | DAMAGE J _.
AT X (BULK) ADD t + 3
LOCATION L_ _ ..... -_ I TOTAL
X BULKDAMAGE
\ ! z (DENI'S)INTERNAL
\=,1 SPACE
RADIATION
FIGURES | DAMAGE
12 AND 13 [(IONIZATION)
ESTIMATED i
RTG! CALCULATE I 3
RADIATION i DISTANCE t RTG
TABLE I _-" ATTENUATIONF ACTORS _" DAMAGE
EXISTING (BULK)
AT \ ADD 2  4
LOCATION L I \ TOTAL
SURFACEIONIZATION
\ , EFFECT
RTG TABLE I
FIGURE 16 DAMAGE(IONIZATION)
Figure 17. Block Diagram of Analytic Stepsto Estimate Internal Environment
In estimating the radiation dose affecting a particular component, the contrt-
: Imtlons from the various sources are reduced to compatible units of damage or
effect, and added arithmetically. The location of the component on the spa(eel aft
will he of primary importance in determining the dose from the RTG's and from
space radiation. The dose-vs.-distance graphs in Figure 16 provide the :_for-
marion necessary to estimate the dose from the RTG's, assuming that no special
shielding is added to attenuate the neutron and gamma photon flux.
In estimating the dose contribution from space radiation, the necessary data
are taken from the damage profiles shown in Figures 12 and 13. As ind/catedl
: previously, these profiles show how the anticipated dose from the space environ-
ment affecting a component will vary as a ftmcflon of the thickness of a uniform !
: spherical shell of alumimtm surrotmdlag the component.
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The procedure for using the damage profiles to estimate the dose levels
affecting sensitive components within a complex and irregularly shaped space-
craft system is called "Sector Analysis." This procedure, described in detail
in Reference 7, involves the judicious subdivision of the solid angle surrounding
a component location into a number of relatively small sectors, over each of
which the total thickness of protecting walls .and enclosures cmn be taken as
uniform.
Such an analysis requires an accurate knowledge of the spacecraft geometry
" and physical characteristics. Data are required for the location of sensitive
components, the thickness of intervening walls, -rod tb kinds of materials used.
The choice of the number of sectors and the solid angle included in each is gen-
erally a matter of judgment. Frequently the major part of the radiation flux
reaching a particular component enters through a relatively small solid angle.
By dividing this solid angle into five or six zones, the spectrum of the flux pene-
trating each zone can be determined with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
Past experience, from analysis of such satellite systems as TIROS M by this
method, indicates that, with conventional component packaging for space, using
aluminum boxes, the shielding provided by the enclosures and satellite structure
surrounding a typical component in a moderately well-protected location "average
location" will be the equivalent of about 270 mils of aluminum. The use of 100-
150 mils would bc more conservative in estima*"ug damage• That is, the doses
reaching the component will be the same as if it were in the center of an alumi-
num shell 270 re'Is thick (see Figure 2). Similarly, the equivalent thickness of
the shielding mass surrounding a component in a location with only minimum
protection ("most exposed location") such as a spot Just within the outer skin of
the spacecraft, will be only about 170 mils of aluminum. How_':er, if, as in
Mariner and Ranger, the spacecraft has no overall enclosing "skin" and com-
ponent boxes are, instead, slung on an open frame, then the effective equivalent
shielding thickness is likely to be lower than this. A nominal IO0 mils has been
taken as the equivalent shielding for the "most exposed location" of internal
electronic and mechanical parts on the NEW MOONS spacecraft, i
!
IIn estimating the dose levels at specific locations within the spacecraft by
the analytical method, it may be difficult to determine with adequate precision, ]
how much shielding is provided by the surrounding spacecraft structure including I
• other components of Irregular size and shape. Under such conditions, the error I
Introduced in dose level estimates will depend to a large extent on the shape of i
the. damnge-proflle curves. For a '_lat" curve the error may be insignificant, j
but if tl_ slope is very steep then even small error_ in estimating spproxlmstely I
the shield thickness or angle subtended by a given shieldL-_ element at the l_mt
of interest will cause large el" _rs in the corresponding dose level estimates.
4_
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Because of the steep eneigy spectrum model used for the space environment,
the ionization d,_mage profile for the NEW MOONS mission, as shown in Figure 12,
has a fairly steep slope. It thus follows that dose level estimates based on the
conventional Sector Analysis technique have a correspondingly large possibility
of error. If particularly critical internal components are involved, then the ex-
perimental determination of shield thickness by laboratory techniques may be in
order. Such techniques have been used, for example, in determining the protec-
tion against radiation provided by the Apollo command module using a 3,-ray
source (Ref. 34). If added _hielding is needed to avoid serious component degra-
dation, then the more precise dose level information, acquired by such "dose
mapping" methods, _ill serve to minimize the weight penalty involved in their
procedure.
The values of equivalent shield thicknesses of 270 and 100 mils of aluminum
formed the typical or "average" and exposed or "worst-case" space radiation con-
ditions to be ,.ntered into Figures 12 and 13. The contribution of radiation from
the ;wo RTG's to the total dose was also calculated for three different distances:
18, 36, and 78 inches as indicated in Figure 16. The 18-inch separation is taken
as the minimum distance to a component, c- responding to an assumed worst-case
condition with respect to radiation from the RTG's. The 36-inch separation repre-
sents an intermediate or average distance from the RTG's to a component, and the
78-inch separation is the distance involved in the spacecraft design described in
Task V.
Table 4 provides a summary of these dose calculations for both ionization
and bulk d_mage effects. Dose levels are given for various combina_'ons of dis-
tance from the RTG's and shielding from space radiation. The shielding equiva-
lent of a 100 mil thick spherical aluminum she]i is taken as a worst-case condi-
tion corresponding to a location on the spacecraft with minimum protection from *
space radi,o,tion. The 270 rail shield thickness corresponds to a more protected
location in the interior region of any of the spgcecrait subsystems. Table 5 indi-
, cates the contributions to the total dose from the various sources under worst-
case conditions with respect to distance from the RTGls (18 inches) and shielding
against space radiation (the equivalent of I00 mils of aluminum). The dominant
_, contribution to the total dose under these conditions comes from the electrons
presumably trapped in a radiation belt surrounding Jupiter, as indicated by the
asterisked items in Table 5. However, it should be noted that the contributionsfrom other sources are significant and if farther analysis should change the en-
vironmental models, one of these might conceivably become the dominant source
of predicted radiation damage effects instead of the trapped electrons.
The dose from the RTGts, for example, may become much larger ff the pre-
launch integration and check out procedure takes a substantial period of time and
if the RTG's are in close proximity to sensitive spacecraft components during
50
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Table 4
Combined 5-Year Dose Levels For Internal Locations
Typical Exposed
Internal Location* Internal Location T
Radiation
Source Ionization Bulk Damage Ionization Bulk Damage
Damage Damage
Rads /_ DENI's Z_ Rads _ DENI'sz_
Space 0.074 0.002 3.23 0.020
RTG's at 18" 0.42 1.02 0.42 1.02
TOTAL 0.494 1.022 3.65 1.04
Space 0.074 0.002 3.23 0.020
RTG's at 36" 0.105 0.253 0.105 0.253
TOTAL 0.179 0.255 3.33 0.273
Space 0.074 0.002 3.23 0.020
RTG's at 78" 0.023 0.055 0.023 0.055
TOTAL 0.097 0.057 3.25 0.075
*Typical Intemal Location = 270 mils equivalent all-aroundA1 shield.
t Exposed Internal Location = 100mils equivalent all-aroundA1 shielding.
//_-- Multiply each nttmber by 10 4
/_ -- MuItiply each number by 10
!
14
i
NOTE: This table assumes: (1) No ground operations with RTG.
(2) Typical NEW MOONS mission and spacecraft.
t
(3) Typical electronic components
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Table 5
Estimated Worst-Case 5-Year Dose Levels
From Space and RTG Radiation
Type of Estimated Dose With
Damage Radiation Source Particle T:_pc 100 Mils Aluminum
Effect Equivalent Shielding
Ionization RTG at 18 inches gammas
0.42 × 104 fadsplus !
neutrons
Earth and Jupiter f protons 0.0_I × 104 rads
Radiation Belts _ electrons* 3.2 × 104 rads
Solar Flares protons/ (alphas) 0.024 × 10 4 rads
...... b ............
[TOTAL IONIZATION DOSE 3.65 X 10 4 rads " !
I
I
[ Bulk RTG at 18 inches gamma nil
neutron* 1.00 x 1014 DENUs
r
Earth and Jupiter i protons 0.00038 × 10 TM DENIts
Radiation Belts [ electrons 0.0127 x 1014 DENI0s
Solar Flares protons/ (alphas) 0.0033 x 1012 DENI's
• ! TOTAL BULK DAMAGE 1.04 x 1614 DENI'S I
*PredomiaamSourceof Dose or Damage.
¢
i, I
i NOTES: (1) DENI calculated for p-type silicon, as in typical NPN transistors.t
Value differs for n-type silicon.
(2) Neutron spectrum assumed to be fission type.
(3) Ground operations before launch not included. See Table 1 for
effects of ground operations.
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this time. Table 1 shows the contributions so the total dose from a 9 month pre-
launch exposure period but is not included in Tables 4 and 5 because only the
flight portion of the mission is considered here.
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SECTION m
THE PREDICTION OF DAMAGE EFFECTS IN SPACECRAFT SUBSYSTEMS
A. GENERAL
The prediction of damage effects in spacecraft subsystems depends primarily
on the results of exposing representative components to simulated space radi-
ation. In this manner, expected worst-case changes in component parameters
can be related to estimated dose levels, and the subsequent net effect on sub-
system performance predicted. However, a component is as sensitive as its
subsystem application dictates. If large changes in performance can be tolerated,
the component is, by definition, less sensitive, and the subsystem is '"nard" in
this respect. If large parameter changes cannot be tolerated, a hardened sub-
system can be achieved by such methods as selecting components which, while
perhaps less efficient than the component of first choice, are relatively resistant
to irradiation; operating devices in a mode which minimizes damage effects; and
by placing particularly sensitive components as far as practical from the RTG's
and in "sheltered" or shielded locations within the spacecraft. In extreme cases,
limited supplementary shielding may sometimes also be justified, but, normally,
only as a '%and-aid" (i.e., small, local shield to close a small aperture).
Measures such as these can raise the radiation hardness of a subsystem several
orders of magnitude.
• T
At the dose levels anticipated for the NEW MOONS mission, only a few types
of electronic component will be appreciably degraded, so long as they are en-
closed In normal electronic chassis and covers. If this condition is met, the
degradation problem is limited to a number of low-frequency transistor types,
r a small, but statistically important proportion of high-frequency transistors
i including possibly a "maverick" or two, integrated circuits, some phototran-
sistors and other optoelectronic devices, some ultra-sensitive types of MOS
device, some diodes, those SCR's which are equivalent to wide-base transistors,
and certain optical materials which may be employed within the vehicle. As
• shown In Figure 1 (Section I), resistors, capacitors, non-optical vacuum tubes,
etc., are well outside the range of important degradation. The probable extent
of the anticipated degradation of the more sensitive components in electronic
• subsystems has been estimated on the basis of a considerable body of available
test data and experience. Detector subsystems, being in a unique class are
considered separately in Section HI C although the effects on the electronics of
these subsystems will be the same as for the broad class of electronic sub-
systems. Materials problems are considered last, to the extent that current
knowledge and experience in this area permits. In this category fall the surface
55
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coating materials which are exposed to the full vigor of the space environment
and are, in some cases, very sensitive to radiation.
In the paragraphs that follow, an attempt has been made to explain the physics
of component f821ure and under what conditions failure can be expected. It is the
objective of this section to outline the nature and scope of the component and sub-
system problems which must be faced at the circuit and layout design stage to
obviate the possibility of subsystem deterioration beyond acceptable limits during
the very long mission. The circuit and layout designs must, of course, become
more specific before close estimates of subsystem lifetimes and failure modes
can be made.
B. ELECTRONIC SUBSYSTEMS
1. Bipolar Transistors and Integrated Circuits
a. Physics of Radiation Damage: In a complex, long-life spacecraft
containiug many solid-state circuits, degradation of transistors will be the most
widespread and serious problem of the designer. The damage takes the form of
degradation of gain, fl, and increase in junction leakage currents (IcBo, etc.). A
convenient way of expressing the damage done is in terms of increase in recip-
rocal of gain 1//_. Loss of gain is attributable to two very different effects: the
first effect is to permanent semi-conductor lattice damage in the base region;
this effect is frequently overshadowed in silicon planar transistors by the second
effect, a surface-linked loss of gain, which sometimes starts at a space radiation '"
flux level fifty times lower than that at which bulk damage becomes effective and
hence at a much earlier time during a space mission (Ref. 8). This surface-
linked loss of gain al_pears related to the leakage-current effect (Ref. 9). This
damage to gain is more long-lived than the leakage effect but is likewise affected
by the biasing levels and the on-off duty cycle of the transistor. Unfortunately,
the degree of the surface type of damage is not easily predictable, and depends
upon the details of the surface processing used. Each manufacturer uses a
significantly different process and may even vary the processing within his plant
and vary it from year to year. One regularity noted is that it is most effective
at low operating current levels. A certain transistor, operated with a collector
current of 10 milliamperes may not experience any appreciable loss of gain,
while the same transistor, operated at 10 microamperes, may have fallen well
below the tolerable level of gain. This current dependence corresponds well
with a damage mechanism which involves the upper surface of the silicon wafer.
Figure 18 shows a typical gain degradation curve for a set of planar transistors
exposed to ionizing radiation from a Cobalt-60 source.*
*See paragraph2 of dis Section for a brief discussion on similarity of Co-60 and space radiation,
also see Reference 19. Bulk damage effects such as producedby neutrons fromthe RTG's are
expected to be negligible at the anticipated fluence level.
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• Figure 18. Gain Degradation in 2N2102 Transistors Exposed to GammaRadiation from
Cobalt-60 (!c = 10 mA; 100%Duty Cycle) (Ref. 19)
Figure 19 shows the variability of surface damage and its insensibility to
initial _ among transistors of the same electrical type. The collector-base
leakage current (Icso) can also be of serious proportions. For example, in some
transistors, in the NEW MOONS mission conditions, the IcBo value could increase
by over a thousand times if bias were continually applied to the transistor for the
entire mission period. Moreover, reasonable amounts of shielding would not
necessarily completely eliminate this leakage problem since the background of
I
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Figure19. DmageFactorvs Beta(Ref.12)
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gamma rays or "bremsstrahlung" produced by the space radiation could still
produce increases in I CBo,
l__.__T_r.ans_ist_o_r"Degradation rand its Impact on -Circuit Design
(I) Degree of Damage
As has been noted in the prcccding scction, the assessment of the
impact of transistor damage in a mkxed radiation environment such
as that of NEW MOONS requires many different calculations. Over
the range of situations encountered in such a spacecraft, the impact
of radiation can vary from negligible to very serious, depending on
device location, on device geometry and processing and on circuit
.application. Added to this, the surface effect in one batch of devices
can vary by two orders of magnitude. Thus, the situation must al-
ways be analyzed in detail by means of an engineering analysis of
up-to-date radiation test data and process details for all transistors
of interest. Some techniques for making this analysis were developed
by RCA over the past five years on several programs and now, form
part of the normal design procedure in effect at RCA AED. In
transistors, the principal changes in parameters caused by radiation
damage as described above, are (1) decrease in forward current gain
(beta), and (2) increase in leakage current (Icso).
Extensive research efforts at RCA and a number of other laboratories
(Refs. 10 and 11) have brought about a clearer understanding of the
damage mechanisms involved and a method for distinguishing between
i the two kinds of damage effects. In studying the effect of radiation on
transistor forward current gain, it was found convenient to introduce
a parameter called the 'rDamage Factor" defined by the equation
1 1 1
where
|
,l flo is the initial value of beta, and
/3 is the _lue of beta after exposure to a specified dose level
It was found that the combined effect of bulk and ionization damage
on transistor gain could be described by the equation
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,__1 (Total) = _' __I (Bulk)• ,'_ __1(Surface)
": _B • "S
A_ mentioned, changes in gain and leakage due to ionization in
tr_msistors are not yet predictable by means of an analytical re-
lationship as are bulk damage effects. Conceivably, continuing
research on this problem may eventually provide such D relation-
ship, but in the meantime, the result of exposing representative
samples of selected transistor types to ionizing radiation seems to
offer the only sound basis for predicting anticipated changes in
transistor gain. An extensive series of such tests formed a major
part of an investigation to determine whether sensitive components
in the TIROS Operational Satellite (TOS) would survive the mission
,_thout causing out-of-tolerance performance. A radiation source
ideally suited to the purpose is a Cobalt-60 gamma ray facility
since, in the dose range of interest, this radiation prodaces pre-
dominantly ionization damage; bulk damage is also produced but in
insignificant amounts.
The above tests are then suitably analyzed so as to supply the circuit
design engineers with worst-case degradation data on all approved
transistor types in a form well-suited for this purpose.
(2) Alternative Design Philosophies
The design engineer can then use these data in several ways. In the
case of a new design, the radiation-hardening philosophy, at its
simplest, would be for the designer to choose only those devices for
his circuits for which he could accommodate the given degradation
i without a loss in efficiency of his circuit design (this may involve theselection both of a particular manufacturer and electrical type
number). In fact, most spacecraft circuitry is adapted from existing
: designs and in this case only a few available electrical types of
device may fit the requirements electrically. The worst case of
• radiation-induced degradation in these may be. too great to he ac-
commedated suitably by means of circuit design. In this case, some
positive hardening measure must be adopted. One such is special
. "pre-selecUon," within a given electrical type of device, for special
resistance of the device to radiation. This approach is described in
detail later. It has great advantages over the second possible
measure, namely, relocation of the device to a more protected
location or, least advisable, addition of slabs of dead-weight shielding.
Depending on the denmmis made on the equipment, the problems due
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to radiation may be very _4despread, or may narrow do_;_ to a few
problem areas with clear solutions available. One conclusion can
quickly be dra_ from the above: in the design of a spacecraft, the
evaluation of a given detailed electrical and mechanical design for
radiation effects must be made early and thoroughly. This is be-
cause, while the changes required may be radical or may be insig-
nifie_mt, only thorough evaluation and testing of all transistor devices
of interest to the designers, inclu ling testing of a number of alterna-
tive types, will give the designer an opportunity to produce elect,'ical
and mech,_.ical designs which take account of the wide variety of t
possible device degradation values _ithout impairing the overall
efficiency of the design.
(3) Some Examples of the Impact of Device Degradation on D( sign
Both bulk and ionization damage effects can induce beta loss in the
same transistor type, bulk damage generally predominating in
transistors with a low-frequency gain-bandwidth product (fT) and
ionization damage in high frequency transistors. The effect of
ionization damage is also strongly dependent on the magnitude of
transistor collector current, becoming much more severe at lower
values of I c, particularly at values below 100 microamperes.
Only a few transistors, serving specialized functions, such as power
handling, will ha_e low values of fT. Most of the modern switching
and amplifying types will have values of fT above, say 15 MHz. Above
this level the predominant damage would be from the ionization effect.
The degree of bulk damage will, of course_ rise sharply as the de-
vices are moved closer to the RTG units. Thus, clearly, power-
handling subsystems should be located away from these sources of
bulk damage and also a suitable amount of packaging placed around
them to cut down the bulk-damaging component of the space
environment.
To illustrate these effects, the estimates of transistor beta loss, in
terms of the NEW MOONS mission, listed in Table 6 were prepared
for two different types of transistor. The first, a type 2N1486
silicon NPN power transistor has a nominal gain bandwidth product
(fT) of 1.25 Mtlz. Because of this relatively low value of fT, most
of the beta loss will come from bulk damage effects. The second, a
type 2N2222A device, is a silicon NPN transistor with a gain-
bandwidth product of about 400 MHz. Beta loss, due almost entirely
to ionization damage effects, was calculated for several different
values of collector current.
6O
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".:'able 6
Typical Transistor Degradation Data - 5-Year .Mission
r-_ ..... -=! ---=V ..... ---_........ :=!.... : " ......... [--:-_ -
' I ; Typical Internal I Exposed Internal
Distance . ! Location* ' Location*I
Transistor From I¢ Initial .......... i -_
Type RTG (mA) Beta Final I cso Final Ica°
(inches) Beta Change Beta . Change
(_A) (gA)
...................................... _ .... _ ........... _ ................
2N1486 18 300 35 11.0 0.4 10.5 1.5
60 12.7 12.0
100 13.9 13.1
36 300 35 21.9 20.0
60 29.6 26.2
100 36.9 | 31.7
78 300 35 29.3 1 25.9
60 45.0 37.5
100 64.5 50.0
2N2222A 18 0.1 30 26 0.04 18 0.15
60 45 27
120 73 34
18 1.0 50 44 24
100 78 39
150 106 58
18 10 70 64 27
• 140 118 48
' 220 177 80
Ic = Transistor Beta = Forward Ics o = Collector-Base Leakage
Collector Current CmTent with Emitter Open
Current Gain
*Typical latemal Locmioa = 270 mils Equivalent all-mound AISldeldias
Exposed Internal Locmioe = 100 mils Equivalmt all-ramrodAINdeldins
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A t)l)ical problem facing the circuit designer is to accommodate _m
•mticipated beta loss without compromising the design in other
respects. For example, severe beta loss such as that sho_ by the
2N]486 at 18 inches from the RTG's would probably require special
treatment. One solution to this problem is to fiBd a substitute
tr:msistor type having a higher fT" Another possibility is to relocate
the assembly incorporating the 2N1486. Doubling the dist.'mce from
the RTG's would increase the final beta from 11 to 21.9 for an
original beta of 35 _md from 12.7 to 29.6 for _m original beta o( 6C.
If, in spite of such measures, beta loss is still larger than can be
tolerated in a given circuit, then the use of two trr_sistors in cas-
cade would probably maintain adequate gain. The penalty would, of
course, be the increased power requirements for the additional
transistor.
It is seen above that the only way to determine the impact of a
radiation environment of the NEW MOONS type is to test and
thoroughly analyze the devices such as transistors known to be
basically sensitive to radiation, followed by an analysis of how
radiation-induced parameter changes in devices will be reflected
in circuit and system degradatiol.
c. General Results from Transistor Radiation Tests. Radiation tests of
electronic components conducted by RCA over the preceding four year period,
primarily as part of Tiros Operational Satellite (TOS) program, have provided
extensive test data on a wide variety of transistor types. Since the radiation
levels estimated for the TOS and NEW MOONS missions are the same order o£
magnitude, some general observations derived from these tests are of use in
evaluating the impact of radiation on the design of transistor circuits for NEW
MOONS subsystems.
(I) The damage factor, A I/Ps, as a fimction of dose is essentially
independent of the initial beta indicating, as expected, that this
factor provides a suitable normalization for initial gain value. The
data in Figl/re 19 illustrates this point. The relationship between
final beta and initial beta of flLy samples of the RCA 2N3F.
transistor after exposure to a dose of 2 × 10 s rads appea _ :_.,, ._
completely random. This is in accord with the theory of _,,.. ":,_e
recombination in transistors (Ref. 12).
(2) The relationship between the damage factor and collector current
: nearly always falls spproximately on a straight Line on log-log
paper, a_ in Figure 20. The damage factor in the I to 10 micro-
ampere range is normally at least an order of ma_aitude larger
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Figure 20. Degradationof Fairchild 2N1711 Transistors vs Collector Current
at Gamma-RayDose of 5 x 104 Rads (Ref. 12)
than the value at one milliampere. This, again, is in accord with the
theory of surface recombination in transistors.
(3) Samples of the same transistor type from different manufacturers
are likely to show marked differences in behavior.
(4) Samples of the same transistor type, even when from the same manu-
facturer, but from different batches, are likely to show substantial
differences in behavior.
(5) Damage effects depend primarily on the total applied dose and may
be almost independent of dose rate. This _onclusion is based on data
from RCA tests of the same transistor types exposed at dose rates
: differing by three orders of magnitude (Ref. 31). However, a small "_
amount of annealing at room temperature .appears to result in some-
what less damage when transistors are e.x_osed at very low rates.* _'_
1
_.-
-_ . *In flight test data on the IMP-F spacecraft tends to support this observation although it is not
_ considered definitive because a sufficient dose level has not been accumulated. A Summaryof a
paper, "Results from the Radiation Damage Effects on MOSFETs Experiment on Explorer XXXIV
(IMP-F)", by John L. Wolfgang, Jr., Flight Data Systems Branch, Spacecraft Technology Division,
Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland, which contains these data is reprinted below.
SUMMARY
Metal Oxide Silicon Field Effect Transistors (MOSFETs) have been used extensively in the -"
main spacecraft encoding systems camIMPs D, E, F, and G. Three of these payloads (DiPs D, E,
and F) have amassed a cmabincd total of over 174 million device-honrs in orbit as of Jume 1, 1968.
In order to _._rrel-'-teHight radiation d"mage with laboratory studies and to verify oncoder shield-
ing, an engineering experiment was flown on IMP-F. This experiment moaitoes 8 gate threshold
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(6) Changes in collector-base leakage current (ICBO)as a function of
dose, often exhibit a more irregular pattern than for gain. Transis-
tors of the same type from the same manufacturer may differ by
several orders of magnitude change in leakage current (:, IcBo) x_ith
increasing dose. While most transistors show a general trend to-
wards higher ler_kage currents as the dose level is raised, a substan-
tial number, after an initial rapid rise, reach a peak and then show a
gradu_ decrease. It is thus more difficult to devise a rational pre-
diction for junction leakage effects under radiation. However, a for-
ttmate trend has been observed in testing from 1965 to 1968, namely
a reduction in the order of magnitude of ICBo increases. Whereas,
in 1964-65, ?: IcB o values of 10 -7 amps were not infrequently ob-
served in small devices (specified to operate at room temperature
at IcBo levels of less than 10-9 amps), similar devices tested in 1967
and 1968 have rarely experienced changes of more than 10 -8 amps.
This indicates that the manufacturers' efforts to improve collector-
base junction passivation for general reliability reasons have also,
fortuitously, sv)pressed the radiation-induced leakage phenomena.
d. The "Maverick" Problem. Although the great majority of transistor
samples tested have followed a log-normal distribution pattern with respect to
their ionization damage factor, there have been notable exceptions. Figures 21
and 22 show the results of two tests, each of which uncovered a case of one ex-
ceptionally radiation-sensitive transistor in a group. Similar tests by Peck and
co-workers (Ref. 9) also indicated that an occasional "maverick" of this kind
might be discovered in an otherwise normal group of transistors, all manufac-
tured and processed in essentially the same mauler.
To design all circuits to tolerate such abnormal sensitivity would penalize '
the design with respect to size, weight, power drain, and complexity. On the
other hand, the effect occurs sufficiently frequently that the possibility of such
an occurrence cannot be overlooked if high reliability, of the type required in a
5-year mission, is required.
t
| readings and 6 drain-to-source leakage readings. These measurements are performedon devices
distributed underthree shielding thicknesses 0.25 gm/cm2, 1.0 gm/cm2 and 2.0 gm/cm2.
After 60 orbits of IMP-F""9.5 x 101° electrons/cm 2 (energy > 0.55 Mev)dose has been re-
ceived by the 0.25 gin/era2 shielded devices. The gate threshold shih of the devices is lower
than the threshold shift of similar devices, at the same dose of 1.5 Mevelectrons in laboratory
studies, indicating possible minur annealing is occurringover the highly elliptical orbit in flight.
No measurable leakage'has been noted in the devices duringthe first 60 _bits.
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Figure 2]. Result of Cobalt-60 Comma Ray Yrradiationof Motorola-Type
2N2222A Transistors (Damagevs Collector Current) (Ref. 12)
Figure 22. Degradationof Motorola 2N3244 Transistor vs Cobalt-_0 Radiation Dose,
ShowingExample of "Maverick** Device (Ref. 12)
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The behavior of the "maverick" is so widely d&fferent from the norm that
the occurrence of such a degradation effect could be catastrophic to a spacecraft
mission. If degradation levels used in design are not to be. set at an unreasonably
high, and hence penalizing, level, the "mavericks" must somehow be eliminated.
Some degree of improvement may be obtained by selection of certain device
manufacturers, however, what is also needed is a relatively simple method that
v:ill identify the "mavericks" in a population, _o that statistical methods for
predicting transistor ;)erfof_aance can De used w_th confidence on the remaining
'kaormal" devices. Preliminary e.xperiments forming part of a joint BTL-RCA
program in 1964, (R¢:. 13), zhowed that gamma-irradiated transistors could be
restored to very nearly tbeit original beta by a heat-treatment process. When
these transistors were irradiated a second time, their behavior followed the same
general pattern observed during the first irradiation. A precedure of this kind
which represents, in effect, a preselection process whereby these unusually
sensitive devices could be. _dentified and eliminated, is described in Section IV.
e. Integrated Circuits and Germanium Devices. All the general considera-
tions discussed here have been found to apply both to transistor or diode elements
in integrated circuits as well as single or "discrete" transistors on individual
silicon chips. Comments concerning passivation apply, of course, only to silicon
devices, since grown oxide passivation is not used on germanium surfaces. The
other elements of integrated circuits (resistors, capacitors) are not likely to
contribute to radiation-induced degradation.
2. Metal Oxide Semiconductor (MOS) Devices
a. Physics of Radiation Damage. The principal effect of ionizing radiation*
on MOS devices is a shift in the drain-current vs. gate-voltage characteristic
along the voltage axis. The slope of this characteristic, which represents the
transeonductance of the device, is not significantly affected until the dose level
exceeds about l0 s rads. Therefore, the effect constitutes a change in the
operating region of the device rather than a true degradation in performance, as
shown in Figure 23. However, unless the circuit is designed to adapt to these
changes, the net result is a degradation of circuit performance that could be
catastrophic. Such a case would occur, for example, ff the threshold voltage of
a p-chaunel changed from -1 to -11 volts, but the circuit was designed so that a
-10 volt signal gate bias was used to command a fully "on" condition of the de-
vice. In a '_)"-channel enhancement-type MOS device, such as the MEM-2017F,
the gate voltage needed to turn on drain current (termed the threshold voltage,
i VT) usually becomes increasingly more negative with increasing dose (the shift
I
*Bulk damageeffects in MOSdevices exposed to neutroos fromthe RTG's will be insignificant at
the anticipated neutronfluence levels. See Figure I.
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Figure 23. Changes in Operating Region of MOS Device Caused by Ionizing Radiation
is termed A VT). This effect is also strongly dependent on the bias applied to
the gate during the irradiation process (termed irradiation bias, VI j. At high
values of negative Vz , the threshold voltage shift may be ten times the value at
zero Vz . However, at negative values of VI , there may be a minimum in the
VT-VS-V I curve in the region of -2 to -5 volts. This, of course, constitutes an
optimum biasing point for tolerance to radiation. The presently accepted model
of how the negative shifts in threshold voltage occurs is as follows- the incident
radiation creates electron-hole pairs in the gate-insulator film. The holes,
having low mobility in the oxide get trapped almost immediately while the elec-
trons shift under the action of an applied or built-in electric field. Many elec- i
trons recombine with a trapped hole; however, some of the electrons drift out of I
the oxide at the metal silicon-dioxide interface. This leaves behind a net trapped
positive hole charge in the insulator. This trapped positive hole charge produces t
. a negative image charge in the metal gate and the silicon. The negative image
t charge produced in the silicon implies a shift in the threshold voltage toward
more negative voltage.
Detailed discussions of the probable causes of the radiation-induced threshold
voltage shifts may be found in a number of recent articles on the subject (Refs. 14
t and 15). Unfortunately, the degree of charge-trapping capability (i.e., the effec-
tive radiation-sensitivity) of the oxide varies ver_ widely with the oxide growth
process used (Ref. 16). Therefore, although existing theory provides a satisfactory
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explanation for the observed behavior of irradiated MOS devices, the magnitude
of the shift in VT cannot be predicted _4th the same certainty as can be attained,
say, in predicting the degradation of silicon solar-cell performance under radia-
tion. Thus, for any particular device type (or other group prepared by the same
gate-oxide growth process) a radiation test is needed as the basis for predicting
how a particular device group will be affected by a given space environment.*
The broad variety of results observed in RCA AED tests of a range of commer-
cial devices is shown in Figure 24 (Ref. 17). RCA AED has studied this problem
intensively for several years. The present conclusion is that, x_i*h (orrect de-
vice selection and correct circuit design, even the existing commercial MOS
t lOG [ I I
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Figure24. Typical Rangeof ThresholdVoltageShiftsin MOSDevices
device can be used at the radiation levels expected in the NEW MOONS mission.
Such devices have, indeed, already been used on AED designed spacecraft under
similar radiation conditions (P,efs. 20 and 30). In addition, new types of gate in-
sulator are being developed which should largely remove the problems described
above.
b. MOS Tolerance Levels. Exposures of MOS devices to gamma radiation
have been made by investigators using the Cobalt-60 facility at the United States
*See footnote on pg. 63 concerning IMP-F experience
q.
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Signal Corps Fort Monmouth test site (Ref. 18) and the RCA Laboratories 1-MeV
Van de Graaff generator (Ref. 16). Simulation of space radiation by gamma rays
is justified on the basis that the predominant damage effect from electrons and
protons in the devices in question will result from ionization of the same nature
as that produced by gamma rays (Ref. 19).* The results of these tests have for
some time been in general use by spacecraft circuit designers. The results of
the gamma-ray tests lend themselves well to the radiation considerations present
in the NEW MOONS mission.
Of particular interest in this application is the fact, as described above, that
the shift in threshold voltage with radiation dose in MOS devices is strongly de-
pendent on the material forming the insulating layer, its thickness and its area.
Figure 25 shows the threshold voltage change as a function of dose for a particu-
larly susceptible MOS device taken from a sample of four devices exposed to
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• tFigure25. TypicalMOSTransistorWorst-CaseChangesin ThresholdVoltage
gamma radiation from a Cobalt-60 source. The dependence on the bias applied
to the gate during the irradiation process (VI) to the extent of the shift in thresh-
old voltage is also shown.
;_For bulk effects a neutronsource, such as a reactor, should be used.
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Thus, even if MOS devices used on the NEW MOONS spacecraft have this
high level of sensitivity to radiation, then the value of A VT, will be in the range
from about 2 to 8 volts, depending on the effective level of gate bias throughout
the mission.* This value assumes a dose level of about 3.6 × 104 fads, previ-
ously estimated as the worst-case combined ionization dose from space radiation
and the RTG's. Note that bulk damage in the fluence range of interest has no
effect at all on MOS device performance.
The possibility that threshold voltage shifts of such magnitude can cause the
malfunction of circuits using MOS devices will not depend on the allowances
made by circuit designers for this effect. This difficulty can often be avoided in
logic circuits by applying sufficteat drive voltage to the gates to accommodate
the anticipated change in threshold voltage. Simply providing an ':average loca-
tion" for the circuit (7 x 102 rads) would, it is seen, also reduce the radiation
problem to insignificant proportions. Precautionary measures of this kind will,
therefore, allow the use of presently available MOS devices on the spacecraft.
Moreover, recent research at AED has brought to light a number of MOS gate-
insulator materials which, as well as being highly practicable for use in high-
performance, mass-produced MOSFET's, are also very much less affected by
radiation (Refs. 20 and 21). The one most likely to be widely-used is pyrolytically-
deposited aluminum oxide, which exhibits _. VT shifts of less than 1 volt at 106 rads
of ionizing dose and V_ values of -10 volts. It is reasonable to assume then, that
the very useful attributes of MOS devices in logic and sensing circuits need not
be sacrificed because of the NEW MOONS radiation environment.
c. Devices for Special Circuitry: FET's vs. Bipolar Transistors. In some
spacecraft subsystems, such as the scientific measurement circuits, some solid-
state devices will be required to maintain their electrical parameters to very
close limits (e.g., less than 5 percent) or, at the least, to degrade at a predictable
rate. Tiros, some devices will have to be selected and individually screened for
low sensitivity and predictability. It is useful here to compare the problems of
MOSFET's and bipolar transistors.
I From the model of radiation-induced charge build-up in MOS structures
which was discussed above, it could be seen that the amount of charge build-up, " i
for any given fluence of radiation, will depend on the electric field in the oxide
and the type and distribution of traps in the oxide. The silicon-dioxide insulating
film, an amorphous material, is formed, in most cases, by thermal oxidation of
silicon in the 1000 to 1200°C range. Consequently, the type and distribution of i
traps in the oxide will depend on such parameters as
*It is expected that a cyclic bias sequence between two losic levels, say 0 and 10 volts, would
=
8ire a shift in V T of value iatetaediate between shifts produced by DC bias values of 0 and
10 volts.
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(1) Oxidation temperature,
(2) Oxidation atmosphere (steam or dry oxygen),
(3) Impurity content of the oxidation atmosphere, ,and
(4) Annealing treatments performed on the oxide after the oxidation has
been completed.
Consequently, a fairly large degree of variability between different oxides
with respect to their radiation sensitivity can be anticipated. Indeed, oxides
prepared under almost identical conditions have shown fairly large differences
in the amount of oxide charge introduced by radiation.
Since it has been found by AED (Ref. 31) that the variability in the charge
build-up process over a single wafer is usually small, a useful screening tech-
nique would be to irradiate several devices from every wafer from which dvvices
to be used on the spacecraft will be taken. On the other hand since the radiation-
induced oxide charge can be annealed thermally (300_C for 1 hour), it may well
be practical to use in flight the actual devices irradiated after they are restored
to initial performance by annealing.
As described in Paragraph B-1-A of this Section, the bipolar transistor
suffers from a "surface effect" in the passivating oxide layers which has features
similar to the MOS oxide effect but depends more heavily on surface recombina-
tion phenomena. In addition, the bipolar transistor can suffer degradation from
'_ulk damage." The surface oxide properties of the bipolar transistor are nor-
mally much less well-controlled than for the MOS transistor gate oxide. As a
result, the repeatability of radiation sensitivity of MOS devices from a given
MOSFET production line is much better than that for a given bipolar transistor
production line.
d. MOS vs. Bipolar 'rr_sistor: General-Purpose Circuitry. R is seen
above that where the bipolar transistor suffers several damage effects, the MOS
device suffers one; all of the effects in bipolar devices are prone to important
variations (Refs. 12 and 22), whereas the effect in the MOS device is the more
controllable at the present time. Thus, as an overall result_ the amount of engi-
neering analysis and test effort required to produce electronic circuits of uniform
• and predictable hardness is probably greater for the present generation of bipolar
transistors than for the present generation of MOSFETts. Bowever, the correc-
tive action required is different in each case. The choice of device win probably
be dictated mainly by the routine electrical requirements of the circuit trader-
going design (impedances, current demands, etc.), and the corrective action will
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be decided on grounds of ultimate effectiveness of the circuit, in terms of per-
formance versus weight and power, before, during and after the irm,diation re-
ceived in flight. Thus, both MOS and bipolar devices should be used, each in its
correct place, radiation simply being regarded as a stress for which allowance
is to be made. The complementary symmetry MOS (CMOS) flip-flop is particu-
larly attractive for use in hEW MOONS spacecraft subsystems. This circuit
element has one of the lowest standby power drains obtainable for electronic
memory elements.
Recent tests (Ref. 32) of complementary symmetry MOS (CMOS) devices in
a logic circuit configuration showed that these devices were still operable after
exposure to 2 × 107 rads. Not aU circuits will perform as well since survival
at dose levels of this magnitude depends L'trgely on how well the circuit can con-
tinue in operation in spite of the expected shifts in threshold voltage. With proper
care in circuit design, CMOS devices can, therefore, be used as memory elements
for the NEW MOONS spacecraft without danger of failure.
3. Junction FET's
The junction field-effect transistor (JFET) is a three-terminal device which
overlaps in some of its uses with the bipolar transistor and the MOSFET. The
"surface effect" in this device has been found, by test, to be small as compared
to these other devices, while the 'qaulk effect" is also negligible. Thus, although
the circuit applications of the JFET are somewhat limited, the device type can
be used effectively at high radi,_.tion levels, at which the other devices are near-
useless. However, in the NEW MOONS mission, such a situation is unlikely to
arise except in the following applications:
(1) Calibrated sensor circuits in which no change in device performance
can be tolerated without loss of sensor accuracy.
(2) Devices which must be mounted very near to the RTG.
(3) Devices with near-zero protection from the direct space environment.
(4) Actual values of the Jovian radiation environment turn out to be several
orders of magnitude greater than in the present model.
4. Effect of Radiation on Diodes
Devices of thi_ kind that depend on the properties of a single crystal, but
also have planar, passivated junctions, are subject to both bulk damage and
ionization damage effects from particle mad gamma photon irradiation. In the
!
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usual space environment, the ionization damage effect strongly predominates
over the bulk damage effect at the dose levels typical of several years' exposure
in a space environment. Ilowever, neutrons emitted by the RTG's will add sub-
stantially to the possibility of appreciable bulk-damage effects particularly in
wide base diodes.
The principal damage effects in these devices are limited to changes in
leM_age current and forward voltage drop. At the m_ximum dose levels listed
in Table 5 the worst-case change in leakage current is not expected to exceed
20 percent, and the change in forward voltage drop is not expected to exceed
30 percent. Likewise, zener diodes experience very little change in zener voltage
in the dose ranges of interest. Parameter changes of this magnitude will pre-
sumably have little effect assuming that allowances for changes such as these
have been made in the circuit design. These estimates are based on the results
of tests by RCA (Ref. 7) and BTL (Ref. 23). The RCA test program for diodes
was conducted much along the san_e line as ior transistors.
It may be concluded, therefore, as indicated in Figure 1, that diodes are, in
general, not significantly affected by radiation at dose levels that cause signifi-
cant degradation in most transistors.
5. Silicon-Controlled Switches
The range of devices termed silicon-controlled switches (SCS) can be re-
garded as a pair of back-to-back transistors, e.g., a p-n-p-n structure. At a
certain point in degradation of gain in these transistors, the SCS will fail to "fire"
or go into its low-conductance state. "£est_ (Ref. 7) of several types of these de-
vices under conditions equivalent to several times the NEW MOONS mission
radiation damage levels showed no noticeable change in their triggering charac-
teristics. However, newer devices could, paradoxicaUy, be more sensitive
either to surface effects or bulk damage. Thus, although serious effects are not
: expected, any SCS device type employed in the spacecraft should be included in
: the radiation test series.
6. Effect of Electronic Component Performance Variation or Degradation
On Subsystem Performance
In the previous paragraphs various mechanisms of component performance
• variations have been described, and indications were givmz of the types of varia-
tions or failures that can occur. In the text that follows, a description of a radia-
tion test of a complete sawtocth generator circuit is given to illustrate the effect
of radiation-induced component failure. The example given is that of an actual
tcst performed for the TOS Radiation Test Program (Ref. 7).
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a. Ceneral. Because of its importance in bo_h Adwmced Vidicon Camera
System (AVCS) and Automatic Picture Taking (A_?T) camera systems (Ref. 7), a
ci rcuit of this type (complete saw,tooth generator) was selected for irradiation
as :m operating assembly The AVCS camera u:_es tl-.is basic circuit in both
horizontal- and vertical-deflection generators, the APT camera only in the hori-
zontal-deflection generator.
Surviwd of this circuit for the duration of the TOS mission was in question
since it used several 2N930 transistors operating _qth collector currents in the
10-microamperc r_mge in high-imi)edancc circuits. Other tests have shown that
these trcatsistors are particularly susceptible to radiation damage effects at
these low currents. The two 2N930 transistors used in the differential amplifier
in the vertical-deflection generator were selected for ,an initial :: of 200.
The circuit assembly subjected to irradiation wa3 a flight-qualified vertical
sa_¢ooth generator circuit module of the same type as that included in the AVCS
camera system.
b_ Test Facilities and Pro_ce_dure. To operate the sawtooth generator during
the test in the normal manner, a suitable sync generator was needed to supply
input pulses at the specified rate of once every six seconds with a duration of
7.5 milliseconds. Speci,'d emphasis was placed on output pulse St'dbillty with re-
spect to both mnplitude and duration.
The sawtooth generator output was fed to a "Z"-type Tektronix differential
preamplifier to measure the positive and negative voltage s-ving of the. sawtooth
wave form. Voltage was applied to the generator through a clock-operated
switch that periodically turned tl_e power "on" and "off" to simulate the operating
conditions for the TOS satellite. "On" time during the test was approximately
2C percent.
The sweep generator was located in the Co6_ hot cell, but the voltage sup-
plies and synchronizing generator were located outside the hot cell in the control
room. Thus, they were not exposed to the gamma rays and could be checked
during and after the experiment.
The initial exposure to Co6° radiation was at a dose rate of 2080 rads/hour
for 49 hours. This rate was increased to 5800 x-ado/hour when a total dose of
I × l0 s rads was accumulated.
c. Summary of Test Results. At 4 × 104 lads, the outllut sawteoth lllnpli-
rude had decreased by 2 percent. At slightly over 10 s lads the .clr_u/t no longer
produced a usable sawtooth. As determined by post-lrrad/at/on measurements,
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failure was caused by one of the 2N930's in a low level differential amplifier.
Beta of this tr_msistor had dropped to 8 percent of its original value. A summary
oi post-irradiation test results is given in tabular form below. Experimental re-
sults are shox_ graphically in Figure 26.
_: -- .... 1 _ _ .....
J
2N930 I Initial .: Final ._: Initial ICB o Final ICB O
: (Amps) (_,mps)i
TransistorNo. 1 ! 200 170 10-9 2 x 10-9
i
[ Transistor No. 2 , 200 i 16.6 ;' 10 -9 10_6
......... - ---4
d. Discussion of Test Results. The results of earlier radiation tests of in-
dividual 2N930 transistors indicated that if these devices were used in the saw-
tooth generator circuit there was a strong possibility of circuit failure at low
radiation dose levels. While some of the individual tr,'msistors* exhibited a
re l.atively small loss of beta at l0 s rads, others retained less than one percent
of the original beta. This wide variation in susceptibility of these transistors to
radiation is well illustrated by the post-irradiation measurements of the 2N930
transistors in the sawtooth generator circuits.
As a consequence of this early failure of the sawtooth generator due to a
badly degraded 2N930, an effort was made to f'md possible substitutes. A radia-
tion testing effort to find a suitable substitute was initiated. From these rather
limited tests it was found that a 2N930 transistor produced by another m_nufac-
turer was a much better choice for this circuit. The relatively limited variation
of beta loss with radiation shown by tests of six samples was considered a major
advantage.
e. Conclusion. The above example is of a typical ultra-sensitive general-
purpose circuit which might be used in the NEW MOONS Mission. Clearly,
during mechanical layout of the vehicle, such a circuit would be specially con-
" . sidered for location, avoiding "most exposed" positions. Reference to Figures 12
._ and 16 show that by locating the circuit more than 24 inches from the RTG and in
{ a not-too-exposed location, effectively building up local shielding to the equiva-
t lent of 200 mils of aluminum in all directions, would reduce the radiation level
" to 5 x 103 rads and hence solve the radiation problem with a good margin of
safety (less than 0.02 volts sh ft in centering voltage).
*The individual 2N930transistors tested and the 2N930transisto, s used in the sawtooth generator
circuit were all madeby the same manufacturer.
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This case illustrates that, in the NEW MOONS mission, radiation problems
are real, but with early anticipation need not have a serious impact on design
freedom or ultimate desig_ efficiency.
7. Subsystem Performance Deterioration for the NEW MOONS Mission:
...................................
C0mP_rison with_State of the Art
The dose levels listed in Table 5 (Section I1) formed the basis for estimating
the cumulative effect that the combined space and RTG radiation environment
will have on sensitive Jupiter Probe electronic components and the resultant
degradation of subsystem performance. As in the case just described, in designing
the spacecraft subsystems, adequate allowances must be made for the anticipated
component degradation to keep subsystem performance from deteriorating below
tolerable levels. The radiation allowances must be combined with similar en-
vironmental specifications for other factors that can affect subsystem and device
performance, uuch as temperature variations and aging. These specifications
limit the choice of components available to the design engineer and impose con-
straints on the circuit design of spacecraft subsystems. If radiation damage
strongly predominates compared with other deteriorating effects, then special
measures may be needed to avoid failure. Such measures may include, for ex-
ample, the addition of protective shields around particularly sensitive components.
A detailed discussion of possible ways of protecting sensitive components is given
in Section IV.
The pote:uial magnitude of the difficulties to be encountered in the design of
radiation har.._ned subsystems for the spacecraft can be evaluated on a broad
general basis by comparing the estimated dose levels for the NEW MOONS mis-
sion with those previously calculated _or other missions. Table 7 compares the
worst-case dose levels (i.e., most exposed location and RTG's at 18, 36, and
78 inches) for the NEW MOONS mission with the dose levels previously estimated
for several of the TIROS missions under similar worst-case conditions.
: "i_c TIROS Operational Satellite (TOS) dose levels formed the basis for esti-
v
mates of component degradation which were then used in designing TIROS sub-
_: systems to accommodate the anticipated radiation-damage effects. Because of
the 1962 "Starfish" nuclear explosions in space, the radiation environment that
, formed the basis for the original TOS dose estimates was particularly severe.
" Special measures were taken to avoid failure including additional shielding for
the protec+.ion of circuits in the Camera Electronics subsystem which were found
to be unusually sensitive to radiation. The radiation environment in 1965 that
. was used as the basis for TIROS M dose estimates was much less severe because
of the decay in the number of high-energy elec+ _ns trapped in the Van Allen belt
at the time of the 1962 explosions.
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Table 7
Comparison of Worst-Case Radiation Dose Estimates
if- ..........I
] Mission ' Rads /_ DENI's ___
Jupiter Probe (5 years)
RTG separation 18" 3.65 1.04
RTG separation 36" 3.33 0.273
RTG separation 78" 3.25 0.075
TOS
6 months, 750 n.mi. 190.0 .83
1962 environment
TIROS hi and rros*
6 months, 775 n.mi. 10.0 .10
1965 environment
*Improved TIROS Operational Satellite
f,
Multiply each number in the column by 104
_'1_4___Multiply each number in the column by 1014
As Table 7 shows, the estimated ionizing dose that _qll affect the NEW
MOONS spacecraft components at a spaceeraft-RTG separation distance of
18 inches is approximately a factor of three less than the dose level used as the
basis for designing TIROS M subsystems and over fifty times less than the TOS
levels.
The anticipated bulk damage affecting the spacecraft components situated at
18 inches from an RTG is, however, substantially above the levels calculated for ,
i the TIROS components. This condition is largely due to the effect of neutrons " i
l emitted from the RTGts and, therefore, depends on the distance between the
: RTG's and components sensitive to bulk damage. Fortunately, relatively few i
components of this kind (namely transistors or thyristors with very wide base [widths) are normally included on a space-approved list of standard parts because; of the limited need for such items so that electronic subsystems with such
!.
78
1969021297-101
components c_m prob:fl)_', u_th caceful packaging, be located at distances from
the RTGts much greater than 18 inches. For a 36-inch separation, the bulk
damage is intermediate between the TOS _md ITOS levels, and for a 78-inch
,_eparation, slightly below. The 78-inch separation was used as the basis for the
_pacecr,_t design study of Task V.
Assuming that the radiation-sensitive component types used for the NEW
MOONS spacecraft _411 be generally similar to those included in the TOS series,
radiation-hardening subsystems to the required level as part of the NEW MOONS
design program will present about the same problems encountered _md solved
for TOS. At the 78-inch separation distance postulated in Task V, the data in
Table 7 indicates that the overall NEW MOOl_S radiation environment _11 proba-
bly be somewhat less severe than the TIROS M environment. However, the un-
certainties in estimating the Jupiter environment, in particular, are considerably
greater than the difference shown in Table 7. This indicates that the precautions
used in evaluating radiation-sensitive components for the NEW MOONS space-
craft should be given at least as much attention aL _ care as was done for TOS.
The absence of any subsystem failures traceable to radiation damage on an)" of
the satellites in the TOS series indicates that the measures taken to avoid such
failures have been effective.
It should especially be noted that, while a "radiation specification",* was
placed on every transistor used in the TOS/ITOS series, no serious design com-
promises resulted. Thus, unless allowances are to be made for contingencies
not dealt with here (unexpectedly large Jupiter belts or solar flares, or RTG
emissions; new "Starfish" bells about Earth), the application of a similar careful
routine device/material evaluation should produce the required hardness level.
C. DETECTOR SUBSYSTEI_
The scientific payload of the NEW bIOONS spacecraft will include detectors
designed to measure even the relatively low levels of particle radiation in inter-
planetary space. To satisfy this requirement the background count level from
RTG radiation at the detector locations should not exceed 10 counts per second
from the two RTG's. The measures proposed for meeting this requirement are
discussed in the Task IV report.
:' ° The radiation effects on the electronics supporting the sensor subsystem,
however, must be treated in the same manner as described for electronic sub-
_ systems and components, Paragraph B of this Section.
*See AppendixI11for typical specification.
_.
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D. MATERIALS
Particle radiation can cause significant changes i:l most bulk organic mate-
rials and in a limited number of bulk inorganic materials (prime examples are
glasses, pigments, insulators, and many highly crystalline materials). The im-
portance and magnitrde of the effect depend, respectively, on the allowable toler-
ances to change in the pr._perty of interest (e.g., coefficient of friction, elasticity,
light transmission, conductivity, etc.) and on the exact "mix" of the frequently
very complex mixtures used for a given purpose (e.g., ratio of phenyl to methyl
groups in a silicone elastomer). Thus, the only statements which c_'mbe made
here concern the critical classes of materials and critical applications expected
in the NEW MOONS mission.*
The materials which will be most affected by radiation are those directly
ex'posed to the space radiation or in direct contact with the RTG's. The material
properties which are usually most sensitive to radiation are (1) optical absorp-
tance or reflectance, (2) the properties determining material behavior such as
elasticity, friction, viscosity, etc., and (3) electrical insulation parameters.
In the anticipated NEW MOONS environment, therefore, the principal prob-
lems in this respect will involve the thermal control coatings and optical win-
dows. It is assumed that no organic insulating materials will be directly exposed
to space radiation, since these _<mld be adversely affected at the expected dose
levels at the spacecraft surface. However, a metal covering over the insulating
material as thin as 10 mils would provide adequate protection against the effects
of direct exposure. See Fig_re 27.
The interconnecting electrical cables from the RTG to the spacecraft, how-
ever, require special attention because of the high operating temperature of the
cables created by the proximity of the cables to the RTG. As shown in Figure 1
the estimated 5 year radiation dose level is sufficient to focus attention on elec-
trical insulating materials when exposed externally. Moreover, the coupling of
the high temperature environment with the radiation environment requires that
special attention be paid to organic insulators. A radiation hardening program
such as proposed in this Report will uncover this need very early in a spacecraft
program when a list of materials is furnished to the radiation specialist, see
Figure 28. At this point in the program the necessary steps to obtain suitable
materials, such as ceramic insulators or protective coatings, can be taken.
The properties of paint can also be significantly affected by ultraviolet radia- .
tion. However, paint formulations with improved resistance to UV have been
developed, and are generally used as thermal coatings on the outer surfaces of
near-Earth satellites with partial success. In interplanetary space, however,
*For a study on environmentaleffects on maeerialsand components for the Galactic Jupiter Probe
spacecraft see Reference 35.
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where the outer skin of the satellite will be exposecl over a long period of time
to a relatively iarge flux of low energy protons and also to UV, the combination
may produce unexpectedly large ch_'mges in the properties of thermal control
coatings. As noted later in the text, limited experimental efforts to determine
the nature and extent of such effects are currently in progress.
The radi'ltion l)roblem encountered in the surface region of spacecraft pro-
tective coatings is illustrated in Figure 27. A very large energy flux in the Van
Allen Belts and in the interplanetary medium, is concentrated in particles which
are very easily stopped (ranges from 0.1 to 100 micrometers). Each particle
may carry several thousands of electron volts of energy. This is all deposited
in a very thin skin area of the coating. Thus, the absorbed energy density in this
skin, i.e., the radiation dosc is very high. The additional photochemical effects
of UV radiation aggravate the problem. Unfortunately, the important reflective
and emissive processes of thermal control coatings take place in this damaged
skin region.
1. Effect of Radiation on Thermal-Control Surfaces
There are many different mechanisms by which radiation _fects thermal
coatings, as shown in Figure 27. As indicated previously, the principal source
of ionizing radiation at the surface of the spacecraft will be the low-energy pro-
tons from the solar wind.* These low-energy protons are particularly effective
in producing ionization in a thin surface skin, a few m2crometers thick, as shown
in the lower view of Figure 27. Changes in the proper'eies of this region can up-
set the thermal balance of the spacecraft. Doses in the first few micrometers
of the spacecraft surface may exceed 108 rads. At this dose level, the change
in reflectance would presumably be comparable to, or exceed, the effects listed
in Table 8 (Ref. 24).
The coatings applied for thermal control of the NEW MOONS spacecraft may
be different in composition from the types listed in Table 8. Thus, carefully i
combined environment tests, to determine the changes in properties of the par-
ticular formulations used would be in order, i
An in-orbit paint degradation test was performed for Lunar Orbiter V, with '
" interesting and pertinent results (Ref. 25). The objective of this test was to ob-
i tain temperature data on four thermal-control paint coupons to evaluate degra-dation characteristics as a function of time. The test consisted of orienting the
spacecraft on the sunline 1.5 hours prior to apolune, for a period of 2 hours to
=_ are relatively ineffective in producing ionizatioa damage. Ionizatioa damage is the
$N_ttons
principal cause of chnnges in the reflecting properties of paint. See Table 8.
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mtuximize the effect of solar radiation. The data points acquired at thermal
equilibrium with no hmar infrared energy" are shox_ in Table 9, Data from the
prime mission are included to establish the starting reference and show the
overall trend. Temperature correction was applied to account for solar constant
changes _md sp;lcecr,'tft heat sources.
During 122 days of exposure to the cislunar and ,unar environments, the
paint coupons degraded as follows: (see also Table 9)
(ST09)* S13G over B1056 final absorptance (:) -: 2.420 times initial ..
(ST15)* Hughes Organic final -. = 2.345 times initial _
(ST16)* Silicone or Aluminum final _ = 1.622 times initial -,
(ST17)* Z93 final _ = 1.481 times initial.,
There is growing evidence that solar UV radiation, if applied iD combination
with "soft" ionizing radiation, has a more strongly deleterious effect on thermal-
control surfaces than if these forms of irradiation are applied sequentially. Ef-
fects in vacuum are frequently _x)rse than effects in ,air. Since it is suspected
that the thermal control of both the Mariner ,and Lunar Orbiter vehicles was un-
expectedly poor due to radiation-induced degradation caused by the solar _4nd
and/or solar UV, this question should receive attention at all stages of NEW
MOONS spacecraft design, especially where coatings of low absorptivity/emis-
sivity ratio (i.e., white coatings) are involved. Such coatings are usually made
from metal oxide powders. In white pigments of this type, the general degrada-
tion of binder and backing adds to the more serious darkening (increase in solar
absorptance) of the pigment, due to the production of "color centers" and possibly
also due to the photo-chemical decomposition of the oxides.
Det,-_iled information regarding the changes in the properties of coated sur-
faces is only recently appearing in the literature. For e_ample, significant re-
suits were obtained through a 3-year program sponsored by the NASA Goddard
Space Flight Center (Ref. 26). A high-vacuum space-simulation facility was de-
veloped that allowed: (1) simultaneous exposure of large arrays of temperature-
controlled samples to electrons, protons, and ultraviolet radiation; and (2) high-
! resolution measurement "in situ" of total hemispherical sample reflectance and
| ultraviolet source irradiance. Twenty coating types (organic and inorganic paints
and specular surfaces) were tested. All sample types were exposed separatdy
to electrons or ultraviolet-rich electromagnetic radiation. Selected types were
*Chmcteristics of the paint samples used for this experimentale listed in Reference ZS.
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expos(.,I to both sequenced and simult_meously combined electron and ultraviolet
racli:ttion. ('oatings were evaluated on .'he basis of threshold and profile of dam-
age. I_lboratory high-rate exposure to simulate low-flux electron effects of
space w-,u wdidated. (;ener:llly, types resistant to degradation from altr_"violet
exposure were susceptible to electron-induced reflectance losses, and vice versa.
Combined exl)osures revealed nonadditive synergistic effects and dependence
upon the ordering of sequenced exposures. Current test practices for combined
eXl)OSuIes were quest!one(l, and the need for st:m(l:_r(liz:ltion examined.
These experiments contributed si_ific:mtly to the state of the art by
1. Identifying the thresholds :rod buildup of electron damage (50 key) in
m_y different types of thermal cwntrol coatings;
2. Verifying that no si6mific_mt differences in effects of 50-key electrons
exist in coatings :_t 295"K, for exposures from peak space rates to those
greatly accelerated rates used in the laboratory;
3. Establishing the vital need for "in situ" testing with low-energy electrons
on the basis of substantial reflectance degradation, and almost complete
in-air recovery;
4. Exploring the differences in damage effects resulting from either simul=
tancous or sequential exposure to given intensities of UV and low cncrgy
particle radiation.
5. Verifying preliminary data on the recovery of electron-induced retic0v-
tance l_ss by the subsequent cxposure to ultraviolet-rich electromagnetic
radiation;
!
6. Demonstrating significant differences in results obtained from different i
sequences of exposure to, as well as simultaneous exposure to, elec-, i
trons and ultraviolet radiation, i
The analytical techniques for determining radiation-dose profiles due to low-
energy particles in the mixed-pigment binder layers of thermal coatings are not
well-developed. The effects constitute a major potential problem, for which
i quantitative prediction methods or corrective techniques must be developed. .
However, for the NEW MOONS spacecraft, one alleviating factor must be
borne in mind: the vehicle recedes from the Sun during the mission and thus has
a reduced UV and solar-wlnd problem.
1
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2. Optical Window Materials
Optical :vmdows in all spacecr_t have the common criterion that they must
be highly transmitting i_. a certain wavelength r_mge or "spectral window." By
introducing new defects into the material, radiatiop, can frequently introduce ab-
sorption bands into this "x_4ndow". Such an effect is the strong 'q)rouning" of
common optical glasses ('2)ro_" or "flint" glasses based on silica) by develop-
ment of a "color center" absorption band in the blue and UV region of the spec-
trum. IR, visible, and UV photometry can be hindered by thi_ effect. Any glass-
vacuum envelopes (bulbs, TI tubes, photo ceils, etc.) must be studied for this
effect. Likewise, lenses, filters, solar-direction sensors, etc., can be strongly
affected. In some applications, the effects can be alleviated by use of sapphire
and fused silica, both of which are very little affected in the-dose range oi interest.
If such materials cannot be used as the refractive elements themselves, it may be
necessary to shield the element _4th optically-fro,rod slabs of the above materi-
als, acting as a clear "filter" on the optical axis. Such protective measures were
taken on TV camera lenses on early Nimbus and TOS satellite flights.
3. Organic Materials
Except where strongly exposed to space or RTG radiation, such as, perhaps,
the RTG-spacecraft intercormecting electrical cables, it is not expected that or-
ganic m_.mrials other than those used in optical applications (e.g., paint binder,
clear epoxy used as sensor covers, or light concentrators) will deteriorate ap-
preciably from radiation damage effects. Lubricants, sealants, potting com-
pounds, structural plastics, bearing surfaces, and hookup wire insulation nor-
mally withstand penetrating radiation doses in excess of 10 s rads in _,acuum
without gross degradation in their functions. Even glass-filled teflon bearings,
sometimes regarded as a special problem, should, at the 104 to 10s rad perform
normally unless severe demands on performance are made (e.g., 10,000 rpm
bearings, etc.).
p,-..ECEDING PAGE BL,'_'NI<.b}OT FILk_,ED.
SECTION IV
THE RADIATION HARDENING PROGRAM
A. GENERAL
As summarized in Section I, a well organized radiation hardening procedure
should be included as part of the normal NEW MOONS subsystem design ac-
• tivity to prevent out-of-tolerance spacecraft performance over the prescribed
mission period. It is important to take into account the predicted effects of
radiation damage even during the definition phase of the overall project so that
optimum tradeoffs can be made early in the program when special requirements,
such as the favorable location of radiation sensitive subsystems on the space-
craft, can readily be accommodated. It is thus imperative that a cooperative
effort involving both radiation specialists, systems, and subsystem design
engineers be instituted at the outset and continued throughout the program.
As outlined in the preceding section and illustrated by Table 7 the ra-
diation e _ironment estimated for the NEW MOONS mission, is approximately
of the saLm order of magnitude as that calculated for the TIROS M and ITOS
missions. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that many of the subsystem
types ultimately selected for use on the spacecraft will incorporate components
and materials similar to those used on TIROS. There is, therefore, adequate
reason to anticipate that radiation-hardening program, implemented early in
the spacecraft-definition phase, should yield a "hardened" spacecraft capable
of surviving the deleterious effects of the combined space-and-RTG radiation
environment without imposing major design constraints or even requiring any
weight penalties, being mainly concerned with very precise specification and
control of semiconductor and other material compositions and the design of
circuits with unusually high tolerance to drift in device parameters.
The two radiation hardening programs under consideration are essentially
the same during their initial phases but differ primarily in the methods used
• to predict the effect of the actual radiation environment on the radiation-sen-
sitive components included in the spacecraft. That phase of the two programs
common to both are detailed in part B of this section. The two different cora- l
. portent test methods used as the basis for predicting component behavior under
space radiation conditions are detailed in part C of this section.
b
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B. FIRST PHASE OF THE RADIATION-HARDENING PROGRAM
The proper time to initiate a radiation-hardening program, as shown in
Figure 28, is early in the design program as the following information becomes
available or can reasonably be forecast.
(1) Mission description
(2) Space radiation damage profiles
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J
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(3) RTG spectrum and spacecraft-separation distance
(-t) Prelimin:lry spacecraft lay_4t
(5) Subsystem performance specifications
(6) Preliminary circuit analysis
(7) Preliminary bill of materials
1. Radiation Environment Affecting the Spacecraft External Surface
With the spacecr_o.ft-RTG separation distance established, a total value for
combined spaze-and-RTG radiation can be estimated by summing the value
derived earlier for space radiation (Section I1) and the contribution of radiation
from the two RTG's, thereby arriving at a value for any subsystem location for
total ionizing dose (in rads) and total bulk damage (in DENI's). This is then an
estimate of the external radiation environment to which exterior thermal coatings
will be exposed.
2. Radiation Environment Affecting Components and Materials
Inside the Spacecraft
The next step is to calculate the internal spacecraft radiation environment.
Radiation damage profiles, as shown in Figures 12 and 13 (Section I1), show how
the anticipated dose from the total environment affecting a component will vary
as a function of thickness of a uniform spherical shell of aluminum surrounding
the component. Figure 2 (Section II) is a pictorial representation of this ideal
" case. The geometry of the shielding surrounding a component within an actual
spacecraft, however, being a function of the spacecraft structure and internal
packaging, is highly irregular. It is therefore necessary to perform a "Sector
Analysis" to determine the actual range of radiation levels to which components
at various locations within the spacecraft will be exposed.
_ A Sector Analysis requires knowledge of the spacecraft layout and physical i
_ characteristics. It is necessary to know the location of sensitive components,
- the thickness of intervening wails, and the kinds of materials used. A stepwise
; integration of the penetrating radiation over the full solid angle of 4_ steradians Jis then performed to determine the radiation dose. A practical method for ap-
i proximating this integration is to divide the total solid angle into small sectors
. over which the shield thickness can be considered uniform. The choice of the
number of sectors and the solid angle included in each is generally a matter
of judgement. Frequently, the major part of the radiation flux reaching a
!
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particular component enters through a relatively small solid angle. By dividing
this solid angle into five or six zones, the spectrmn of the fltLx penetrating each
zone can be determined with reasonable accuracy. To verify this procedure
consideration should be given to mapping a breadboard or prototype spacecraft
using appropriate detectors.
The availability of both a preliminary circuit analysis, through which a list
of critical components can be prepared and a preliminary materials list, so
critical materials can be identified, will permit evaluation of the damage levels
to which each component will be exposed through the working tools of the Sector
Analysis and the combined radiation-damage profiles ce. g., by way of the space-
craft l_-out, the proposed location of a component is known, then by using the
results of the Sector Analysis, the equivalent shielding afforded to a particular
component or material by the spacecraft structure and packaging can be de-
termined, and finally, once the equivalent shielding is -known, the combined
radiation-damage profiles, which show the relationship between the damage-
producing capability of incoming particles ,and the shielding effect of intervening
materials and structures, can be used to determine the flux to which a component
will be exposed).
With the anticipated flux for critical devices and materials estimated, the
next step in the radiation-hardening program is to radiation test both materials
and devices to determine the extent of degradation at the estimated dose levels.
, C. THE RADIATION TEST PROGRAM
I
I. Reasons forTesting
The need formaterialsand devicetestingto obtaindegradationresultshas
been discussed in Section III. Although there is a large quantity of radiation
test data available these data should be used only as a guide in the initial se-
lection of components and not as available design criterion. Due to rapid
changes in the processing art for semiconductor devices, it is important to
continually update test data and to evaluate newly developed devices. There
are various reasons for this point of view:
(1) The persistence of ase of a given solid-state device is very short, "
since new and improved devices are being made available at a rapid
!
rate. The fact that a new device has improved/electrical performance I
characteristics does not imply that its response to the effects of ir-
radiation have also improved. The contrary is actually possible.
92
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#(2) Manufacturers are continuously working at improving processing tech-
niques even in established, well-known electricai device types. A
change in processing can radically alter the radiation-effects character-
istics of a device, possibly for the worse, even though the nominal
electrical characteristics which determine its JAN "2N" classification
have not changed.
(3) Where established devices have undergone no change in manufacturing
techniques, there is still the condition, due to poor reproducibility
of semiconductor surface conditions and other device characteristics,
that devices can vary from batch to batch in radiation-sensivity. It is
also well known (Refs. 7, 8, and 12) that even devices out of the same
batch and with the same "day code" can vary.
(4) The same device type, manufactured by several different companies
can be distinctively different in response to irradiation. This difference
can be put to good advantage if the characteristics of that device type
are highly desirable; while test data on the device obtained from the
first manufacturer tried might indicate undesirable results, a broader
collection of test data covering other manufacturers could show from
which manufacturer an acceptable device can be obtained. Thus, in
planning a test program, a sampling of products from several manu-
facturers should be anticipated.
(5) There is a serious anomaly that is also a continual cause for concern:
Arising unheralded, except through test results, is the anomalous
degradation of a device that could be of any type number or any manu-
facturer. These "maverick" type of degradations occur for no well-
understood reason. The "maverick" device has been described in
Section III. The behavior of the "maverick" is so widely different
from the norm (in the direction of excessive sensitivity to radiation)
that the occurrence of such a degradation effect could be catastrophic
to a spacecraft subsystem. Statistically, "mavericks" occur suf-
ficiently frequently that the possibility of such an occurrence cannot
• be overlooked.
(6) Certain '_)ulk" materials, such as thermal coatings, optical windows,
, and some organics, where stability of properties is important, must
also be tested carefully for damage effects in the properties of interest,
for the following reason. The exact chemical mix of a commercial
material, will often vary from lot to lot and produce results similar
to those described in Items 1 through 5 above. Such batch variations
can have an important bearing on radiation hardness. Organic paints
and glasses are important examples of such materials.
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Other important advantages to be gained from a test program are discussed
in the paragraphs that follow where two alternate component test programs are
described.
2. Solid-State Device Testing Program Based on Worst-Case Data
Small statistical samplings of each device (10 for example) must be ex-
posed to an appropriate source of radiation in a manner to achi(:ve the dose
levels of interest within a reasonable time. As shown in Figure 29, the test
results, in the form of degradation predictions, are then submitted to the design
engineer. Based on worst-case data, the design engineer must decide if the
predicted degradation of the device is within acceptable limits. The order of
magnitude of damage to beta implied by a giv: F. 'alue of A1/# (explained in
Paragraph III-B) can be obtained by consulting /'able I::. If the predicted
degradation levels are acceptable, appropriate quantities of 'h_ same device
type from the same manufacturer can be purchased for suL._=..iuent circuit
integration.
If the predicted degradation results are not tolerable, it can be seen in
Figure 29 that there is an array of options available to the systems and sub-
systems design engineers. By way of example these options will be discussed
as they apply to radiation hardening for ionization damage of a sensor electronics
chain shown in Figure 30. These options are:
(1) Circuit redesign of the preamplifier.
(2) Circuit redesign of the sensor electronics chain.
(3) Relocation of the chain or a particularly sensitive part of the chain to
a zone more protected from space radiation.
(4) Increase separatiou distance between the chain and the RTG's or
provide shielding for the chain.
(5) Select "harder" component(s) for the chain circuits.
For the example noted, redesign of the preamplifier, option 1, can increase
the "hardness" by an ,_rder of magnitude above the hardness level before re-
design. Redesign of the electronics chain, option 2, to accept a preamplifier
_ gain of 1'/5 as compared to 300 can lead to an additional order of magnitude
, increase in hardness. If, however, the entire chain were relocated, option
3, from lightly shielded zone of the spacecraft, such as might be represented
by zone 3, to a zone which is very well protected by other components or sub-
= systems, such as fotmd in zone 5, then approximately two orders of magnitude
94
1:: I,. "...... II
1969021297-116
|
=,,
,.iJ u_ ,.J I t_,_ 'JJ
_c. Z -J l :R. _j. I- <{ u-
0o.
w'J_ 41)
-- di
<+,,-: °-zz :_i.n LLI-I
U <_ _ i,,j 0 <_ _ r" tJ U+o_ ggi .... cmo-.m ..,,.u- __uO -- I o
,,o_,'-:+,,,+++ '"°"..... _ +z +
+,/.l+r_l l.IJ w (I]'
IWI'_ < I__ I/)
.J r- Oo- 0 -" 0
wu" _ CQ
E
w- _<[ t.,,
®
n-i>+ ;z_ -,-
OD t,,,-
" _,,,<, o
I "I-< ¢_,-_ ., , o-w
+,z JI '°+-_ N "pZO dnP-m _,WO> I
o<g + ...... o.5:+'_I <z_. + '
- -.....I I ° I*,, _ O'rZ'__+<+ , O.i e_ 8r "-- . ,1t
0
I ot +
w_ _
L
95
.o
• w _ / -
.............. __L, _'jr ++ _._ :: -.'- .... -'_-;"-. +:.:+.:.
1969021297-117
96
IlII'I " li_'" _ .................. " _" ' " I l'I [ -- -- .... _L_I_ ...... _ _ -_ . '1 "I II .,, _ .... ; , i
• .is
1969021297-118
increase in radiation hardness would be achieved without may redesign of either
the I)re_unplifier or the remaining circuits of the electronics chain. "I',, (le-
tcrmine the value of option -t, increase separati,,n (iist_-mce and/,)r shielding
from the R_Gts, it is necessary to evaluate the shield weight needed or the
added weight accrued by lengthening the RTG b,,oms and then examine the
spacecr_t inertia properties resulting from cithcr of these mo(iificati(,ns. An
evaluation of these factors can then be compared with other available options
to judge its suitability.
The selection of "harder" components, option 5, gives the system and
, design engineers two choices: (1) select an _ternate device for testing in the
reasonable hope of achieving better results (possibly, existing test data or
• device design principles* can be used as a guide in selecting an alternate that
has been shown to be "harder") and use "worst case" predictions for that device
or (2) use a preselected form of the same device. This preselection technique
was described briefly in Section III-B and will be covered in greater detail in
Paragraph C-3 of this section.
The "worst-case" program would appear to offer more economy in
terms of program time and cost than the alternate preselection program de-
scribed later in this section. There are, however, three possible penalties
that may be incurred for the "worst-case" program that must be seriously
weighed against the advantage of testing economy: (1) There is the possibility
of a requirement for overde,._ign to assure reliability, which could mean the
use of redundant devices or expensive, extra-high-rated devices. Either ap-
proach infringes upon economy of another sort--there is added weight (con-
ceivably several pounds throughout all the circuitry), added power drain, and
added design time. Added design time could be significant since redesign of
one circuit can necessitate redesign of the subsequent circuits with which the
first circuit is coupled, as shown in Figure 30. (2) There is also the possi-
bility of having to accept reduced subsystem performance. (3) The third
possibility arises from the fact that since the statistical population of "maver4ck"
devices seems to average about 1 in a sampling of 100, the results of small
sample tests could miss this worst-case possibility•
3. Testing Program Based on Component PreselecUon
a. The Preselection Concept. The "preselecUon" test program is
predicated on testing the entire quantity of any device proposed for use, plus
a percentage of extras. Then, based on test results and design criteria, in the
• form of specified allowable degradation, the acceptable devices are retained
(those that degraded wit_n acceptable limits) and the unacceptable devices set
aside for other less critical uses. The samples that have been selected for
i
i
i *e.g., narrow_ base wldth leads m smaller deBr.-4mtionfrotabulk effects.
¢
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use can then, through an annealing process, usually be restored to their orig-
inal (pre-irr:ldiation) electrical characteristics, without unacceptable loss of
reliability. Any subsequent irradiation to the same dose levels, which would be
the case in flight, will cause the devices to degrade to the same extent as during
the test in the simulated environment (Refs. 9 and 12}• This gives the engineer
the :l(l(ied adwtntage of knowing in a(lvnnce, exactly what the degradation will be.
Before describing a suggested test program based on the techn:,que of
comlx)nent l)reselectioia, it seems useful at this time to discuss the basis for
the concept, as it applies to radiation-hardening.
Preliminary experiments, as part of the joint BTL and RCA ComSat Study
Program (Ref. 13) showed that gamma-irradiated transistors could be restored
to very nearly their original beta by a baking process. When these t2ansistors
were irradiated a second time, their behavior followed the same general pattern
observed during the first irradiation. A procedure of this kind obviously offered
the intriguing possibility of forming the basis for a preseleetion process whereby
transistors prone to degrade beyond acceptable levels could be identified and
eliminated• Life tests were conducted on annealed samples and the results
showed essentially no effects of the irradiate-anneal procedures (!_.ef. 13).
More expe_--iments to evaluate further the feasibility of an "irradiate-
,anneal" preseleetion technique of this kind were recently conducted (Ref. 12).
G,'oups of transistor samples of various type were exposed to gamma radiation
in the normal manner; they were then baked overnight at a constant temperature
of 250 ° C and were then subjected again to the same irradiation conditions.
It was found that the times and temperatures used during annealing were
not critical and could be varied over relatively wide limits without producing
major differences in the results. Temperatures were generally in the range
from 200 ° to 300°C time from 4 to 24 hours (Ref. 12). Figure 31 shows
typical beta versus dose curves obtained by repeated exposures of the same
transistor to gamma radiation with an annealing process in between. Both of !
the transistors shown are low-power silicon planar devices with gain-bandwidth
products of about 400 MHz. The 2N2222A is an NPN type and the 2N2907A is a
PNP. The occurrence of a "maverick" can be seen in View A of Figure 31.
For both transistors, the behavior of the test samples, including the maverick,
during successive Irradiatlens followed the same pattern with generally de-
" creased but with only minor deviations.
The variation of behavior within batches of transistors of the same type
is summarized in graphical form in Figure 32. Differences in the initial values
of beta at the beginning of successive e_,)osures are indicated on the left of each
view, differences In beta values after expoeure to 5 × 104 l-adll on the right of
each view. Each data point plotted alenll the horizontal axis, View A of
ii
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Figure 31. Ccmparisonof Beta Loss fromSuccessive Irradiations
with IntermediateAnnealing Step (Ref, 12)
Figure32, shows inpercent,the differencei,zbetavalueof a transistorsample ' !
mcasured duringsuccessiveexposure cycles. The groupingofthedatapoints Jinthesegraphs indicatethatmost ofthesamples foUowed theiroriginaldegra-
dationpatternalthougha few showed slightlygreatersusceptibilityo radiation
damage".
• ,:.
Severalothertransistortypeswere studiedinthe same manner including
i the 2N3244, 2N2979, 2N834 and the MD 1130 devices. The results of experi-
i ments with these transistors are presented in View B of Figure 32 in the same
, _orm as in View A. These data also show that the "irradiate-axmeal"procedure
I provides a reliable indication of the behavior to expected during a succee-Ungbe
irradiation.
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_, b. The Preselection Test Program. For the preselection test program,
shown in block diagram form in Figure 33, it Js necessary to test the entire
quantity of any device proposed for use plus a percentage of extras considered
necessary to achieve the required number of acceptable devices. The test
. results should then be reviewed in terms of the design engineer's criterLa,
i. e., percentage of allowable degradation. The devices are then sorted to
t select all of those that are within tolerance. These devices would be baked to
i restore their initial electrical characteristics and supplied to engineering for
i subsequent spacecraft integration. If tlds approach can be accomplished safely,
without incorporating reliability risks arising from the addRional handling of
the spacecraft-destine4 devices, it may offer a technique to deal with the
"maverick" problem.
There are two posslble test results other than an adequate yield of accept-
able devices. The first is that the yield might be less than the number of
!
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Figure33. Test ProgramBasedon PreselectionTechnique,LogicDiagram
devices required, thereby necessitating the radiating, testing, sorting, and
annealing of an appropriate number of devices to achieve the required total.
The second possibility is that the test results might be generally so poor, that
a substitute device must be tested. Although this last possibility indicates an
undesirable extension of cost and schedule, it is worth noting that if a similar
result occurs in the worst-case program, corrective action in terms of the
alternatives shown in Figure 29 could lead to a commensurate penalty in cost
and schedule with the additional undesirable situation where the design engineer
is still working with predictions as a final outcome instead of space-qualified
components. It is also worth noting that since the initial component selection
would most probably be based on existing test data, the component choice
would, of course, be that with the most desirable performance history, thereby
almost eliminating the number of tess that might result in an tmacceptable
device. This aspect of statistical probability offers further interest in that,
with wise initial component selection, the overriding probability is that a 100-
percent yield could be achieved the first time.
The preselection approach, then, claims the following significant advantages
ovex the worst-case approach:
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(1} ttigh reliability, in that the devices integrated into the spacecraft are
space qualified for radiation in the same sense as all other environ-
mental tests such as vacuum, humidity, etc.
(2) Potential weight savings in eliminating the need for redundant devices.
(3) Potential power savings in eliminating the need for redundancy or
highly de-rated devices.
(4) Reduced overall design time in obviating the need to cope with cumber-
some tradeoff techniques and/or circuit redesign in those areas where
degradation levels are predicted to be either marginal or below toler-
ance. Reduced design time accrues also by virtue of not having to
redesign those circuits that are coupled to the problematical circuit
in order to accommodate reduced performance.
!
i (5) Improved accuracy in circuit design since the design engineer can workwith specific degradation levels instead of performance predictions
where allowance would have to be made for variability.
4. Comparison of Worst-Case and Preselection Test Philosophies. The
worst-case approach offers a relatively quick and economic way of hardening
an existing spacecraft. Its main virtue is that spacecraft integration does not
have to await the performance of a somewhat lengthy screening program to ac-
quire needed devices, in addition, last-minute circuit substitutions of electri-
cally equivalent devices can be made (assuming that there are up-to-date
predictions on the substitute device} without the time penalty entailed by a
radiate-test-anneal cycle. However, there is always the possible reliability
risk of a maverick device being incorporated into a critical circuit and there is
_ still the batch-to-batch variation to be compensated for in circuit design. The
enonomy virtue dwindles somewhat in the light of the added possible burden to
;- design time in those cases where redesign of a circuit, and possibly other re-
lated circuits, is necessary to accommodate those devices where worst-case
levels are not acceptable, and suitable electrically equivalent devices are not
available. It appears that implementation of the worst-case test philosophy
would be appropriate if the expected dose levels are relatively low, e. g., if i
a deployable RTG is used, in which case the I/R 2 law works in favor of the
• damage levels to which the spacecraft electronics will be exposed, or if the
' environment model for Jupiter is lowered by virtue of new scientific findings.
"_ The preselection approach offers the option of high reliability. Although
'_m costs (schedule-money) would obviously be greater, these costs could be
tobviated by a reduction in design time in that the criterion established by the
103
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design engineer would be satisfied at the outset, relieving him of the problem
of excessive circuit redesign and coping with difficult alternatives. The reduced
weight and power are also important cost considerations. It appears that imple-
mentation of the preselection program would be most appropriate if anticipated
radiation doses are relatively high, as would be the case if a close-to-body
mounted RTG is used in the final spacecraft configuration, or if conservatism
in anticipated space and Jupiter environment is maintained or increased.
If the Sector Analysis when augmented by radiation mapping of the space-
craft indicates a fairly wide range of device problems, from minimal to critical,
then a third "hybrid" approach might be worthy of consideration as a compro-
mise between the disadvantage of the possible reliability risks and reduced
performance inherent in the worst-case approach and the dtsadvantage of greater
costs inherent in the preselection approack. It may be reasonable to "worst-
case" test those devices in protected locations or where performance deteriora-
tion is only semi-critical. In exposed areas and where failure might be cata-
strophic, preselection procedures could solve the reliability problem.
The predicted performance of a subsystem based on component character-
istics derived from radiation testing, while generally satisfactory, does not
exclude life testing of selected subsystems. These tests should be conducted
as soon as a prototype is available.
°
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SECTION V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON RADIATION
SUSCEPTIBILITY ANALYSIS
The use of a carefully planned and controlled radiation-hardening procedure
which is already implemented during the Definition Phase of the NEW MOONS
Spacecraft Program can ensure survival of the spacecraft over the postulated
5-year mission without excessive degradation from exposure to the combination
of space ,and RTG radiation. This can be done successfully even if the two RTG
: units are mounted within 18 inches of electronic subsystems that contain semi-
L conductor devices sensitive to radiation-damage effects. Results of the study
I contributing to these conclusions include the following:
(1) Neutron flux from the RTG's _ill be the principal source of bulk-
damage effects in semiconductors, particularly transistors. This
difficulty can be avoided to a large extent by using only those transistor
types having a relatively large gain-bandwidth product (fT > _ 50 MHz).
(2) Space and RTG radiation both conthbute significantly to the anticipated
ionization dose affecting sensitive components. The maximum antici-
pated dose is about a factor of five below the level used to estimate
damage effects in typical earth satellites such as the TIROS series.
(3) In calculating the ionization dose, a major difficulty is the uncertainty
involved in the estimates of the near-Jupiter radiation environment.
As indicated by item (2), however, an order of ntagnitude increase in
t
the Jupiter radiation flux could be accommodated without serious con-
sequences. The electron flux could, therefore, be an order of magnitude :'
larger since it predominates over the proton flux. Alternatively, about
the same effect would be produced by an increase in the Jupiter proton
flux by about three orders of magnitude. These estimates assume that
the energy distribution of the particles will not change significantly.
" However, if the spectra become harder, that is, having proportionately
more high energy particles, then the allowable increase in number will
• be reduced.
With a detailed semiconductor component list, component layout, and list of
bulk materials, it is possible to calculate subsystem degradation rapidly and
fairly accurately and thereafter to assess the extent of compovent testing
t
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necessary to provide the data needed to predict component degradation or
achieve component prcselection. However, the prediction of subsystems per-
formance based on component behavior does not exclude proof-of-principle
testing or life testing of selected subsystem.
To validate shielding estimates provided by the spacecraft structure and
intervening subsystems mapping internal dose patterns on a breadboard and/or
prototype spacecraft should be considered. This may be done for a selected
sector where a particularly sensitive subsystem is housed or on the entire
spacecraft.
The degradation predictions arising from the worst-case component test
program will provide much of the necessary data for a tradeoff study where
the effect of degradation situations can be balanced against the addition of
shielding, component or circuit alteration, reduction of mission demands, etc.
Preselected space-qualified components can be obtained through a pre-
selection program that employs a radiate-test-anneal cycle for most solid-
state devices.
It is recommended that the choice between the alternative component test
programs outlined here be predicated on the final spacecraft-RTG configuration
which will be necessary to establish the magnitude of the radiation effects
problem.
In general, however, while experience with similar radiation-hardening
programs suggest that, for the radiation levels anticipated, the impact of
radiation on overall spacecraft design will not be dominating, it should be
considered a '_new environment" subject to a careful consideration as a design
parameter, especially in subsystem layout, parameter drift considerations, :"
materials choice and fInally, test verification.
B. IMPACT OF R&DIATION EFFECTS ON "NEW MOONS"
PROGRAM TIME AND COST
1. General
The inclusion of radiation as a design parame ,¨ „ ina sophisticated, long- "
life spacecraft has, inevitably, some time and cost implications. Recent re-
( search and development makes it somewhat more simple than in the past to
assess these implications. Engineering a "hardened', spacecraft requires the
collaboration _,f engineers and physicists and good general dissemination of
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unfamiliar design concepts throughout a spacecraft design orgauization. Once
this basic understanding is present in ,an organization, the cost for a given degree
of "hardening" can be approached with a fair degree of accuracy.
_veral important functions of a Radiation-Hardening Activity are noted in
the following paragraphs with a very brief description of each activity and ap-
proximate man power required for the activities.
2. Mission Analys;:.s
[ Several m_m-months of a physicist will be required to assess the radiation
fluxes to be met in the mission and the penetration characteristics of these
fluxes in typical spacecraft materials.
Also needed is a determiuation of the estimated radiation flux from the
RTGts that will reach the detector subsystems to ensure that tolerable "noise"
levels will not be exceeded.
3. Spacecraft Sector Analysis
Information derived from spacecraft layouts and drawings showing the
location of individual subsystems as well as the internal construction of the
subsystems will form the basis for applying the "Sector Analysis" technique
to estimate the extent of the "natural" shielding surrounding radiation-sensitive
components at various locations throughout the spacecraft. If added shielding
seems necessary then the amount needed can be determined more accurately by
using X Ray techniques to measure the extent of the '_natural" shielding sur-
rounding a component. This effort will probably take several man-months and
will start early in the Definition Phase of the program and will continue as new
and more detailed information regarding the internal physical arrangement
of the spacecraft becomes available.
4. Component Damage Analysis
. Determining the effect of the anticipated environment on each spacecraft ]
component, particularly the semiconductor devices known to be sensitive to _
radiation, will constitute a critical part of the radiation hardening program. |
Information of this kind will form the basis for determining the measures that I
i must be taken as part of the subsystems design effort to maintain performance
within tolerable limits over the entire mission period. When bills of materials
and parts become available, an extended search for radiation test data on such
i parts will be needed followed by a test program (item 6) to fill gaps in existing
knowledge. Again, this effort will probably require several man months and
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and should start as ._oon as possible during _he Definition Phase of the progr:ml
when preliminary parts data becomes awlilabLe.
5. Circuit/System l)egradation
Design engineers nmst "add-on" to their existing design time a proportion
(say 5 percent) for :malyzing the impact of the above device/material degrada-
tions on their system. Start of this phase may be delayed by lag in step 4.
6. Component Test Program
The identification of critical parts and materials on which no adequate test
or prediction datam exists leads to an unavoidable testing effort to supply a
basis for prediction. A typical program, as performed by AED for the TIROS
project is shown in Figure 34. About 600 devices of over 160 different types
were tested to establish "worst-case" degradation levels under Van Allen
Belt radiation. In the present case, some neutron tests may also be required.
Thc program sho_a involved four engineers and physicists continuously for
3 months. The results and implications of such a test may be disseminated
I rapidly as obtained if the correct background analysis techniques and working
I relations is already set up between testing device, evaluation and design per-
sonnel, shortening time delays radically.
7. Screening Tests
If, as is advisable, each flight unit of certain critical devices is pre-tested
or "quahfied" under radiation before integration into the spacecraft, then such
tests must be scheduled into the device-procurement cycle. Allowing for the
need for recycling certain items because of poor yield or catastrophic failures,
the procurement cycle could be lengthened by well over a month. As a rule, the
device vendor cannot supply such a service .and the user must anticipate the need
for in-house testing and resultant added lead-time in procurement. Research
and development on the preselection technique to be used can, of course, remove
uncertainties as to the cycle time involved.
8. Final Corrective Action
As with step 5, the assurance of optimum tolerance to radiation in the final
desig_ requires the cooperation of design engineers and radiation physics per-
sonnel. An "add-on" to design engineers t time is thus required as well as
consulting time from radiation experts. "Preof-of-1_rinciple 'f overall test of
selected prototypes of a particularly sensitive sybsystems might be included
in this part of the program.
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9. Conclusions
A well-lfianned r:idiation analysis effort need not add _-eatly to the time re-
quired to bring a spaceer,'fft from concept to launch phase, ._inee the work involved
e:m be "dovetailed" x_ith the routine design process. However, the services of
"radiation effects" personnel grounded to some degree in radiation physics, test
procedures and desi_a engineering arc required. Several engineers will probably
be required to ,;hare the tasks described. Total labor involved could vary Crom
•5 to 15 m_m-years, depending on (a) severity of "internal" environment, (b)
number of types of components involved, and (e) degree of reliability required in
design.
i
C. DEVELOPMENT PItOGIIAM
1. Radiation-Sensitivity of New Solid-State Components
New solid-state components, new junction geometries, new semiconductors,
and new insulators will be considered for use. In particular, the incorporation
of new dielectric materials (silicon-on-sapphire substrates, ceramic isolation,
photodiode/phototr,_Lusistor optical links, silicon nitride encapsulation, etc.), is
likely to bring with it new radiation problems (e. g., trapped-charge buildup in
sapphire substrate leading to inversion layers in semiconductor). Thus, to
achieve the quick reaction time demanded in making device evaluations, a
steady radiation-testing activity, anticipating the radiation _usceptibility work
of NEW MOONS is recommended. In this way, a list of standard "space-
qualified" components can be kept up to dat¢ and problems caused by new effects
c_m be followed up by device-physlcs R and D work before the effect becomes a
"bottleneck" to efficient and timely spacecraft deb_gn. --
Device Preselection_e
The work on _creening techniques described has generated an understanding
of "maverick" and batch variability elfects in transistors and established feas-
ibility of the technique. However the general applicability of the technique to
•"ill sensitive but otherwise spaceworthy devices has yet to be studied while the
most economical and reliable method of applying the technique must still be
dctermlned.
o
3. Stable Exterior Coatings and Components
a. General Solar-Wind Pheaomenology. The _ery short stepping distances
,f interplanetary solar-wind particles makes the analysis of effects due to them
II0
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difficult. Further basic study on the interaction of these particles with surfaces
is required. Such questions as the i'elative amounts of atomic displacement,
sputtering, and ionization produced must be a-.lclrcsscd.
i:. Development of Stable External Materials. Materials directly exposed
t() low-cr_ergy trapped and solar particles have a special materials problem.
Stlh materials as organic binders for paints, paint pigments, insulators for
('at,:es, pottLng compounds for electrical harness etc., will receive surface
doses above 10s rads. The problem will be acute if white (low _-'e) coatings
are required. For example, color-center formation in white pigments by
protons and UV probably caused the changes of _ by a factor of 2 and corres-
ponding temperature rises in white paints observed during the 3-month missions
of Lunar Orbiter. Current technology has not produced good space-stable
coatings which will retain thermal, optical, and electrical properties under
such conditions. In addition, recent experiments indicate that the combined
effect of particle and ultraviolet radiation may be very much greater than the
effect produced when the two different types of radiation are applied in sequence.
Thus, further development of such materials is required and recommended for
long interplanetary missions.
4. Experimental Mapping of Shielding Afforded by Spaceclaft Structures
and Components
Statements on pages 24 and 94 ,and the material of Section IID indicate that
for magnetically-trapped electrons and protons of the type expected in NEW
MOONS mission environments, the role played by component box covers, device
encapsulations and neighboring structures in providing mutual protection for the
active solid-state components inside them is very significant. This being so,
variations in the layout of the electronic packages can have a strong impact on
the "hardness" of the overall system (see, for example, P.ef. 8, Figure 10). Thus,
it is important to examine several different layouts in order to determine the
optimum layout for °'hardne_s't in a given space situation. The mapping of radia-
tion doses in each component location, if done by individual manual calculation,
for many space situations would be extremely time-consuming.
: An experie_ental method can be devised which conserves time and effort.
Equipment mockups, in several layouts, could be constructed, a radiation detec-
tor placed inside various component boxes and a suitable radiation source placed4'
outside to simu!ate the space radiation. This preliminary '_napp/ng" of layouts
for mutual radiation protection could ultimately produce significant savings in
weight, by eliminating shielding which might otherwise have to be added to pro-
tect sensitive but under-protected electronic components.
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5. Computationof Shielding Effects
The exl)erimental mapping, described in the foregoing section, requires an
essential ,tccomp,'mying eapability. This is the capability to compute, rapidly
and accurately, the space radiation flux and doses which emerge after passing
through a slab shield of a given material and thickness (see Section 1I-6). New
computations are needed for ever$* change in spacecraft trajectory around Jupiter.
Thus, the process should be c¢ mlmterized. Only a limited range of programs is
at present available for thi_ purpose. Furthcrmore, as accurate prediction curves
for the degradation of key deviees are evolved, the dose and damage levels com-
puted above could be automatically converted into degradation levels for deviees
behind a given thickness of shielding. Such programs are not yet available for
internal electronic components. Finally, the fact that, in real life, shielding
around a component is non-uniform could be included in a computer program, by
making independent shielding calculations for several sectors of the 4_ solid
angle about a given component location. Such calculations would be particularly
important for critical components such as MOS transistors, and for d_te_mining
of the feasibility of certain close-flyby missions with respect to radiation degra-
dation of the spacecraft system as a whole.*
6. Other Recommendations
Radiation-hardened products are being pursued by D of D (Reference Article
in ELECTRONICS NEWS, Monday, Feb. 24, 1969 by Ron Williams, Dallas, entitled
Standing Up to Radiation). New study contract for radiation resistant products to
component and subsystem companies are being released. Companies include:
Texas Instrument, Motorola, Fairchild Semiconductor and Signetics. It would
seem appropriate to coordinate with the government agencies involved and their _
contractor to insure optimum use of relevant data for NEW MOONS missions.
t
*V. Danchenko,GoddardSpace Flight Center has previously indicated the importance of this re-
quirementin mission analysis.
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RADIATION ENVIRONMENT OF THE JUPITER FLYBY
FOR VARIOUS NE/_R-JUPITER TRAJECTORIES
The postulated space radiation environment for the Outer Planets Explorer
(OPE) mission is based upon data from various sources* and is tabulated in
Table I-1. The radiation environment produced by 4 RTG's used as the electrical
power source for the OPE spacecraft t is also included in Table I-1 and is given
in more detail in Table I-2.
A study was made of the change in accumulated dose as a function of the
near-Jupiter trajectory. The various trajectories considered relating distance
from Jupiter to time from closest approach are illustrated in Figure I-1. To
obtain flux curves for a specific near-Jupiter trajectory Figure I-1 is used in
conjunction with the curves in the NEW MOONS Report, Task HA. Figures I-2
O
and I-3 are examples of the proton flux for a trajectory of 7 Rj_ and 7.4 Rj^
respectively. Figures I-4, I-5 and i-6 are examples of the electron flux for
, trajectories of 7 RjA, 5 Rj^ and 3 Rj^ respectively. The area under these flux
curves (i.e., Figures 1-2 through I-6) represent a fluence/cm 2 for a specified
trajectory; hence by integrating and multiplying the result by two (the curve is
actually one half of the flux as it is symmetrical about the ordinate) the fluence/
cm 2 as a function of a specific trajectory is obtained. Considering the uncertain-
ties _f the Jupiter environment the results obtained indicate that the fluence is ._
relatively insensitive, wRhin an order of magnitude, to changes in the trajectories
considered.
• i
• *SeeRepc_t,GalactiCsectioa_]upiterll.Probe Phas A Relxzt , GSFCX-701-67-_ and the NEWMOONSTask IIA i
t SeeOPE X-701-(_-l_).
$ Rjt indicates a Radius ia Jupiteraltitudes.
DThe trajectoryof 7.4 RjA usedin the NEWMOONSReport.
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Table I-1
The Design Fluence for the Environmental Radiation
of the OPE Mission are as Follows:
Energy Particles/cm 2 Adjusted(MeV) Fluence $
Electrons >5.0 1.0 x 10 _0 1.0 x l0 11
Space Proton t >0.1 5.0 x 1013 5.0 x 10 TM "Environment*
>30.0 1.5 × 108 1.5 × 109
RTG
EnvironmentO Neutrons 2.5 Approx. 3.0 × 1011 3.0 x 1011
Gammas 2.5 AFprox. 4.0 x 1012 4.0 x 1012
Notes: *The radiation totals include the (1) Near-Earth, (2) Earth to Jupiter,
(3) Near-Jupiter environ_Jents.
t The proton estimate could vary as much as 2 to 3 orclers of magnitude.
The adjusted fluence for Space Environment includes a factor of safety
of 10.
f
eRTG Environment = 4 RTG For 8 Yrs. @ Approx. 1700 Watts each.
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52 .-_
TRAJECTORY: 4Rj = 3 RjA
TOTAL DOSE: 9.08 x 109iS(E - S MEV|
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FigureI-6. ElectronFlux v= Time foro Troiectoryof 3RjA (ClosestApproach)
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FUEl, DATA AND DERIVATION OF ISOFLUX MAPS
SECTION I
SUMMARY
This Appendix contains a compilation of the pertinent physical, chemical,
and nuclear properties of the selected radioisotopic fuel, PuO 2, and an evaluation
of the gamma and neutron radiation fields surrounding a planar RTG.
Most of the fuel property data are presented in tabular form. The effect of
O-18 depletion is discussed separately. The RTG radiation fields are presented
graphically in the form of gamma and neutron isoflux contours with respect to
three RTG power levels [50 watts(e),75 watts(e), and 100 watts(e)].
I
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SECTION II
INTRODUC TION
The overall objectives of this Task are the assessment of the susceptibility
of the model mission configurations to the nuclear radiation environment of an
onboard RTG and the evaluation of the possiblc modifications and radiation
hardening programs which may be required for a successful deep spac._ flight.
In support of these objectives, a study was performed with respect to _he PuO 2
fuel properties and the radiation fields surrounding a planar RTG.
A compilation of the physical, chemical, and nuclear properties of PuO 2 has
been made on the basis of the latest available experimental ant theoretical data.
The properties are presented in tabular and graphical form in Section HI.
Section IV contains a discussion of the relative biological hazards of PuO 2
microspheres and PuO 2 cermets. In addition, an evaldation is made of the feasi-
bility of O-18 depletion from PuO 2 and the associated reduction in neutron emis-
sion rates.
The R'rG gamma and neutron radiation fields are given in Section V. They
are presented graphically in the form of isoflux contour maps. A separate map
was constructed for each of the three selected RTG power levels, i.e. 50 watt(e),
75 watt(e), and 100 w_t(e). The effect of O-18 depletion is discussed in conjunc-
tion with the isoflux data. A description of the nuclear fuel data and the method
of analysis is also included in Section V.
Conclusions and recommendations with respect to PtK)_ cermets, O-18 de-
pletion, and the accuracy of the RTG radiation field analysis are presented in
Section VI. Section VII contains a list of references cited in this report.
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SECTION HI
PERTINENT PROPERTIES OF SE,_ECTED
STATE-OF-THE-ART RTG FUEL
A. PHYSICAL CIIARACTERISTICS OF Pu-238 OXIDE MICROSPHERES
1. Composition (Ref. 1)
a. Oxygen
_12 wt % (calculated)
b. Plutonium
Depends on age of fuel (see Figure II-1)
c. Uranium
Depends on age of fuel (see Figure H-l)
2. Specific Power (80%Pu-238 isotope purity; theoretical
Pu23SOz'density) (Ref. 1)
a. 0.40w/g
b. 12.13Ci/gm
3. Power Density(bulkpower density) (Ref.1)
2.6 ± 0.1w/ec
i
4. Mechanical Properties (Ref. 2) ||
a. Hardness of Sintered Pu2390_ |
• "_1163kg/mm 2 l
b. Crush strength of 1_ 2_s02 Mloro_lmres
; - 3kZ/_here
s. ThennoplvslealProport/es
I
a. Density of Ind/vldaal M/crospheres (Ref. 3)
Theoretical 11.46 gm/cc
Production grade 8.9 - 10.1 gm/cc
II-5
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b. Linear Thermal Expansion Coefficient for
1)u2agO2 Microspheres (see Figure H-2) (Ref. 4)
c. Bulk Density
>6.2 gm/cc (varies inversely x_4thparticle density and
inversely with void volume between particles)
d. Heat Capacity (Ref. 5)
16.4 cal mole -1 °K-I at 25°C for pu23902 microspheres
e. Enthalpy (Ref. 5)
O
H 298 - H0 = 2600 cal/mole for Pu 2a9 0 2 microspheres
f. Temperature of Phase Transformation (Ref. 6)
Melting point for Pu2aao2 microspheres is 2240 ± 30°C
g. Absolute Entropy
19.7 cal °K-l mole-1 at 298°K (Ref. 3)
h. Entropy of Formation
ASF29s = -416 cal OK"1 mole -1 (Ref. 3)
- i. Latent Heats of Phase Transformation
AHf. s for P112390 2 -- 15.2 kcal/mole (11ef. 7)
t
AHvap for I>1123902 = 133.8 kcal/mole (Ref. 4)
j. Vapor Pressure for pu2agO 2 (Ref. 4)
$ log P (atm)= A - (B/T), where A = 8.072,
B = 29240, and T.is the temperature in °K
_ - k. Thermal Conductivity for Pressed and Slatered Pu 23902 (Ref. 8)
Figure H-3 gives thermal conductivity values as
calculated from experimentally determined thermal
• dtffusivity of pressed and sintered Pu 2a902. The
temperature correction of the PuO 2 density is based
on the reported coefficients of linear thermal expansion.
The specific heat of PuO 2 is assumed to be the same as
UO2
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1. Thermal Diffusivity for Pressed and Sintered pu23902 (Ref. 8)
The thermal diffasivity values of Pu2a902 reported in
Figure H-4 h:'ve an accuracy of i5%
m. Viscosity of Pu 239 0 2 (Ref. 1)
32 Centipoise (+25%) at melting point (calculated)
n. Sttrface T_asion of pu23902 (Ref. 1)
525 dynes/cm (+15_)
o. Crystallography: Pu 238 0 2 (Ref. 6)
FCC structltre (Ref. 6)
Space greup Fm3m
Lattice constant 5.400 A °
Ionic radius 0.90 A °
6. Electrical Properties (Ref. 3)
Electrical Resistivit_ of Pu 23902
800 ohm-cm at 1250°K
4 × 1012 ohm-cm at 298°K by extrapolation
B. CHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF Pu-238 OXIDE MICROSPHERES
1. Heat of Formation of Pu-239 Oxide (Ref. 9)
-252.9 kcal/mole at 25°C
-253.3 kcal/mole at 1200°C
2. Free Energy of Formation of Pu-239 Oxide (ReL 9)
-240.4 kcal/mole at 25°C
-192.3 kcal/mole at 1200°c
Free energy of formation can be calculated from empirical
equation
AGf° = (-253480 - 3.45T log T + 52.58T) cal/mole
II-10
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Figure !1-4. Thermal Diffusivity of Two Densities of pu2390 2
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Table II-1
Standard Free Energy Change for PuO 2 -- Metal Reactions
Between 1000 L and 2000OK (Ref. 10)
&F for
Temperature Temperature Range -
Metal Range, °K Reaction Listed, kcal
Ni 1000-1728 Ni + 2PuO 2 4 NiO + Pu20 3 +hA, +57
Mo 1000-2000 Mo + 4PuO 2 _ 2PU203 + MoO 2 +96, +149
Fe 1000-1812 Fe + 2PuO 2 _ Pu20 3 + FeO +49, +39
W 1000-2000 W + 4PuO 2 _ 2PU20 3 + WO 2 +98, +80
Cr 1000-2000 2Or + 6PuO 2 -_ 3Pu203 + Cr203 +81, +58
Nb 1000-2000 2Nb + 101:_uO 2 -_ 5PU20 3 + Nb20 s +134, +90
Ta 1000-2000 2Ta + 10PuO 2 _ 5Pu20 3 + Ta20 $ +100, +56
Ti 1000-1933 2Ti + 6PuO 2 -_ 3Pu20 3 + Ti203 -7, -28
1000-1900 2Ti + Pu20 3 -_ 2Pu + Ti203 +34, +37
Zr 1000-2000 Zr + 4PuO 2 -* 2Pu20 3 + ZrO 2 -23, -34
1000-1900 3Zr + 2Pu203 -_ 3ZrO 2 + 4Pu +4, +28
Be 1000-1556 Be + 2PuO 2 -_ Pu203 + BeO -23, -27
1000-1556 3Be + Pu203 -_ 2Pu + 3BeO -33, -23
Th 1000-2000 Th + 4PuO 2 -" ThO 2 + 2Pu20 3 -53, -63
1000-1900 3Th + 2Pu203 _ 4Pu + 3ThO 2 -88, -58 {
3. Compatibility with Materials of Containment*
_ Results to date show pu23SO 2 microspheres to be compatible with all
materials tested on a short term basis. Free energy change values for
reactions between PuO 2 and metals can be used as an aid in selection
_ of potential encapsulation material,
.!-
*S. _. Paprocki, et al., t_TheChemical ReactivitT of PuO2with Reactor Materials", BMI-1580,1964.
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Table II-2
Dissolution of Microspheres in Distilled Water and Sea Water (Ref. 12)
Number Total Sample
of Surface Area Type Rate of Release*
Particles (mm 2) " Water Temperature _ug day- 1 mm-2 )
446 34.81 Florida sea Ambient 1.02 x 10-8
water
515 43.58 Florida sea Ambient 1.23 x 10 -8
water
628 54.69 Florida sea Ambient 1.00 × 10 -8
water
917 82.69 Distilled Ambient 1.52 × 10 -8
water
518 46.32 Distilled Ambient 1.27 x 10-8
water
885 76.79 Distilled Ambient 1.49 x 10 -8
water
*Rate of release based on 22 months exposure; test is continuing.
f
C. NUCLEAR PROPERTIES OF Pu-238 OXIDE MICROSPHERES
WITH NATURAL)-18 CONTENT (Ref. 11)
1. Radiation
• Type Energy (Mev) (particles w" Isec" t)
Alpha 1 5.495 "_8.04 x 101 z
. 2" 5.452 "3.12 × 10 I1
3 5.353 1.45 x 109
4 5.204 5.59 x 107
5 5.004 7.82 x 104
H-13
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Type Energy (Mev) (particles w- lsec" 1)
Beta Stable
Gamma 1 0.810 _2.24 × l0 s
2 0.776 _'5.59 x 10s
3 0.203 4.47 x 104
4 0.1531 1.12 x 107
5 0.0998 1.01 x 108
6 0.00435 4.25 x 108
7 0.017
8 6.45 (due to Pu-238)
9 6.95 (due to Pu-239)
10 2.61 (due to T1-208)
11 Other low energy gamma
rays due to impurities
Bremsstrahlung Negligible
i
Neutrons: Neutron emission primarily due to (a, n) reactions
with oxygen-18. Best available average value is
2 x 104 ,{ sec" 1 gin-1 Pu-238 (see Figure H-5 and
Table ]1-3) :
l
.!
!
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Figure !!-5. Neutron Energy Spectrum for PuO 2 Micmspheres With Normal Oxygen-18 Content
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Table II-3
Data Plotted in Figure II-5
En (Mev) Neutron Intensity En (Mev) Neutron Intensity
0.48 9.1 3.12 7.8 •
0.59 6.8 3.42 5.6
0.80 6.5 3.72 3.9
0.99 4.5 4.00 2.4
1.34 4.5 4.28 1.3
1.66 6.5 4.82 0.62
1.96 9.7 5.3 0.43
2.24 10.0 5.8 0.30
2.48 11.4 6.3 0.22
2.51 12.1 7.4 0.16
2.78 10.6 8.3 0.096
2.81 9.9 9.1 0.062
3.03 8.7 10.0 0.044 |
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SECTION IV
FUEL FORM MODIFICATIONS
A. CERMETS
The current status of Pu-238 fuel forms is an area of major concern to the
NEW MOONS Program. Presently, only the PuO 2 microsphere form is available
for use. This fuel has a number of unacceptable characteristics _ith regard to
safety. It has been shown that if released at high altitudes, the microspheres
will break up into inhalable size particles which could result in unacceptably
high lung burdens. Particle degradation ,also occurs if the fuel is impacted or
stepped upon. If released at ground level, the fuel can be suspended and carried
by winds creating an inhalation hazard and a highly contaminated do_qnd foot-
print pattern. A number of alternate fuel forms have been postulated which pre-
vent the generation of inhalable particles and subsequent atmospheric transport.
One promising fuel is a matrix consisting of PuO 2 microspheres and either
a high melting point metal or a ceramic. The Battelle Memorial Institute, under
contract with the AEC, is presently engaged in the preliminary investigation of
such cermet or ceramic fuels. Matrix materials, such as molybdenum and mag-
nesia, are being considered. Little information has been reported on the status
of this development work so that nothing can be said as to when these improved
fuels will be made available. If successfully developed in time to be factored "
into the NEW MOONS Program, such itlels would provide an additional safety
backup of some significance.
: B. DEPLETED OXYGEN FUEL FORM
Plutonium-238 dioxide (PuO2) decays by alpha emission. Neutrons are gen-
t" erated by spontaneous fission and by Cot,n) reactions between the emitted alpha !
_: particles and the oxygen atoms. ]
The neutron emission rate for PuO 2, made with naturally occurring oxygen,
can be as high as six times that of high purity Pu-238 metal for equal quantities
of Pu-238 (Ref. 11). Examination of the emission spectra of aqueous solutions of
• poloalum-210 (llef. 13) have indicated that oxygen-18 is the major source of Ca , n)
neutrons with 1>o-210 alphas. Polonium-Z10 experimental results are applicable
to Pu-238 since the a energies are very similar C5,3 Mev and 5.5 Mev, respec-
tively). The cross-section for the Ca, n) reaction with O-18 meeds the cross-
section (a, n) reactions with all other materials except beryllium. Further
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examination of (., n) cross-sections has revealed that the cross-section of O-17
is less than ten t). '.'cent of the cross-section for O-18. Therefore, most of the
neutron emission from PuO 2 appears to result from the ( :, n) reaction with ()-1_.
Base(! on the ;;bore, it appears that a subst:mtial reduction in neutron emis-
sion is possible if a major portion of the O-18 isotope were del)leted from the
oxygen used to produce the PuO 2.
One effective method of l)reparing oxygen dep!eted in O-17 and O-lt4 is
thermal diffusion of oxygen gas. The required apparatus is simple, :rod separa-
tion factors are large. Since O--16 is initially :tt a high concentration, there are
no initial tr_msport problems trod more coml)lex distillation methods to g_tin
capacity at the feed end of the system are not necessary.
Mount .Laboratory used a simple thermal diffusion column system to prepare
oxygen deplsted in O-17 ,-rod O-18 (Ref. 11). Two e.'q)eriments were performed.
Oxygen was depleted to _m intermediate composition in the first experime_ and
a portion of the resultant material further depleted in the second experiment.
Using a portion of the first experiment product, analysis utilizing a mass
spectrometer indicatc_! a decrease in O-18 content from 0.204 percent to 0.01 per-
cent. Carbon dioxide (CO2) manufactured with the depleted ox_ gen was separately
analyzed to deter:nine the mass 46 content (12 C 160 lso)" This measurement indi-
cated ar. O-18 content of 0.015 percent and was felt to be more accurate than the
direct measurement technique.
Another portion of the first experimentts product was depicted further in
O-18 in a .;econd experiment. Carbon dioxide samples, prepared with this pro-
duct, indicated less than 0.005 percent O-18 content. Natienal Bureau of Stand-
ards measurements indicated that O-18 content had been reduced to 0.0016 ±
0.0005 percent.
An estimate indicated that the G-17 content had been reduced Iron, a natural
abundance of 0.039 percent to 0.0033 percent, t
Oxygen samples were prepared with various amounts of 0-18 content ranging
from essentially no 0-18 to the natural abundance of 0-18.
i
t Metal buttons of 80 percent Pu-238 were measured for specific neutron
emission rate. The buttons were converted to plutonium hydride and immediately
exposed to five oxygen samples. When the reaction was completed, each of the
samples was encapsulated and the quantity of Pu-238 in each sample was deter-
mined by calorimetry.
i
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The oxide samples were counted individually using a recently calibrated
detector. _m results of the sample are presented in Table II-4 and Figlare II-6.
Note that oxide samples prepared xdth negligible amounts of O-18 showed very
little increase in specific neutron count over the original metal. The specific
neutron count of samples containing O-18 indicated an approximately linear in-
crease in neutron emission with increasing O-18 content.
The experiments performed indicated that a substantial portion of the neutron
emission of PuO 2 is due to the (_, n) reaction of plutonium alphas with O-18.
PuO 2 prepared _4th O-18 depleted oxygen had a neutron emission rate about one
sixth of that from natural oxygen fuel form.
The availability of O-18 depleted PuO 2 is dependent only on the availability
of O-18 depleted oxygen. There are several feasible methods for depleting oxy-
gen in the O-18 isotope, including the previously described method used by
Mound. The increase in cost due to producing the fuel form would be small when
compared to the total fuel cost. The physical, chemical, and mechanical proper-
ties of the fuel form should remain essentially unchanged. The decrease in neu-
tron emission will yield an equivalent decrease in neutron dose rate.
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SECTION V
RTG RADIATION FIELD MAPPING
A. RADIATION ISOFLUX DATA
The radiation analysis was performed for three planar RTG power levels:
50, 75, _md 100 watts(e). The results, in the form of gamma ant! neutron isofluxes,
are presented for each power level graphically in Figures II-7 through II-12. A
• phantom outline of a planar RTG is included ._neach figure for orientation. The
magnitudes associated with each contour have the units of particle flux, as indi-
cated in Figures TT-7through II-12.
The isoflux contours can be uscd to evaluate the total gamma and neutron
particle fluxes at any point in the vicinity of an RTG. If the point in question
happens to lie between a pair of contour lines, interpolation can be used to esti-
mate the magnitude of the flux.
The same isoflux contours are applicable to multiple RTG configurations.
The total gamma or neutron fluxes at a selected point can be obtained by super-
position. The procedure is to determine the relative positions of the point in
question with respect to the RTGs. In effect, the same point will have several
sets of coordinates, one for each RTG. Every coordinate set yields a flux mag-
nitude on the isoflux map, and the summation of all the magnitudes represents
thc total flux at the point due to all the RTGs in the system. Figure II-13 gives
an example of the method for a two-RTG system.
A noticeable feature of the gamma isoflux lines is the characteristic contour
indentation in the "aorizontal" plane of the RTG. This reflects the self-absorption
effects of the PuO 2 fuel. The overall spatial distribution of the PuO_ fuel among
the spherical capsules auproximates a planar configuration. The amount of self-
absorption is greatest when viewing the fuel plane tun edge", hence the indented
contours. The neutron isoflux lines are not indented since the self-absorption of
neutrons within the fuel is not significant. In fact, the neutron calculations dids
not include any neutron absorptions within the fuel or any of the RTG materials.
Consequently, the shape of the neutron isoflux contours is determined by the
geometry of the fuel distribution.
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Figure 11-7. Neutron Isoflux Contours for a 50 watt(e) RTG
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Figure 11-9. Neutron Isoflux Contours for a 75 watt(e) RTG
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Figure li-10. GammaI=oflux Contours for a 75 watt(e) RTG
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Figure 11-13. Applicotion of Izoflux Mops to Multiple RTG Ca_flgurotions
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B. EFI:E('TS ()F OXYGI':N-18 I)EPLETION
It has been estimated (Ref. 1.1) that about 90 percent of all the neutrons
emitted by PuO 2 originate in (,, n) reactions involving the oxygen a'4d s _me light
element impurities. If the plutonium is eOml)OUn(led with naturally occurring
oxygen, the resulting dioxi(le _ill contain several oxygen isotopes. Of these,
oxygen-18 is the princil)al contributor to (-,, n) reactions. Experimental mcas-
ur(,meats (Ref. 11) have shown that the total neutron emission rate wtries linearly
with the oxygen-18 content in PuO2, an(I so it is possible to establish a simple
. relationship between the two variables. This can be (lone with a _,iml)le multil)li-
cative const,-mt that can be used directly in conjunction with the neutron isoflux
maps.
An approximate relationship between the neutron emission rate _md the con-
tent of oxygen-18 can be written in the form:
N(x) kx + c
where
x : percent content of oxygen-18
N(x) :: PuO 2 neutron emission rate with x percent of oxygen-18
k, c = empirical constants based on the best available upper (natural O-18
content in PuO2) and lower (Pu-238 mc_al) neutron emission rates.
The best available value of the neutron emission rate for PuO 2 with natural
oxygen (0.201 percent O-18) is 2 x 104 neutrons/sec-gm Pu-238 (Ref. 1). The
corresponding lowest value is about 3.7 x 10 a neutrons/sec-gm Pu-238. With
this information, it is possible to define an emission reduction factor in the form:
• N(x) kx _"e
: : (4.07x + 0.185)
R(x) = N(0.201) 2 x I04
• To find the neutron emission rate for PuO 2 with x percent of oxygest-18, it
is only necessary to multiply 2 x 104 neutrons/sec-gm Pu-238 by the reduction
factor R(x). Since the neutron flux mas_mdes arc proportional to the PuO 2
neutron errdsslen rate, then it follows that the same reduction factor can be ap-
plied to the isoflux maps. Any neutron flux magnitude obtained directly from the
Isoflux rasps represents a maximum value. The effect of oxygen-IS depletion
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can be assessed easily by using the reduction factor R(x) for a selected oxygen-
18 content. In brief, we have
oNeUtron flux from _ / Neutron flux from
PuO 2 with x percent ! = R(x) _PuO 2 with natural J
xTgen-18 / \ content of oxygen-18/ .
C. NUCLEAR FUEL DATA
The calculated RTG radiation fields are based on the PuO 2 gamma and neu-
tron emission rates listed in Table H-5. The gamma emission spectrum repre-
sents a synthesis of data from References 14 and 15. Reference 15 contains a
fively resolved l>uO2 gamma spectrum below 1 Mev. However, it does not have
quantitative data above 1 Mev. High energy data were taken from Reference 14
and combined with those of Reference 15 to form a composite PuO 2 gamma
spectrum.
As indicated in Reference 14, the gamma emission rates at higher energies
(1 to 3 Mev) vary significantly with time. In order to be conservative, the spec-
trum with the highest emission rates (corresponding to five year old PuO2) was
selected
The PuO2 microsphere neutron emission rate listed in Table II-5 represents
the product of the '_0est-value" of the specific neutron emission rate (2 × 104
neutrons/sec-gm Pu-238, Ref. 15) and the specific power (0.4 w/gin PuO 2, Ref. 15).
The emission rate is based on PuO 2 with the natural oxygen-18 content (0.20 per-
cent).
D. METHOD OF. ANALYSIS
The RTG radiation fields were obtained with the ISOQAD shielding code. A
: multizone nuclear mockup of the planar RTG was generated separately for each •
power level [50 watts(e), 75 watts(e), and 100 watts(e)]. The nuclear mockup,
l together with other nuclear and geometric RTG data, was used as ISOQAD pro-
I gram input information. The programts output consisted of gamma and neutronfluxes as a function of distance and orientation with respect to the RTG. A
graphical technique was used to reduce the output data to a set of gamma and
neutron isoflux contours for each RTG power level.
Figure H-14 shows the zones used in the nuclear meckup of each RTG. Due
to the relative thinness of the RTG components and the absence of hydrogenous
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Table II-5
Gamma and Neutron Emission Rates For PuO_ Microspheres
GAMMAS
Energy (Mev) Emission Rate (_//watt-sec)
0.0435 4.25 x 10 s
0.0998 1.01 × 108
0.1531 1.12 x 107
0.203 4.47 x 10 4
0.776 5.59 x l0 s
0.810 2.24 x 10s
1.5 2.475 x 104
2.5 3.0 x l0 s
4.0 3.25 x I02
6.0 5.5 x 10 x
NEUTRONS
.... !
Energy (Mev) Emission Rate* (n/w_,_tt-sec) i
0-12 5 x 104 ]
i
• *Based on a specific emission rate of 2 × I04 n/sec-gm Pu-258 and a specific powerof 0.4 I
• watts/gin PuO2
i materials, it was possible to negiect neutron attenuation within the RTG. Conse-
" quently, the zones were selected on the basis of distinct material regions perU-
nent to gamma ray attemmtton. To avoid unreasonably long computation times,
approximations were introduced in some of the zone descriptions. For example,
the thermoelectrics were represeuted as a single zone. Instead of having a
separate zone for each thermoelement, the entire thermoelectric assembly (i.e.,
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thermoelcments, hot shoes, cold shoes, hot straps, etc.) was described by a
single equivalent material. The equivalent material is a result of a mixing
process performed by ISOQAD. The program is supplied _ith a volume fraction
for each element within the volumetric confines of the thermoelectric assembly.
It uses them to "reconstitute" a single material with equivalent radiation attenua-
tion properties.
A similar smearing process was applied to the PuO 2 fuel capsules. As
shown in Figuv "[-14 three fuel zones were defined. The 19 capsule configura-
tion was appr-.. : ..._ed by a central capsule, an intermediate ring of six capsules,
° and an outer ril._g of t_:e!ve capsules. The cross sections of the capsule wall and
the PuO 2 fuel are rect_mgular. A circular cross section of the spherical capsule,
when revolved about the RTG axis of symmetry, would generate toroidal surfaces.
Toroidal geometry cannot be described with the current version of the ISOQAD
program.
Figure II-15 illustrates the distribution of detector points with respect to a
planar RTG. The gamma and neutron fluxes were calculated with ISOQAD at each
detector point. The trausition from the radiation fluxes at each detector point to
isoflux contours was acb:_eved by a cross plotting technique. A graphical plot of
flux versus distance -yas done along each line of detectors (see Figure H-16). A
typical plot is shown in Figure H-16 for gamma radiation along a 40 ° detector
line. Selection of a particular flux magnitude, say 104 photons/em 2-see, yields
a distance, as indicated in Figure II-16. The same flux magnitude generates
other distances with respect to flux versus distance plots for 0°, 10°, 20 °, 30 °, etc.
In effect, a unique distance is associated with each angle for a given flux magni-
tude. This information, when plotted in polar coordinates, is transformed into an
isoflux contour, as shown in Figure 11-17.
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Figure |1-15. Detector Distribution With Respect to the Planar RTG
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Figure 11-17. Method of Construction of the isoflux Contours
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SECTION Vl
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. EFFECT OF OXYGEN-18 DEPLETION ON NEUTRON SHIELD WEIGHT
As discussed in Section IV-B, total O-18 depletion should produce about a
sixfold reduction .in the PuO 2 neutron emission rate. For a given neutron shield
. configuration, the O-18 depletion cm_ be translated into a decrease in shield
thickness. The neutron shield thickness curves presented in "Task IV Weight
l_hnimization," HIT-301, can be utilized for that purpose. For example, suppose
the ratio of the shielded to bare neutron D:.x at a selected location with respect
to a planar RTG is 5 x 10-3 . Then, acc,;_-dng to l_igure 3.6 of "Task IV Weight
Minimization," HIT-301, 37.4 cm of lithium hydride are required. Total O-18
depletion would reduce the bare neutron flux by artful. • ,:-ctor of six, so that the
ratio of shielded to bare neutron flux would increase to 30 x 10- 3 Reference to
Figure 3.6 shows that the lithium hydride thickness would by reduced to 26.5 cm.
On a weight per unit area basis, the neutron shield weight reduction would amount
to about 0.13 lb/in 2.
: In practice, however, according to the best available data for pu23802 and
Pu-238 metal, the actual neutron emission reduction by total O-18 depletion in
large batch quantities is only about threefold. Thus, the shield weight savings in
the above example would be somewhat less than 0.13 lb/in 2.
B. SAFETY ASPECTS OF PuO 2 CERMETS
Intensifieddevelopment work Inthe area ofimproved Pu-238 fuelforms is
recommended. The use of a chemically and thermally stable, non-degradable
fuel form in the NEW MOONS generator would provide a safety backup which
would significantly simplify the safety assessment and virtually assure a safe
system under all conceivable accident situations.
C. ACCURACY OF PLANAR RTG RADIATION FIELD DATA
The accuracy of the radiation isoflux contours presented in this report is
subject to analytic approximations inherent in the ISOQAD shielding code, and to
some degree, because of fuel data variation from one "fuel batch" to the next.
The isoflux data are useful in establishing preliminary radiation intensities and
radiation shielding estimates. This is especially true when evaluating the possible .
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two-RTG configurations with respect to the spacecraft, as discussed in Sec-
tion V-A.
Precise information on the shielding requirements, in view of the extremely
low permissible radiation flux levels at the sensors, can be obtained only with
experimental measurements and more rigorous analytic methods with respect to
an RTG-spacecr_,2t flight unit. A proposed experimental program is outlined in
"Task IV Test Program to Verify RTG Shielding Requirements," HIT-291. More
accurate analytic tools, such as the Monte Carlo Transport code SOBER, can be
applied to an RTG-spacecraft system. The code would permit an evaluation of
additional radiation considerations, such as scattered radiation, secondary radia-
tion emission, and precise spectral data with respect to gammas and neutrons.
i
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APPENDIX IH
TYPICAL DESIGN CRITERIA
ON
PREDICTED DEGRADATION FOR SEMI CONDUCTORS
UNDER SPACE RADIATION :
J
1p
i
111-1
i
i [] UIIm_gmL
1969021297-191
.PRECED;._:'- "" . E BLAF,I_( NOT F1L/V.D'9,.
TYPICAL RADIATION SPECIFICATION FOR TIROS M MISSION
(Taken From: RCA-Astro ElectronicsDivision,Drawing No. 1960811 Rev. 3)
i
LocationWith Most
Assumc<l Average Exposed
Manu- Tr&usistor Operating Initial Exposure Location
facturer* Type Ic (MA.) Beta Final IcBo Final I cBo
Beta iChange Beta Change
2N718A NPNS 0.5 30 25 i 0.1/_A 20 0.21_A
70 48 I 32
100 61 37
5.0 40 36 31
80 66 51
120 .92 65
2N722 PNPS 0.5 20 16 0.2PA- 13 0.5_A
40 25 19
60 32 23
r ,,
5.0 30 25 22
60 43 34
90 57 41
2N869A PNPS 0,5 30 27 0.2/_A 25 0.5_A
55 46 39
85 65 52
5.0 40 38 36
80 73 67
120 105 93
2N916 N1)NS 0.5 35 28 0.1_A 23 0.2/_A ,_
70 48 34 -_
150 76 46
5.0 50 45 i 40
! 67• 100 82 l
140 I 1002O0 |
, TIRO6 M Mlssio_ 6 Months, 750 n.__i, 82 ° Orbit
Doses For Most Expose(t Iocation: 1 x 10 s Rads: 1 x 1013 DENI
Dose For Location With Average Exposure: 2 x 104 Rads: 5 x 1012 DENI
• lMm_cnm_s _ dele,_l
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